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Abstract
My study is about opportunities for revolutionary developments in urban transport. Often, we
think of transport and urban development as an evolutionary process, yet there exist a few
opportunities for cities to revolutionize their transport system within a short timeframe of only 10
years. Prime examples for such opportunities are mega events. Based on my hypothesis that mega
event owners exercise a decisive influence on urban and transport planning through the
requirements they impose on cities, the challenge inherent to leveraging the mega event
opportunity is the alignment of transport provisions for staging a world-class event with the
metropolitan vision by using the mega event as a tool for desirable change.
In my study I examine the dynamics of the urban-change process in the run-up to mega events by
analyzing the potential clash between the event owner's requirements and the development of
transport strategies pursued by four cities, which have hosted the largest mega event of all - the
Summer Olympic Games. The Olympic cities in my research are Barcelona (1992), Atlanta
(1996), Sydney (2000), and Athens (2004). I comparatively analyze the extent to which each city
did or did not align the planning of preparations for the mega event with the metropolitan
strategies for long-term urban and transport development. Through field observations, document
analysis, and interviews, I identify the influences the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
brings to the transport planning process of metropolises, analyze the Olympic impacts, and finally
propose a causal model linking IOC influences and urban transport outcomes.
I find that the influence of IOC produces a similar pattern of urban and transport change. I explain
further why and under what conditions the event requirements can function as catalysts for
transport investments, integration of transport systems, upgrades of institutional coordination, and
management capacities. If planned effectively, event transport strategies can bring significant
long-term enhancement in regional mobility.
Existing theories of urban development do not fully capture the interdependencies among factors
operating before, during and after mega events. My research suggests that the IOC is a powerful
agent in local urban and transport plannning that guides cities towards similar urban change in the
run-up to the Olympics. To leverage mega event opportunities for transport, I provide policy
recommendations on the alignment of event transport requirements and metropolitan strategy.
Given the high investment costs and associated risks, city governments should catalyze their
endeavors for improved metropolitan transport through the city's bid that can ultimately enhance
metropolitan transport for users on a daily basis.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske
Title: Peter deFlorez Professor of Regional Political Economy, MIT
Readers: Arnold Howitt, Executive Director, Ash Institute for Democratic Governance
and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School
Christopher Zegras, MIT, Assistant Professor
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Extraordinary global forces bring tremendous opportunities to metropolitan
regions. As one of these phenomena, mega events' and their effects on metropolises
deserve appraisal and examination as momentous opportunities to realize ambitious urban
and regional goals. Two political power players, the "event owner"2 and the city
government, determine the outcome of this urban-change process - each seeking to
implement its own agenda. The dynamics of the change process lie at the center of my
study, which is guided by the following hypothesis: mega event owners exercise a
decisive influence on urban and transport planning through the requirements they impose
on metropolitan regions. My findings show that this influence can significantly alter pre-
existing city plans, usually leading to a recurring pattern of transport change in hosting
cities, and frequently creating-but also squandering-valuable opportunities for the host
city in preparation for the event. Unless the city takes proactive steps early on in its
planning for the mega event, to make sure that the transportation decision-making does
not serve only the event's short-term needs, then city planners will not get the
transformation and long-term benefits they had hoped for. Yet it is those hoped-for
benefits that are the typical rationale for cities to bid for the event in the first place, and
that persuade people to support the idea of the mega event.
Problem statement
Essentially, two sets of actors - the event owner and city government- 3 use the
occasion of the mega event as a powerful tool to achieve their objectives. Even though
both share the goal to make the mega event a success, the groups with regard to whom
this success is defined are inherently different for the two players. Their reputation, the
economic position of sponsors and, in terms of transport, the well-being of the athletes (in
1 A definition of "mega events" in the transport context is developed later in this chapter.
2 An "event owner" is the overseeing and ruling body of the mega event, such as the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) for the Olympic Games.
3 The focus of my study lies on the interaction between the event owner and the host city government. A
potential third party, the private developer, can only act upon the decision of withdrawal or agreement by
the city government and hence is here of secondary importance. Throughout this study, however, I will
refer to the third party's influence, especially in my second case study, on Atlanta in 1996.
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the case of the Olympics) is the prime focus for the event owners, whereas the citizens
are the center of attention for city governments. The differing interests of these groups
create a potential clash between the long-term perspective of the development goals the
city is striving to accomplish, and the short-term needs of the event--the requirements the
particular event imposes, through the event owner, on the city. The outcome ultimately
evolves out of this clash of two forces.
This clash is evidenced by new stadiums and their use. Many Olympic researchers
have found that there is a clear need for these stadiums during the event, but they are a
lasting burden for the city afterwards due to their high maintenance costs and underuse.
So far, Olympic researchers have paid little attention to the transport sector, even though
the potential clash between the short-term needs and the possibilities for the city's future
development seems far greater than for single stadiums. For the mega event, demands for
the short-term transport peaks have to be met; investment in transport systems is likewise
of high importance, since it can clearly benefit the city in the long run by increasing
mobility and accessibility both to and within the region.
From the short-term perspective, the transport demands placed on the city by the
event and the event owner are in the foreground. During the mega event, the transport
system has to cope with the increased demand from visitors, deal with special needs of
the participants, and provide reliable and continuous service for the residents. Event
owners scrutinize transport preparations for the predicted peak flows across the city. The
smooth operation of transport is crucial to the event's success and the city's reputation in
the world.
From the long-term perspective, the planning for the mega event and the transport
measures cities undertake to accommodate the additional passenger demand become part
of what determines the city's future development. Hence, the city's motivation is to
maximize its benefit from these measures. New highways, metro lines, or transport
management systems ideally bring about the desired urban development through the
investments necessary for the Olympics.
As interest in hosting mega events grows, along with their impact on the city and
the need to plan for sustainable transport, it becomes ever more urgent for cities to
understand the variables and factors that can make possible a transport strategy for such
events that both meets peak event demands and achieves a city's developmental goals.
Theory and hypothesis generation
A power struggle between global and local forces is the theoretical foundation on
which I build this study. The globalizing force embodied by the mega event owner, and
the local force represented by the hosting city's government, compete on a global-local
stage in the run-up to a mega event. In analyzing this setting, my goal is to theorize a
global to local connection when a set of mega event requirements interacts with what the
city has been planning to do on its own before the mega event.
Explanation of hypothesis
I hypothesize that mega event owners exercise a decisive influence on urban and
transport planning through the requirements they impose on cities.
The mega event owner is a powerful global agent that has power in a local setting,
because it forces cities to compete in order to be designated as the host place. Therefore,
the agenda and requirements of the mega-event owner are essentially forced upon the city
and can powerfully influence its development. The ways in which the individual cities try
to stage the event so as to satisfy these requirements essentially make the cities adopt a
specific set of transportation improvements. My hypothesis expresses the idea that in this
struggle between the global and the local, the global in the form of the event owners
frequently gains the upper hand, because they inherit the power to award the event (in the
bidding stage) and retain the power to withdraw the event from the host at any time.
Research questions
To take advantage of the opportunities mega events bring to cities, the key
question for planners to answer is how cities can align the necessary transport provisions
for staging a world-class event with their metropolitan vision, and hence use the mega
event as a driver towards desirable change. To develop practical guidelines, however, a
deeply rooted theoretical problem needs to be explored. According to Essex and Chalkley
(2005, p. 7), mega events are complicated projects that "do not fit any planning model."
If they do not fit any model, what role then do mega events play in urban development?
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The model, which I develop, describes a pattern of change that cities are likely to
undergo when staging a mega event. I provide in the conclusions the practical
recommendations I draw from the model.
Research aim and contribution
My research aim is to formulate recommendations for planners on how best to
leverage the opportunities mega events bring to the transport and urban development
process.
My theoretical contribution is a model of urban change, showing the effects mega
events have on cities that can aid policy makers in understanding how to use mega events
efficiently as catalysts for metropolitan transport development. Change can be
represented through a model leading from cause (mega-event influences) to effect
(metropolitan outcomes) based on an analysis of the metropolitan planning and
implementation process before, during, and after mega events.
My practical contribution is transport planning and policy recommendations for
cities on how to manage temporary peak passenger demands while planning for urban
transport benefits. The goal of this research is to aid decision-makers in planning a mega
event not as an interrupting occurrence but rather as an opportunity, enabling
discontinuous transport improvement.
Methodology and constraints
I examine one type of mega event: the Summer Olympic Games. Scholars in
general agree that the Olympic Games always deserve to be grouped into the category of
mega events (Getz 1999; McDonnell et al. 1999). Furthermore, among all mega events
the Olympic Games are the most studied phenomenon. Furthermore, I constrain my
analysis to four Olympics -- Barcelona (1992), Atlanta (1996), Sydney (2000), and
Athens (2004) -- which I comparatively analyze as case studies.4
My measure of alignment (between the requirements and the metropolitan
strategy) is the extent to which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) through the
4 For a detailed explanation of the selection of my case studies, refer to Chapter 3.
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Olympic Games makes the city deviate from its original5 plans. Any deviation from the
original city plans provides evidence for the decisive influence of mega event owners on
urban plans. I acknowledge that there might be other influences that change the original
city plans in the run-up to the Olympics. This possibility, however, is highly unlikely due
to the host-city contract6 and the time pressure the city faces in complying with
requirements during the seven-year preparation period. Measuring change (and deviation)
stretches from building new infrastructure, to implementing policies, to altering travel
behavior across private, public, and active transport.
Findings
I found my hypothesis to be true in all of the cases, however, the degree to which
Olympic requirements made the cities deviate from their original master plan varies
greatly. I attribute this degree of deviation to two factors. One, over time the mega event
owner became more knowledgeable about handling Olympic passenger travel learning
from previous hosts' mistakes and successes, and hence imposed additional and more
stringent requirements on cities. Second, the more the IOC doubted that the city was able
to handle the Olympic transport demands, the more pressure it exercised on the cities to
comply with their requirements and desires. Mega-event owners are indeed agents of
change in urban settings. In exploring mega events and their impact on urban change, I
believe there are four important results brought to light through my research.
First, the validity of the hypothesis implies that mega events are more than mere
catalysts for urban development - in contrast to the claims of previous researchers
(Chalkley and Essex 1999; Essex and Chalkley 2005; Gold and Gold 2007b). In their
view, mega events provide only catalytic stimuli that speed up construction and other
projects that had been planned before the Olympics came into the picture. In contrast, I
show that, because of the requirements the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and
other mega-event owners impose on cities, the period during which a mega event is
prepared introduces a powerful vision on the local level and elevates the mega-event
5 Master plans developed before the city was awarded the right to stage the Games.
6 The host-city contract is an agreement signed with the IOC by the city hosting the Olympics, in which the
city agrees to implement all modifications in the manner stated in the bid file. Changes to this agreement
are difficult to implement and only possible with the consent of the IOC.
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owners to formidable agents of urban change. Hence, I believe such event owners should
occupy a place in the urban and transport planning literature, to which my study makes a
pioneering contribution.
Second, I found that because of the requirements imposed by the IOC, cities
staging mega events show a similar pattern of transport change. In general, these
transport requirements are imposed to ensure that the host city's transport system is
capable of transporting the peak passenger loads of the mega event. These similar
requirements impose change at the local level resulting in similar measures of
implementation and similar legacies. 7
Third, cities rarely planned for leveraging mega-event benefits after the event. I
found that cities frequently failed to take long-term advantage of the Olympic event,
notwithstanding what they originally thought they would do, e.g., implementing major
changes in their public transport system. In identifying the common pattern mega events
impose by theorizing the global-local connection, this study could potentially not only
help to avoid the missing of opportunities, but also provide planning recommendations
that leverage the potential for beneficial urban development through mega events.
Fourth, to the extent that cities have been able to gain sustainable advantage from
hosting the Olympics, it is because there has been an alignment of their long-term
planning perspective and the way they used the Olympics to improve their transport
systems. The typical rhetoric surrounding the decision to bid to host the Olympics almost
always emphasizes the legacy impacts of the Games, but the dynamic that I document in
this study is -- at least on the transportation side -- that cities are pushed into giving
priority to satisfying the short-term demands. If cities are not very careful to protect their
goals and city planners design the Olympic venue selection and make smart land use
choices in a way that supports the cities' own transportation goals (always somewhat
different from the IOC's), then the Olympics' beneficial legacy will actually be quite
minimal. Therefore, there is a clear need for aligned planning very early- preferably
during the bidding stage -- to ensure the alignment of the event with the metropolitan
strategy.
7 Legacies are defined at the end of this chapter.
Mega events bring the potential to move cities towards sustainable transport
practices. To achieve the IOC's goal of moving millions of spectators in a short period of
time, temporary transport measures fostering public transport are implemented. Properly
planned and implemented, these measures can enhance long-term urban transport
efficiency for the city. Evidence-based transport planning and policy recommendations
can help cities make the most of the potential of hosting the Olympic Games to promote
discontinuous progress in transport improvement.
Definitions
A few definitions are necessary to enhance the reader's understanding of the
material discussed.
Mega events in the metropolitan transport context
Until the beginning of this century, transportation in association with mega events
was usually mentioned in a side note: transport played the role of a temporary supporting
service (Hall 1996; Syme et al. 1989). Surprisingly, the subject of transport has rarely
been studied in relation to mega events. On the one hand, transport systems need to be
prepared for the mega event; on the other hand, these preparations remain as tangible
legacies, which can potentially enhance urban transport by being a stimulus to change the
way people travel. However, research on transportation systems beyond the mega events
themselves does not exist. "Facilitating successful access to special events is key to their
success, yet a transport and events research agenda is still to emerge" (Robbins et al.
2007, p. 303).
The key variables that define mega events in terms of transportation are given by
da Silva (2003, p. 209). Bearing in mind the size of the region as well as the quality of the
transport system, he established the following variables for an event:
* size: number of visitors, as well as direct participants and personnel hired for the
event;
* concentration: duration of the event, duration and magnitude of traffic peaks;
* foreseeability: periodicity of the event and the time available to prepare it;
* additional cost of extra transport demand, compared with existing transport
demand
* level and capacity of existing transport system
Strongly leaning on Bovy's characterization (2002) of mega events, I define mega
events in the transport context as follows:
A transport mega event is a unique temporary combination of mass transport flows,
requiring the involvement of all available metropolitan transport modes with different
service levels and requiring temporary and long-term modifications of a transport
system.
Academics believe that at least three kinds of events fit the category of a mega
event (the World Cup, the Olympics, and World Fairs), for which they have concluded
that significant planning efforts are necessary to surmount the challenges these events
impose on a city's transport system (Botella 1995; Bovy 2006; Bramwell 1997; Gold and
Gold 2007b).
Power play
By "power play" I designate the dynamics through which urban change is
produced by the various actors, mostly IOC representatives, planners, and politicians.
Primarily, I analyze political power plays, which also have economic and social
implications.
Catalyst
A catalyst in chemistry is "a substance that enables a chemical reaction to proceed
at a usually faster rate or under different conditions (as at a lower temperature) than
otherwise possible" (Merriam-Webster 2009). Metaphorically, one social phenomenon
can be conceived as a catalyst if it makes another social phenomenon happen faster,
sooner, or more readily. Researchers have found this catalytic effect of mega events in
various circumstances (Chalkley and Essex 1999; Essex and Chalkley 2005; Gold and
Gold 2007b).
Missed opportunities
The concept of missed opportunities is twofold. The first is tied to the idea of
"alignment," in which the ideal is to produce an Olympic transportation plan that to the
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greatest extent possible advances the pre-Olympic transport vision of the host city. This
definition implies a fixing of the understanding of good urban and transport planning for
seven years (the time between bidding for and staging the Games). Admittedly, this
implication denies any evolution of the conception of what good planning is for the city
during those seven years. This assumption is valid because the IOC freezes the urban
plans through the host city contract and no change without the IOC's consent can be
made. Furthermore, the city is likely to be so entirely occupied with the Olympic
preparations during those seven years that only very rarely will any additional changes be
implemented that were not planned beforehand. The second concept of missed
opportunities emerged from the interviewing process, in which interviewees described
ideas for projects that could have leveraged the Olympics for a better, more locally
attuned outcome, but were not implemented at the time because of other, more pressing,
Olympic priorities.
Influences, effects, and legacies
For this study, I define influences, effects, and legacies as follows: Influences are
any temporary changes brought to the host city before and during the mega event.8 These
influences are broadly stimulated by the Olympics as an event and either imposed by the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) members, or by city governments driven by
Olympic aspirations. For this study, influences are caused by explicit and implicit
requirements the IOC imposes on the hosting city. Influences become effects if they
manifest themselves after the mega event. Legacy is a term frequently used by academics
to describe effects on a city as consequences of a mega event.
Study structure
In Chapter Two, I review the literature to theorize a global-local connection of
mega event owners' influence on local planning. The challenge is to use established,
well-known theories to illuminate mega event practice. The goal of this chapter is to
build a theoretical framework suggesting that the IOC as an agent of urban change can
influence urban plans due to the requirements they impose on hosting cities.
8 Influences according to Merriam Webster Dictionary are defined as (1) the power or capacity of causing an effect in
indirect or intangible ways, (2) a force exercised and received consciously or unconsciously.
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In Chapter Three, I lay out the research design of my study. I develop an
analytical framework for testing my hypothesis and defend the methods used for my
research.
In Chapter Four, I introduce the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as a
global agent of change and its medium, the Olympic Games. Throughout this chapter, I
identify influences the Olympics bring to bear on the transportation and venue planning
process. The goal of the chapter is to marshal evidence that the IOC has, through the
Olympics, the vision, the power, and the necessary tools to intervene in the urban
planning process. My key argument is that the IOC, equipped with the Olympics as an
international mega event, can be a global force in shaping cities.
In Chapter Five, I recount narratives from the four selected Olympic cities
(Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney, Athens), in which I analyze the process for planning and
implementing Olympic transport and venue requirements. The goal of the chapter is to
highlight in each case the role the Olympics play in urban and transport change. Each city
section consists of four parts. The first lays out the transport picture before the Olympics
by presenting a trajectory of transport developments. The second analyzes the Olympic
plans and highlights the dynamics between planners, politicians, IOC members, citizens,
and private companies that occurred during the planning process for the Olympics and
how these dynamics brought about changes to the original urban master plan. The third
provides a quick glimpse into the time during the Games. The fourth reviews the changes
that manifested themselves in the urban realm and retrospectively analyzes missed
opportunities identified by Olympic planners.
In Chapter Six, I conduct a comparative analysis across all four cities. This
chapter fulfills two purposes. First, I argue for causal connections between influences of
the mega events and certain urban outcomes, in particular in the transport sector. Hereby,
I build a model of change in the wake of a mega event by answering my theoretical
research question: What role do mega events play in urban development? Second, I
analyze the dynamics of the urban change process. I find that the IOC has exercised more
power on urban plans over the years likely due to the IOC's experience gained from
previous hosts. The IOC's pressures and short time horizon of the Olympic Games tend
to lead to hasty decisions and to similar missed opportunities across cities.
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In Chapter Seven, I tackle my practical research question on how cities can align
the necessary provision of transport for staging a world-class event with their
metropolitan vision, and thereby use the mega event as a driver towards desirable change.
I reflect on my case studies and provide an outlook on how my model of change might
have to be adjusted depending on future scenarios.
Chapter Two
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
By theorizing a global-local connection I seek to develop an understanding of the
role global mega events play in local planning and urban transport development. In the
age of globalization, cities seek a competitive edge to create, reinforce, and consolidate
world city status. As one opportunity, mega events provide a platform on which to claim
such status. Viewing the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as an agent of urban
change rather than the Games as a catalyst (as previous researchers have done) allows me
to analyze the dynamics between the IOC and city leaders when the city conducts its
urban planning in the run-up to a mega event. The outcomes of this planning process, the
Olympic legacies, remain in cities long term and provide evidence that in the pursuit of
staging a mega event, cities change. I capture this change process in a theoretical model
that links cause - a mega event- to their effects - legacies (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework for analyzing the role of mega events
I. DRIVER OF URBAN CHANGE: CAUSE
'hceor\ on ,' Wrld C(ities aird Clihl.Lc Acnts
IOC as an agent of change
II. DYNAMICS OF URBAN CHANGE: PROCESS
Thtor onl thde [Urban t:lfanning P-ocess
IOC as an influence
III. MANIFESTATION OF URBAN CHANGE: EFFECT
lhcolr on lral anld Tra1n1s1 ort D)cvclomicnt
IOC as an Olympic legacy builder
Source: the author
First, the driver constitutes the cause for urban change; in my case, the cities
desire to stage a mega event. Here, the literature on world and globalizing cities lends
powerful support to my proposed model, because at the heart of academic work on world
cities lies the analysis of the constant competition among cities for world-city status
(Friedman 1986; Hall 1966; Sassen 2001). Providing the global-local connections, Short
(2004) argues that the Olympic Games provide the stage for cities to claim such status.
Drawing from the literature on change agents, principally stakeholders influencing the
urban political process, I introduce the IOC as a globalization force potentially initiating
change on the local level (Nas 2005).
Second, the dynamics of urban change stands as a synonym for the interaction of
various actors to develop and implement urban strategies, visions, and plans. As a
perturbation of the well-established local urban processes, the IOC through mega events
insert a different force into the planning process by imposing a set of requirements.
Traditional urban-planning theories do not fully capture the preparation and outcomes of
planning in the wake of mega events; as Essex and Chalkley (2005, p. 7) believe, mega
events "do not fit any planning model." Urban changes have so far been understood
through policy changes. Regime theory,9 as academics have argued, offers a powerful
explanation of political changes that occur during mega events (Andranovich et al. 2001).
In this section, I focus not on the interaction between all stakeholders in the urban
planning process during a mega event, but rather on the specific influences mega-event
owners insert into the urban- and transport-planning process.
Third, manifestations of urban change are reflected in tangible and intangible
outcomes of the change process. Urban and transport development theorists analyze
processes through which cities take shape (Fainstein et al. 1992). These standard
trajectories are interrupted by a mega event and result in urban developments - the
legacies, which I interpret as the results of the global-local connection.
I explore the causal effects of mega events on urban transport. Because mega
events affect entire urban areas rather than only their transport system, and because a
comprehensive understanding of urban planning is crucial for the evaluation of urban
development (Hopkins 2001), I base this literature review on urban areas, zooming into
transport in detail where appropriate.
Driver of urban change - the cause
Since the 1980's, globalization has been a major force in urban and regional
change around the world. Driven by international trade, investments, increased mobility,
and advances in information technology, globalization is a process that fosters
9 Regime theory is a tool for such analysis, because it seeks to explain mechanisms of how urban change
agents act during the processes of decision making (Lauria 1997).
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interactions among people, companies, and governments of different nations across the
globe (Levin Institute 2008; Marcuse and Kempen 2000). Within urban systems,
globalization has led to a new outlook and changes in governmental aspirations. Moving
from solely providing services to its residents, cities ventured beyond. "Globalization...
means greater intercity competition both nationally and internationally in which
entrepreneurial cities seek a competitive edge" (Hiller 2006, p. 319).
Cities seek a competitive edge in the world city system
The competition of cities on the global scale has as its primary objective to remain
or become one of the great "world cities." World cities are centers of political and
economic power (Hall 1966), command and control centers of the global economy
(Friedman and Wolff 1982), and possessors of a cluster of advanced producer services
(Sassen 2001): they are where the world's business is conducted (Geddes 1915). There
are three traits, most researchers agree that a world city possesses:
1. A focus on competitive capitalism (Smith 2000),
2. A modern image (Burbank et al. 2001), and
3. Worldwide connectivity (Castells 2000).
The focus on developing a global hierarchy among cities considers only a few
within a narrow range, and tends to ignore the processes through which globalization
shapes cities (Short 2004). Both processes are different, while globalizing cities are
constantly seeking promotion to "world" rank (1999). The desire to secure a place at the
top of a postulated global hierarchy has captured cities. To claim world city status, each
city, whether a world, global, or globalizing city, devises a carefully thought-through
strategy to become or remain competitive. One important strategy, more and more cities
have come to believe, is to stage a mega event.
Mega events as strategy to acquire or confirm world city status
As an important process of globalization, the Summer Olympics "have become
the mega event with the ability to create, reinforce, and consolidate global city status"
(Short 2004, p. 108). Over the past three decades, the number of cities applying to host
mega events has grown exponentially (indicated by the light grey bars in Figure 2.2). In
recent years, developing cities such as Capetown (South Africa), and Beijing (China)
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have joined the competition among cities for mega events and successfully secured the
right to stage them (BOC 2008; GCIS 2008). The Olympic motto "citius, altius, fortius"
(swifter, higher, stronger) seems to have captured ambitious cities.
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In the process of staging a mega event, three competitive advantages come into
play that potentially promote and enable world city status. These correspond directly with
the three traits of world cities (p.25):
(1) Economic growth of the region. Burbank et al. (2001, p. 4) have suggested that
cities pursue mega events as part of a local strategy to promote economic growth through
consumption-based development. The prospect of economic growth is the driving force
behind bids for hosting mega events (Malfas et al. 2004), while maximizing the direct,
indirect, and induced economic effect is the primary goal for cities (Preuss 2004).
(2) Worldwide image creation. Ultimately, cities strive to be placed on the world
map (Essex and Chaildey 2004; Harvey 1989), which they hope to achieve by
showcasing the chocolate side of the city as the spitting image of a clean and modem
international metropolis worthy of belonging to the "world-class" (Burbank et al. 2001).
Short (2004) suggests that mega events are a showcase opportunity and may well be "the
best stage upon which a city can make the claim to global status" (p. 24). The
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international media attention is a tool to broadcast this new image (Hiller 2000; Home
2007).
(3) Enhanced connectivity. Wilson (1996, p. 617) has observed that mega events
transform urban spaces, "spectacularizing them in the interests of global flows," and
Short (2004) argues that mega events connect the city into a global space of flows. 10
Introducing urban change agents
Urban change evolves out of the dynamics between agents. Mega events provide
a unique stage in which all of these agents are present. Ranging from governments,
private sector, individuals, grass-root groups, and non-profit organizations, academics
have sought to define agents of change and explain the mechanisms by which these
agents act in the urban realm (Ball and Magin 2005; Nas 2005).
Social movements frequently underlie changes in cities. For example, Blumer's
(1990) analysis of industrialization as an agent of social change proposes that
industrialization exerts a set of causal forces on societies that result "in change in the
social structure, normative orders and patterns of belief and conduct found in societies"
(xvii). These movements in general play a neutral character, but set the stage for changes
in the traditional order. In a similar manner, globalization exerts forces on cities.
Of particular interest to my study are international organizations, which can also
bring about urban change, as Brenner and Keil (2006) have pointed out. They observed
that international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, as well
as international non-profit organizations, "frequently exercise a powerful influence on
patterns of urban development in the global south" (p. 192). As such an international
agent, an "event-owner" - a body such as the International Federation of Football
Associations (FIFA) or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) - can exercise
significant power.
10 For world city status, the global space of flows is an essential feature, as it shows the importance of the
informational society through the preeminence of the space of flows over the space of places (Castells
1993). By the "space of flows," Castells refers to a "system of exchanges of information, capital and power
that structures the basic processes of societies, economies, and states between different localities regardless
of location" (Castells 2006 , p. 136).
Staging mega events initiates urban change
Academics believe mega events to be catalysts for urban renewal and
regeneration by improving the physical infrastructure and existing facilities (Essex and
Challdey 1998; Malfas et al. 2004; Owen 2005; Ritchie and Yangzhou 1987; Spilling
1996). The Metropolis (2002) report on the impact of major events on the development of
large cities featured eight case studies, of which "all the events studied have been
conceived as catalysts for large-scale transformations of the city" (p. 18). In specific, this
report stressed transport as receiving a particularly strong stimulus through mega events,
in the sense that it enabled cities to speed up the building of certain infrastructures,
gaining 10-15 years in development (Metropolis 2002).
I agree with the above researchers that mega events are an initiator and a vehicle
for urban change, but doubt their pure catalytic role. A catalyst in a chemical sense is "a
substance that enables a chemical reaction to proceed at a usually faster rate or under
different conditions (as at a lower temperature) than otherwise possible" (Merriam
Webster 2009). This definition implies that the chemical reaction stays the same, whereas
the substance speeds the process. For mega events, I believe, a different approach is
necessary, which takes into account that through a mega event, the "reaction (= urban
decision-making process)" changes. I draw evidence for this belief from mega-event
scholars who have observed the general trend that occur prior to mega events - excessive
promises occur by bidding cities to out-do competitors (Essex and Chalkley 2005;
Coubertin 1911 quoted in Preuss 2004).
Mega-event owners as agents of urban change
Reflecting on the literature, I introduce the event owner as an agent of urban
change, that among multiple stakeholders - national, regional, and local governments,
grassroots groups, citizens - can influence the urban-planning process. Unlike most
academic scholars, I believe that mega-event owners can be powerful agents of urban
change rather than mere catalysts. Nas (2005) defined directors of change as being
"actors with explicit ideas about city development in a position to formulate and
influence future urban transformation" (p. 3). Even though Nas (2005), referred to
individuals, I believe, his definition is transferable to mega-event owners just as Blumer's
(1990) analysis of industrialization was, or Brenner's and Keil's (2000) observation about
international agencies. Nas' definition implies two fundamental characteristics of
directors: they have a vision about the city and possess the power to implement it. As a
given, they own the tools to influence urban policy. If the Olympics show these
characteristics, they can be defined as a powerful agent of urban change in the planning
process that has the potential to actively structures cities and their transport systems
(Chapter 4).
Dynamics of urban change - the process
Urban planning and urban politics have to be analyzed simultaneously to
understand decision-making processes, which arise from the interplay among all
stakeholders (Hall 1982; Wu 2003). Analyzing the power play in the urban realm and its
resulting urban change is a multi-faceted undertaking (Killtorp 1994). Clegg (1989) has
argued that the key to understanding the powers through which urban change occurs lies
in "thinking of power as a phenomenon which can be grasped only relationally" (p. 207).
Killtorp (1994) goes on to argue that the relational concept of power is determined by its
capacity to influence processes. Because power capacities alone cannot secure a
particular outcome, Hindess (1982) introduces agents as shaping the final outcomes of
the planning process, driven by their own particular strategy made out of certain interests.
Shaping cities as an interaction of global and local forces in the political process
The process of globalization influences local decision-making and initiates
change on the local level. To indicate the complexity of this influence, scholars invent
terms such as "local-global interplay" (Dunford and Kafkalas 1992), "local-global nexus"
(Peck and Tickell 1994), "glocalization" (Swyngedouw 1992, 1997), and
"glurbanization" (Jessop 1998) to label the concept of how globalization acts within
cities. A city evolves in a social process through negotiation, in which different actors
express their interests, propose solutions, and generate decisions (Ward 2004). Most
scholars find that global forces were penetrating at the national and regional scales
(Fainstein et al. 1992; Sassen 2001), but that globalization was only one of the forces
determining the spatial pattern of cities (Marcuse and Kempen 2000, p. 262). Academic
opinions, however, diverge on how powerful federal, state, and local governments are in
shaping global forces.
For this study, I adapt the view of Anttiroiko and Kainulainen (1998; 1996), and
in particular Beauregard (1995, p. 232), who finds that "dominance is conceded to actors
and forces operating internationally, and local actors resist, adapt, or acquiesce but do not
fundamentally alter global intrusions." As a result, people had three choices: to
capitulate, adapt, or attempt to turn the imposed changes to valuable opportunities for
their community.
If global forces dominate, common urban actors - to gain and stage mega events -
submit to the Olympic vision of perfection and the balanced interplay between these
actors shifts in favor of Olympic projects and their priorities.
Urban and transport planning processes
Hopkins (2001) defined a vision as "an image of what could be" (p. 38). He also
acknowledged that a vision cannot only overcome resistance in an established system, but
also that a common future can work "if people can be persuaded that it [the vision] can
and will come true" (p. 38). I find that the metropolitan vision is expressed in a statement
officially issued by the city council about future directions of the city. In comparison,
Hopkins (2001) defined the term "strategy" in the urban realm as a set of decisions that
forms a contingent path through a decision tree. Strategy is arguably the most inclusive
and thus fundamental notion of plans because "it is the most explicit about the
relationships among interdependent actions, their consequences, intentions, uncertainty,
and outcomes" (Hopkins 2001, p. 41). For van den Berg et al. (2000) the necessity for
cities to align their strategies, programs, and projects with their overall vision for the
region is vital. Inskeep (1994) warned that without such strategic thinking, planners may
create unexpected and unwanted outcomes. Newman and Thornley (2005, p. 8) defined
"strategic urban planning" as a policy that is citywide, having a spatial dimension and
implications for specific geographical areas within the city, and that establishes priorities.
For this study, I adopt the latter definition. Drawing from the above-mentioned scholars,
a metropolitan plan is a reflection of both vision and strategy, because it is guided by
visions and implemented through a specific strategy with definite goals.
To implement the urban plan, Fassbinder (1996) believes that planning has to
become a complex commercial undertaking, which includes the mobilization of all
sectors and all actors towards one great vision which all should be "willing to share ...
and support" (p. 69). Mega events have been acknowledged as accelerators of plans for
rapid change and as a vehicle to overcome resistance (Burbank et al. 2001). Fassbinder's
argument provides an explanation on why the Olympics are so powerful in changing
urban processes: it is because they provide the vision the city needs to move forward.
Mega events and regimes
Harvey (1989) suggested that "urban spectacles" have become a key element of
urban and economic policy. A decade later, similar observations by Chalkley and Essex
(1999) claimed that mega events have turned from a tool to an agent that plays a
significant role in urban policy without providing further evidence. In line with their
suggestions, Short (2004, p. 107) believes that "the Games act as an important tool to
literally reshape the city, in both discursive and spatial terms."
According to Stoker (1995, p. 54), regime theory holds substantial promise for
understanding the variety of responses to urban change. Frequently witnessed in the wake
of mega events is the creation of urban growth regimes" , which enable the acceleration
of an urban agenda (Burbank et al. 2001). Short (2004) argues that urban regimes focus
on city competition and constitute an entrepreneurial model of regime. These regimes
come to power in the run-up to mega events that may shape the city.
Transport planning for mega events
Usually, five factors influence the development of transportation: (1) spatial and
land use planning, (2) government policy, (3) economic forces, (4) technology, and (5)
social and behavioral trends (Masser et al. 1993; Newman and Kenworthy 1999). For
mega events, other factors become important, because "Olympic cities are judged as
much on the quality of the transport services as they are on their sporting facilities,"
states Curnow (2000, p. 62). Creating a world-class image includes the perfect
functioning of all its parts, in particular, transport.
1 An urban regime is defined as "the formal and informal arrangement by which public bodies and private
interests function together to be able to make and carry out governing decisions" (Stone 1989, p. 6).
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Efficiency, effectiveness, and safety are the three keywords used in planning for
exceptional events. Mega events are regarded as an outstanding transport challenge for
the city and require broad strategic and operational measures (Bovy 2006; ECMT 2003).
Planning has to consider the urban form, the usual traffic flows of citizens, the layout for
event sites, and cultural as well as climatic conditions. Recommendations include using
the regional infrastructure to the maximum and serving the visitors mostly through public
transport services. Bovy and Liaudat (2003) provide a description of the mega event
transport task. In "grande manifestations 12" they distinguish six client groups (spectators,
actors, logistical staff, volunteers, VIP's, media), each of which has specific mobility and
accessibility needs. Among client groups an implicit hierarchy is established. In order for
an event to be successful, each of these clients' needs has to be fully met.
Manifestations of urban change - the effect
Pursuing globalism shows impacts on the local level. Due to the increasing tie of
cities to global trends, cities change (Brotchie et al. 1995; Brunn and Leinbach 1991;
Sassen 1994). "Cities are the urban theaters where the two worlds, the local and global,
meet and interwine" suggests Nas (2005, p. 1). The most interesting aspect of this type of
study is the effects of globalization processes on the urban structure (Ward 2004) and
hence, mechanisms by which national and international forces produce specific spatial
changes within cities (Marcuse 1997). Given that globalization forces build and change
cities, impacts cannot be easily translated into spatial patterns due to the complex
interactions of economic and political forces (Marcuse and Kempen 2000; Smith and
Feagin 1987). The forces of city competition in the discourse of globalization have
shaped cities. Pioneers in global cities research such as Hall, Friedman, and Sassen have
analyzed the changing city systems around the globe, arguing that globalization is a
major force in fostering change on the local level.
Just as globalization has an impact on the city, so do mega events. Short (2004, p.
25) concludes that "as a factor in globalization, then, the Olympics and other global and
regional media spectacles have an immense impact on the urban image, form, and
networks of the host." As an example, Wu observed the making of global spaces
12 Great festivals.
associated with mega events, such as the Shanghai expo and Beijing Olympics (Wu
2003). The shift of a city towards a world city through the Olympics is frequently
manifested in their urban development and in Olympic legacies. The city is permanently
transformed by the spatial restructuring of the mega event (Short 2004).
Legacies as manifestations of mega events
Mega events have different impacts on the hosting city, its region, and its country,
whereas I am primarily concerned with the impacts mega events bring to metropolitan
regions and their transport systems. Impacts of mega events adopt many forms.
Academics agree that mega events have significant impacts on hosting cities and their
futures (Botella 1995; Bovy 2006; Bramwell 1997; Gold and Gold 2007b). However,
what exactly the impacts are and how they manifest themselves in metropolitan regions is
in continuous debate.
Academic discussions on the impact of mega events are centered on the question
whether they are 'good' or 'bad' for a city. Advocates and cities seeking to host a mega
event proclaim a variety of benefits for citizens; opponents point out cases of
unsuccessful and negative impacts on host cities. The literature paints a rather positive
picture of mega-event impacts (Gold and Gold 2007b), whereas only a few authors argue
against the positive findings (Lenskyj 2002). A summary of the debates is presented in
Table 2.1, while in the following two sections I only discuss the physical and political
impacts in detail, because they directly apply to my study.
Table 2.1: Structure of exemplary impact types of mega events
Type On whom? Impact
Positive Negative
Cultural World Worldwide positive Worldwide negative
image creation, impression of city
international tourism
destination
Economic Country Growth of the region, Short-term impacts that
increasing employment, are not sustained,
tourism revenues increased housing prices
Physical Metropolis New infrastructure, new Unused and costly
facilities facilities;, budget drawn
away from education
Political Governance Catalytic effect to move Exclusion of the public
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urban plans
Psychological Individuals National and regional Bad memories (terrorist
pride, good memories attack)
(fair sports)
Social Groups Renewal, affordable Evictions
housing projects
Source: compiled by the author.
Physical-enhancement vs. white elephantsl3
Chalkley and Essex have distinguished four phases over the past 100 years of
urban infrastructural development related to mega events, showing an increasing scale of
impact, organizational effort, and international attention (Chalkley and Essex 1999; Essex
and Chalkley 2004a). There seems to be a mismatch between the promises cities are
willing to make in the pursuit of hosting a mega event and what the city needs for its
future: cities, "given the imminent publicity and world-wide interest focused on the
Games invest extravagantly in unnecessary infrastructure" (Essex and Chalkley, 2002, p.
12). Aware of mega events' pitfalls, grassroots groups frequently protest against new
stadiums (Curry et al. 2004) and academics highlight the danger of underused and thus
costly arenas (Gold and Gold 2007a).
The other controversy in using mega events as a strategy for urban renewal
revolves around the discussion of the beneficiaries. Academics have argued that rarely
have any improvements benefited citizens (Andranovich et al. 2001), and if they did, they
benefited the already wealthy (Eitzen 1996; 2002). Hence, Ruthheiser (2000) suggested
that mega events as such may serve to exacerbate social problems and deepen existing
divides among residents.
Political-the missing element of public participation
Preuss (2004, p. 1) noted that mega events provide a "unique opportunity for
politicians and industry to move hidden agendas" by fast-tracking the decision-making
process (Cashman 2002; Hiller 2006). This frequently leads to the exclusion of public
participation in the decision-making process (Lenskyj 2002). Hall (1989) reported that an
13 White elephants are considered valuable possessions that their owners cannot discard. Their maintenance
cost exceeds by far their value. The phrase originated in South East Asia (Thailand, Burma). In the 1800s,
receiving a white elephant as a gift was both a blessing and a curse: a blessing because the white elephant
was sacred, and hence had to be kept; a curse because the animal had to be worshiped, fed, and could not
be put to practical use to offset the cost of maintaining it.
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apparent inverse relationship existed between the increase in size of a mega event and the
decrease of public involvement in the decision-making process. Later on he (1996, p.
375) observed that public resources were shifted to imaging functions.
Transport influences, impacts, and their legacies
Mega events lead to investments in public transportation, road construction, and
airport expansion, and researchers claim that these improvements provide the host city
with benefits in terms of quality of life, significant time saving, more capacity, and more
attractive travel (Bennett 1999; Christy et al. 1996; Getz 1999; Preuss 2004; Syme et al.
1989).
Surprisingly, the field of transport for mega events has rarely been studied. On the
one hand, transport systems need to be prepared for the mega event; on the other hand,
these preparations remain as tangible legacies that can potentially enhance urban
transport by being a stimulus to change the way people travel. Improved transport is a
potential benefit frequently mentioned in bidding files and used as a claim to counter
potential costs and burdens to the hosting community (Cashman 2002). Transport as a
lasting legacy in hosting cities has the potential of leveraging mega-event benefits.
However, research on transportation systems beyond the immediate post-event
evaluations by planners does not exist. "Facilitating successful access to special events is
key to their success, yet a transport and events research agenda is still to emerge"
(Robbins et al. 2007, p. 303).
The missing links
In this study I am attempting to analyze the connection between the global and the
local, seeing the metropolis as a reflection of global impacts in the run-up to mega events.
The focus of my study is how the IOC through the Olympics as a global force shapes
urban areas and their transport systems.
Defining the mega-event transport problem
The basic problem mega-event transport planners face is, I believe: the alignment
of transport provisions for staging a world class event with the metropolitan transport
strategy by using the mega event as a driver towards desirable change. Support for my
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position can be drawn from several scholars who have studied metropolitan impacts.
Coaffee (2007) and Preuss (2004, p.94) make general statements claiming that the
"matching of urban development and event plans are very important", yet neither one has
given recommendations concerning how to achieve these goals. With my problem
definition I oppose the views of other scholars.
Hensher and Brewer (2002, p. 383) argue that the end customers for public
transport in the value chain of mega-event transport are "spectators, athletes, officials,
and workers" transported during the Olympics. I believe that the end customers in the
value chain are the residents of each city; therefore, the long-term perspective for
planning has to be geared to benefit them and staging a mega event should foster the
long-term developmental goals of the city.
Robbins et al. (2007, p. 304) declared that the "basic problem planners face" is
"the provision of additional capacity to meet peak levels of demand, ... [which] may
result in the underutilization of that capacity for the remainder of the year and is therefore
economically unviable." This, however, I argue, is only a small piece of the "problems
that planners face." Robbins et al. suggest that the problem lies purely in the use of the
built transport infrastructure after the event. Aligning the metropolitan vision with the
requirements a mega event bring to the city are of a multifaceted nature: the sustainability
challenges metropolitan transport faces in the future, the metropolitan strategy the city is
pursuing, and changing citizens' demands for transport should be the main targets in
expressing the problem planner's face when hosting a mega event.
Hiller (2006, p. 331) emphasized that after a mega event, the use of facilities must
be "reevaluated and integrated into the fabric of urban life and the needs of its residents."
Given the importance of a long-term planning horizon (Ashworth and Voogd 1990;
Bramwell 1997), I argue that a shift in thinking and analysis is needed. I believe that the
alignment of the event with the urban future has to happen before the plans for a mega
event are implemented.
Given my critique and my understanding of the transport problem, my aim is to
develop policy recommendations on how cities can align event requirements with the
metropolitan transport strategy. Those go beyond the attempt to express the potential of
mega events, which came from Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Roura (1995), who
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have suggested that events are planning instruments for urban-transport development,
such as clearing congested areas or re-organizing transport systems. My
recommendations are rather targeted towards leveraging the potential the events bring to
metropolitan transport.
The unmet challenge of aligning event and metropolitan strategy
Only recently have academics and practitioners emphasized the importance of
aligning the requirements an event sets for the city with the city's own goals. Bramwell
(1997), in analyzing the 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield, conducted one of the
few empirical studies, investigating strategic planning before and after a mega event. He
found that Sheffield did not plan for the long term, but rather used a learning-by-doing
approach. Based on his findings, he suggested the city might have missed important
opportunities. Hence, he emphasized the importance of a long-term perspective on mega
events. Just like the long-term perspective on projects, Ashworth and Voogd (1990)
recommended that urban planning be guided by the strategic vision of the region if the
city wants to market itself for tourism. Getz (1999) furthermore believes that an event is a
strategic tool for helping to achieve metropolitan goals. His recommendation to planners
was to focus on the intended outcomes of the event and plan for pre- and post-event
impacts. In terms of transport, Getz's advice (1999, p. 28) was to "disperse venues and
activities throughout the destination as far as practical to spread benefits more widely and
to avoid congestion"; but it has not been tested empirically. Coaffee (2007) suggested the
same way of thinking when he concluded that a successful process of urban renewal
emphasized the long-term and strategic planning horizon, geared towards sustainable
regeneration in the wake of a mega event.
Even though I agree with the importance of aligning both strategies for the
betterment of the cities (as both Bramwell and Coaffee have emphasized) and find their
idea of a long-term planning horizon essential, these authors give no recommendations on
how to achieve them through a mega event. In order to develop such recommendations, it
is essential to understand which impacts mega events have had and why, and hence the
causal links between mega events and their effects on urban development have to be
understood.
Conclusion
I deduce my hypothesis from this literature review: mega event owners exercise a
decisive influence on urban and transport planning through the requirements they impose
on cities (summarized in Figure 2.3).
In the first section (Driver of Urban Change), I introduced the IOC as a
potentially powerful stakeholder in the urban planning process in the run-up to a mega
event. Because cities seek the promotion to world-city status, some choose to stage mega
events and hence allow the mega-event owner to intervene in their preparations thereby
making them an agent of urban change. In Chapter 4, I describe the vision the IOC has on
Olympic transport, explain the power they hold within the run-up to the Olympics, and
point out specific requirements the IOC imposes on hosting cities.
In the second section of this chapter (Dynamics of Urban Change), I highlighted
the struggle between global and local forces, particularly pointing to researchers who
have suggested that global influences dominate local ones. The emphasis lies on the
necessity to view a city's planning process in the run-up to a mega event as undergoing a
shift in priorities. If I view mega-event owners as a global force, the IOC then can
exercise a decisive and sometimes even predominant influence on urban politics, and can,
consequently, also alter the planning process in metropolitan regions, because Olympic
priorities dominate local thinking and decision-making. In Chapter 5, I tell four narratives
on past Olympic hosts, focusing on the shift in priorities within urban and transport
planning.
In the third section of this chapter, I provided evidence that the Olympic
dominance is manifested locally in Olympic legacies, e.g., stadiums. Within the few
years leading up to the mega event, cities undergo a transformation stimulated by the
hope for economic growth, a world-class image, and urban regeneration. Researchers
have attributed mega events the role of catalysts in the urban development. In contrast to
these statements, I found that white elephant buildings tell a different story.
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Figure 2.3: Theoretical framework for building my hypothesis
I. DRIVER OF URBAN CHANGE: CAUSE
IOC as a powerful agent of change
II. DYNAMICS OF URBAN CHANGE: PROCESS
IOC as a decisive influence
III. MANIFESTATION OF URBAN CHANGE: EFFECT
IOC as a transport and urban developer
Source: the author
The model of change I develop throughout this study suggests that the IOC is a
powerful agent of urban change. As a globalizing force driven by constant world city
competitions, the IOC significantly influences local transport planning and decision-
making and hence can have an effect on long-term urban transport development. Hence,
there is a need for an explanatory model of change evoked by mega events. Because
transport has been largely ignored by researchers and yet holds great potential in
benefiting cities post-event, I focus my analysis on transport systems cities undergo in the
run-up to a mega event.
Chapter Three
RESEARCH DESIGN
The IOC exercises a decisive influence on urban and transport planning through
the requirements they impose on cities. To support my hypothesis, I gathered evidence in
Olympic cities to reveal the urban-process strategies during which mega-event owners
change cities. Given the complexity of analyzing the influence of the IOC on local
planning post-event, I considered multiple case studies to be the only viable alternative;
for causal studies Yin (2003) considered explanatory case studies selected via replication
logiC14 as suitable, for comparative investigations of urban change, Killtorp (1994)
suggested an inductive, qualitative method, which would allow theoretical interpretation
of highly varying data. My research design, hence, is qualitative using primarily
interviews triangulated with document analysis and observations for cross comparison. 15
With my study, I hope to develop a process strategy for cities choosing to host a mega
event in order to leverage mega-event opportunities.
Shortcomings of previous methodologies
The development of the transport system through mega events as an object of
study has largely been neglected in academic discussions (Robbins et al. 2007). At the
same time, transport, just like other investments for mega events, requires significant
planning efforts and investments upfront, and can - if well planned - remain as a lasting
legacy in hosting cities, benefiting citizens beyond the mega event (Hiller 2006, p. 318).
The few researchers who have studied transport for mega events generally
recorded findings in a descriptive manner without analyzing the planning process or
remaining legacies. Further shortcomings of many previous studies are their focus on
single cases, their short time horizon, or the researcher's bias. My analysis tries to
overcome these shortcomings in four ways: its comparative nature, its time range, its
theoretical approach, and relatively unbiased view.
14 All of my case studies are intrinsically different regarding their preexisting transport infrastructure, and
their choice of Olympic venue locations, yet staged the same event - the Olympic Games (Table 3.1).
15 Triangulation is used to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate findings in a single study. This strategy
usually integrates the findings by offsetting the weaknesses of one method with the strengths of another.
Most past analysts have studied one-time performances of mega events and have
drawn conclusions from a single case. They comprise practical guidelines, e.g., by the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT 1997), short-term measures, and "strategic
planning guidelines" describing a single specific event and listing lessons learned (Trout
and Ullman 1997). My approach is to compare preparation efforts among four cities
which staged the Olympic Games.
Former analysts have focused on the immediate need to "perform well" during the
event. The short time horizon does not account for long-term impacts mega events may
have had on cities. Post-event studies were usually conducted within a year after the
event. Based on short-term studies and single cases, an analyst cannot establish general
benefits cities bring to a region and analyze conditions to foster potential benefits. In
contrast, I focus on the implications and outcomes of the preparation efforts and thus look
into results of up to 15 years after the event has passed.
Past mega-event analysts were mainly driven by views from practice and
summarized lessons learned. They ignored the potential influence of the mega event itself
on planning and hence argued they were catalysts. In contrast, I am grounding the
analysis in a theoretical approach in viewing the IOC as a change agent acting within the
cities planning process.
A fair amount of research has been conducted by investigators eager to place their
cities in a positive light after the event (Getz 1999; Home 2007). Therefore, the legacies
that follow the hosting of an event are "difficult to quantify, prone to political
interpretation and multifaceted" (Malfas et al. 2004, p. 209).
My focus is on analyzing how and why urban change in the run-up to mega
events took place. Because I believe that the causal relationship between influences
exerted by a mega event and its impact is crucial in formulating recommendations for
leveraging benefits.
Methodology
I started with the intent to use both quantitative and qualitative techniques for my
research question on how metropolitan transport changes through a mega event. After
pre-testing of simple measures, such as the percentage of public transport vs. private
transport ridership with the quantitative data collected from secondary sources (census,
public transport agencies, and governmental statistics), I judged the data to be unreliable.
The trial to compare data across four countries over a series of 20 years yielded
'impossible results' due either to lack of data or changing methods of data collection,
conducted by research agencies. Therefore, I will only use qualitative techniques for this
research.
Given that my research theme is hardly understood and I am analyzing a multi-
year process while trying to identify causal relationships, Yin (2003) argued that in these
cases the comparative case-study strategy has distinct advantages over other
methodologies. The explanatory nature of my case studies will be examined through
pattern matching (identification of similar patterns) suggested by Yin and Moore (1988)
to untangle the complex relationships inherent in my search for a process strategy. Cross-
case comparative analysis and synthesis yield valid insights into the phenomenon
(George and Bennett 2005b; King et al. 1994). Analysts should compare the collected
data systematically across cases to develop conceptual categories according to a
grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Killtorp
(1994) outlined a 12-step research design for comparative studies on power in urban
change, on which I have drawn throughout my analysis. Results can be achieved through
building an inductive-iterative theory through the careful examination of empirical
evidence (Ragin 1987; Yin 2003).
The Olympic Games as the phenomenon of my analysis
As the specific phenomenon, I have selected the Summer Olympic Games for my
research. Scholars in general agree that the Olympic Games always deserve to be grouped
into the category of mega events (Getz 1999; McDonnell et al. 1999). Among all mega
events, the Olympic Games are the most studied phenomenon and research centers
around the world are dedicated to it (Olympic Museum, Lausanne, Switzerland; Centre
for Olympic Studies & Research, Loughborough University, UK, Australian Olympic
Studies Center, University of Technology Sydney, Australia; Olympic Studies Centre
CEO-UAB, Barcelona, Spain). Thus, I have drawn on extensive resources and gathered
the most relevant information given that I am exploring a new research area: the transport
sector before, during, and after mega events.
Another approach to the selection of cases could have been a comparative study
among different types of mega events such as sporting events and political conventions. I
declined this option because studying the Olympics in depth lends more information and
allows for the analysis of a broader range of impacts. The Olympic Games comprise most
of modern sports and draw the largest numbers of spectators and athletes in the shortest
time span compared to other mega events. Hence, the pressure on the transport system is
the largest and its performance is tested to the maximum. Other events such as world
expositions, the world cup, international conventions, etc., are, in essence, the Olympics
on a smaller scale, e.g., fewer venues in a city and/or focused only on a single sport
(soccer competitions). Therefore, my findings are transferable to other events, because
the Olympic Games "generate similar dynamics for the host cities or regions" (Malfas et
al. 2004, p. 1). On a final note, I chose not to study the Winter Olympic Games, because
the number of spectators is only about 30% of those for the Summer Olympic Games.
Selection of the case studies
I chose to analyze four metropolises that previously hosted the Summer Olympic
Games, namely Barcelona (1992), Atlanta (1996), Sydney (2000), and Athens (2004).
Getz (1999) believes that cities have to be compared globally to understand the relative
impacts of mega events. The selection of four case studies is based on replication logic
where cases are chosen based upon either a literal or a theoretical replication or both (Yin
2003). My goal is to select representative cases that help build a theoretical framework
for examining the role of a mega event in changing metropolitan transport. Through my
selection, I can control for two likely variables to impact metropolitan transport change in
the run-up to mega events: (1) whether there were one or more main centers of Olympic
activity - venue location: one vs. several clusters and (2) whether Olympic standard
public AND private transport to the venues existed prior to the Olympics - transport
infrastructure did or did not exist prior to the Olympics (Table 3.1).16
16 1 believe those variables to be likely, because the Olympic transport system is determined by the venue
choices, and change in urban transport infrastructure are necessary depending on the existing transport
infrastructure to those venues.
Table 3.1: Selection of Olympic Case Studies
Venue location
Transport One main cluster Several clusters
To major venues exis
Yes Atlanta Athens
No Sydney Barcelona
Source: the author.
Whereas Atlanta and Sydney established one main center of activity, Athens and
Barcelona set up a dispersed structure of Olympic activities. While Atlanta and Athens
located their main Olympic activities and stadiums containing most of the venues on a
well-connected transport system, Sydney and Barcelona chose rather remote locations as
their main centers for Olympic activity (see individual city sections for detailed
description). The other important cross-case comparison is the city's vision in staging the
Olympic Games. Past hosting cities, Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney, and Athens cover the
broad range of how cities can prepare for the exceptional conditions of a mega event,
including both extremes. Barcelona is known as the prime model for urban
redevelopment through a mega event, whereas Atlanta adopted the strategy of purely
staging the Games for a profit. Finally, my focus on the selected ones was constrained by
finding interview partners (alive), my time for this study, and by my language skills.
Approaching the research questions
The challenge in preparing a city for a mega event lies in aligning the short-term
strategy for the event with the long-term strategy for the city's future. To understand the
causal mechanism underlying developments in the run-up to mega events, it is necessary
to identify the influences and corresponding effects mega events have on the city.
Therefore, my theoretical research question given my focus on the transport sector is:
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"What role do mega events play in urban development?" The independent variable is the
mega event; the dependent variable is the legacies (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Mega event as influence
Source: the author.
Developing the analytical framework
Analytically, three steps are necessary to identify change (Figure 3.2):
I Influence Analysis Process Analysis
Dyamc of Trnsoe
Effect Analysis I
Olympic Games
International Olympic
Committee
Media attention
Figure 3.2: Analytical framework for urban change
Source: the author.
Black Box
Metropolitan Vision
Metropolitan Plan
Olympic Vision for the City
City infrastructure
Olympic legacies
Sustainability?
Influence analysis: the Olympic Games as an agent of change
Here, I identify the transport and urban requirements the IOC impose on the
cities. These requirements include, but are not limited, to the number of venues, number
of vehicles for athletes, restrictions on travel time for athletes, etc. Furthermore, the
transport priorities the IOC places on different customers (athletes, media, spectators,
citizens etc.) and on transport in general, as a criterion for being elected as the host for
the Olympics are important to analyze. The influences, in general, are stimulated by the
Olympic Games (Chapter Four).
Process analysis: dynamics of urban change in four Olympic cities
I analyze each of the four cities in detail about how the mega event influences
changed urban-planning and transport decisions. The stories entail the transport-planning
processes of each city over a period of approximately 20 years. I emphasize the
metropolitan vision the city had prior to the Games, the vision the city had for the Games
and ultimately, how these plans, vision, and strategies change due to the Games, thus
providing an insight into why and how metropolitan transport undergoes changes while
the city stages the Olympics (Chapter Five).
Change analysis: identifying similar patterns through comparative analysis
The third analysis section is comparative and analyzes legacies that remained or
were hoped to remain in cities after the Olympics left (Chapter Six).
Project evaluation and impact assessment
My practically oriented research question driving this study is: How can cities
align their metropolitan vision with the necessary transport provisions for staging a
world class event, and hence use the mega event as a driver towards sustainable change?
For that, I researched the cases in the light of whether and, if so, how cities have
aligned the Olympic requirements with the metropolitan vision in the past. My measure
of alignment is the extent to which the IOC through the Olympic Games makes the city
deviate from its original plans. I define the original plan as the urban plan developed
before the city was awarded the right to stage the Games. This master plan presumably is
driven by governmental goals. The influx of the mega event and the resulting response
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from the city leads to metropolitan change. The question in assessing effects is whether
and, if so, to what extent do the Olympics' forces push all cities along the same path of
urban development? My view is that deviations from the urban strategic plan provide a
vital indicator of a city's response to the mega event and also to the dominating influence
of the IOC.
Table 3.2: Structure of effect types of mega events
Not in urban master plan In urban master plan
= deviates from = catalytic
Source: compiled by the author.
In Table 3.2 I list urban developments that had been made prior to the particular
city staging the Olympics (completed between the election of the city and hosting the
Olympic Games; this time span is about seven years). I distinguish between Olympic
inspired changes, those that have not been in the urban master plan, and catalytic
changes, those that appear in the metropolitan plan prior to the Olympics.
I acknowledge that there might be other influences that change the original city
plans during the Olympics. This possibility, however, is highly unlikely due to the host
city contract 17 and the time pressure the city faces in complying with requirements during
the seven-year preparation period.
Missed opportunities
My measurement of change does not only include infrastructure but also
implemented transport policies, altered travel behavior across private, public, and active
transport, as well as sustained transport operations. While measuring change, I came
across various missed opportunities. The concept of missed opportunities is twofold. The
first is tied to the idea of "alignment," in which the ideal is to produce an Olympic
transportation plan that to the greatest extent possible advances the pre-Olympic transport
vision of the host city. This definition implies a fixing of the understanding of good urban
17 The host city contract is an agreement signed with the IOC by the city hosting the Olympics, in which the
city agrees to implement all modifications in the manner stated in the bid file. Changes to this agreement
are difficult to implement and only possible with the consent of the IOC.
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and transport planning for seven years (the time between bidding for and staging the
Games). Admittedly, this implication denies any evolution of the conception of what
good planning is for the city during those seven years. This assumption is valid because
the IOC freezes the urban plans through the host city contract and no change without the
IOC's consent can be made. Furthermore, the city is likely to be so entirely occupied with
the Olympic preparations during those seven years that only very rarely will any
additional changes be implemented that were not planned beforehand. The second
concept of missed opportunities emerged from the interviewing process, in which
interviewees described ideas for projects that could have leveraged the Olympics for a
better, more locally attuned outcome, but were not implemented at the time because of
other, more pressing, Olympic priorities.
Methods
I combine research techniques believing that the ecumenical approach - no
research method is superior to the other - should offer better opportunities to compare
urban change among mega event cities. Each method has strengths and weaknesses, but
used together and carefully triangulated they should complement each other and allow for
a rich analysis. I used interviews, observations, and document analysis in each city. I
conducted the study in a concurrent manner, meaning all techniques were applied in
parallel and if necessary repetitive. Because new schemes evolved, I had to review
additional documents, get access to further documentary material, and even visit
interview partners more than once.
Formal and informal interviews
I conducted interviews with two types of focus groups. 18 The first type was
interviews with IOC experts on transport and operations planning for the Olympic Games
conducted at the IOC Headquarters in Lausanne. Professor Phillippe Bovy, Professor at
EPFL in Lausanne, is the IOC consultant for Olympic transport. Lisa Hindson is the
expert and coordinator for Olympic operations. Since 2006, I have been in contact with
18 A focus group is an established elite for a particular topic as the center of my attention. The elite is
defined as someone who is in a privileged position as far as knowledge is concerned. Frequently, these are
people in positions of authority with considerable personal power.
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both of them to clarify issues arising through my research and follow-up information was
exchanged via email. The second type was interviews with key planners of each case
study city. These comprised professionals in governmental agencies, local transport
authorities and independent researchers.
I identified interviewees through four different sources: the IOC consultants,
experts running the Olympic centers in Sydney and Barcelona, official publications, and
archival documents obtained at several research centers. Thereafter, the interviews were
conducted in a snowballing manner. Being aware of the possible bias in such snowballing
interviews, I made sure to interview, at least one person from the private sector, one from
the public sector, an independent researcher (e.g., professors at universities), and one
member from the local Olympics Organizing Committee. I interviewed only those
individuals, who were fluent in English, and had public exposure through their work.
However, sometimes the interviewee switched into his/her native or more familiar
language (languages included English, Spanish, and German, all of which I understand)
so as to better express their point of view.
Interviewees, who expressed the wish not to be recorded yet willing to share their
thoughts, allowed me to take notes during the interview. I conducted informal interviews
and had casual conversations with tourists as well as residents living close to the Olympic
sites. Further sources included conversations at conferences and general meetings with
members of the planning committee for the World Cup in Germany (2006), and the
upcoming World Cup in Capetown (2010) including the head of transport roads and
stormwater.
Unobtrusive observation
To gain a good understanding of the city's layouts and its development caused by
the Olympics, I conducted site visits in each city for several months: In Barcelona, I spent
three months during the summer of 2007 as a fellow of the Olympic Studies Center at the
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. In Atlanta, I spent about three months during three
visits, during the summer of the 1996 Olympics, during the summer of 2008 and during
March 2009. In Sydney, I was a research fellow of the Olympic Studies Center at the
University of Technology, Sydney, during January, February, and March 2008. In
Athens, I spent about 4 months, during the summer of 2004 as a Golden Ambassador
(during the 2004 Games), and during the summer of 2008.
I used observation to verify interviewees' statements and to support some of my
findings. I took field notes and pictures immediately on site. Later on the same day, I
consolidated these notes into a research report. In all Olympic cities, I observed the
activities at the Olympic sites. I also tested all transport modes leading to the main
Olympic venue clusters.
Content analysis of governmental, planning departments
At the Olympic Museum, I received special access to the restricted archives. The
25-year embargo on the archives for the Olympic Games was lifted for me by the
president of the IOC, J. Rogge as a special exception to facilitate my research. At the
Olympic Museum, I was able to collect transport evaluation documents that had been
written prior to awarding the city with the Games and during their preparations. These
included personal communication files between the IOC (french) and the cities,
questionnaires posed by the IOC to bidding cities, presentations given to bidding and
candidate cities, bidding file guidelines, and evaluation documents of bidding cities
regarding their transport sector, specific passenger forecasts, detailed strategic and
operational planning documents, etc. I performed an archival analysis of existing
planning documents for all cities, such as meeting minutes, letters etc. at the headquarters
of the IOC in Lausanne. The Museum also had all bidding files, candidacy files, and
after-Games reports of my case study cities.
Further sources were local Olympic archives. In Barcelona, I conducted an
archival analysis at the Olympic Studies Center at the Universitat Autonoma de
Barcelona. Here again, I received special permission to the restricted archives. During my
research stay in Atlanta, I visited the city's Olympic memorial museum and searched its
archives at the Kenan research center. In Sydney, I conducted an archival analysis at the
Olympic Studies Center at the University of Technology in Sydney.
In each city, I searched in local libraries and their databases for newspaper
articles/information on the transport and urban planning of the Games as well as the
general perception of the public, political leaders, and tourists after the Games.
Furthermore, I searched the city archives for strategic metropolitan planning documents
before the Games, how the Games impacted such metropolitan planning, and how the
metropolis has developed since the Games (these documents were written in Spanish,
Greek, French, and English). Finally, I obtained the strategic and operational transport
plans for the Olympics through personal contacts I had established during my visits.
Limitations
There are five rather obvious limitations of my methodological approach. The
first is my assumption that the mega event is an independent variable. Mega event owners
and the city's political leadership negotiate on the best option to implement the
requirements, some of which are strict while others are flexible. Hence, there is no true
independence of the mega event variable. The second is that the requirements the IOC
imposes on cities change over time. Through knowledge-management techniques, the
IOC informs cities about new requirements or warns about potential pitfalls. Hence,
requirements are not static.19 A further shortcoming is the inevitable limitations the case
study approach bears, the selection of my cases. Due to my language skills, budget, and
available time, I had to limit my selection to four cases. A further shortcoming of my
analysis is the selection on interviewees and their willingness to share information.20
Because of political reasons and ethical constraints, the information the interviewees
provided may have affected my results. A further shortcoming of my study is the lack of
a counterfactual. Because I only researched cities that staged the Games - given I wanted
to analyze how cities change due to a mega event - I cannot account for changes that
happened in other similar cities that did not stage the Olympics at the time. Likewise, I
cannot take account of urban changes that were not motivated or catalyzed by the Games.
My goal is not exhaustive in the sense that I do not list all requirements, and all
changes, a mega event can bring to the transportation system. I expect there to be
additional influences the IOC exerts on cities. Instead I intend this study to start a
discussion on how to leverage the opportunities the Olympics bring to urban transport.
19 In Chapter Seven I give a detailed analysis of this constraint, as it is important for future hosts.
20 In a few instances, Olympic city planners denied to be interviewed by me - the reason they gave me were
their position in the city governments.
Conclusions
This study is a pioneering effort to fill the gap in the literature regarding urban
and transport change cities undergo when staging mega events. Its methodology, seeking
to avoid biases of the past, is defined by its comparative nature, its long-term time
perspective, and its quest for causal explanations. The goal of this research is to aid
decision-makers in planning a mega-event not as an interrupting occurrence but rather as
an opportunity enabling discontinuous transport improvement.
Chapter Four
THE IOC AS AN AGENT OF URBAN CHANGE
In this Chapter I introduce the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as an
agent of urban change.21 Nas' (2005) defined directors of change as "actors with explicit
ideas about city development in a position to formulate and influence future urban
transformation" (p.3). His definition implies two fundamental characteristics of directors:
they have a vision about the city and possess the power to implement it. The point of this
chapter is not to establish the IOC as a director, because they have to interact with city
government, which ultimately have the power to implement changes in the planning
process. The argument, I am laying out here, is rather that the IOC through the Olympic
Games can have a significant effect on urban and transport planning due to its Olympic
vision and the power it holds within the planning process.
Throughout this chapter, I focus on these two characteristics by identifying
influences 22 the Olympics bring to the transportation planning process. For transport,
these include accessibility requirements for venues, mobility requirements for Olympic
client groups, and transport planning recommendations given by the IOC. Implicitly,
cities view these recommendations as "golden rules" which, when complied to, enhance
their chances in winning the right to stage the Games. The IOC itself defines its role in
the organization of the Olympic Games as follows:
The organisation of the Games consists of a partnership between the IOC
and the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG). The
Games are the exclusive property of the IOC, which has the last word on
any question related to them. The IOC plays a supervisory and support
role; in other words, it controls the organisation of the Games, ensures
they run successfully, and checks that the principles and rules of the
Olympic Charter are observed.
Source (Olympic Movement 2008)
The first goal of this chapter is to crystallize "the vision" the Olympics bring to
city development. The IOC's primary focus lies on the Olympic ideal, which, applied to
transport, means ensuring smooth operations for all Olympic client groups during the
21 International Olympic Committee (IOC) is an international non-governmental non-profit organization based in
Lausanne, Switzerland.
22 Refer to Chapter 1 for definitions.
event. As a secondary aspiration, the IOC wants to ensure that Olympic legacies benefit
the cities' long-term development.
The second goal of the chapter is to build a strong case that the IOC has the
power, ability, and necessary tools to intervene in the urban and transport planning
process to realize their Olympic vision. Having a vision and the power to implement it
would make the IOC a global actor of change with the ability to affect local urban
development.
For this chapter, I use three primary sources for my analysis. First, I draw on
personal communications with the transport advisor of the International Olympic
Committee, Professor Phillipe Bovy (EPFL), and his presentations for candidate and
bidding cities. Second, I evaluate an interview23 and emails exchanged with Lisa
Hindson, the head of Olympic operations (IOC). She oversees seven functions during the
city evaluations' process, in specific the transport infrastructure and operations process.
Third, I utilize documents gathered at the Olympic museum (Lausanne), some of which
are written by other Olympic city officials.
This chapter is structured according to the two definitional elements - vision and
power - of the agents of change. First, I find that in terms of transport, the "vision about
the Olympics means a vision for the city". Guided by the explicit and implicit
requirements, the IOC superimposes an organizational structure for transport on cities
that requires investments in transport, frequently in infrastructure. As a hook for cities to
buy into the Olympic idea, Olympic legacy claims stimulate motivations to use the mega
events for urban regeneration. Second, I suggest that the IOC has the power, and
necessary tools, to interfere in the urban-planning process. I support this claim through a
careful reflection on the types of interactions and tools of influence between the IOC and
the hosting city. Before launching into a detailed analysis of the IOC as an agent of urban
change, I provide an introduction to the Olympic Games and its transport challenge is.
Introducing the Olympic Games
The Olympic Games have become the largest sporting event in modem times.
Baron Pierre de Coubertin re-inaugurated the Olympic Games in 1896 according to their
23 Questionnaire for the interview can be found in the Appendix.
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Athenian ancient predecessor. Two years prior, Coubertin had founded the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) as the governing body for this worldwide athletic
competition. Since then, the modern Olympic Games take place every four years.
The IOC awards the Olympic Games to a city after a careful process of evaluation
(IOC 2003, Rule 36, para. 3). Like many world mega events, the Olympic Games are
attributed by the event owners (IOC) to the event organizers (city) after a selective
bidding process. For the event organizer bidding entails defining objectives, structure,
and content of the event and its most significant requirements and constraints. For the
event owner bidding is an evaluation and decision process. The main aim of the bidding
process is to facilitate selection of the "most efficient and reliable" project (Bovy 2005).
The detailed procedure leading to the election of a host city for the Olympic Games is
manifested in the Olympic Charter (Chapter 5, Rule 34 and its bye-laws - page 72). This
procedure is sketched out below.
Olympic bidding is a two-stage, two-year process, preceding the actual Games
preparation period of seven years. The first stage is called the bidding stage, in which
prequalification for potential acceptance is evaluated by the IOC. One Olympic host city
proposal per country is allowed, presented by its country's National Olympic Committee
(NOC). If more than one city within one country aspires to bid, national elections are
held and evaluated by the respective NOC. The second stage is called the candidacy
stage. The candidacy dossier follows eleven criteria 24 set forth by the IOC. The IOC
carefully evaluates individual city' proposals in comparison with other city bids
according to the Olympic Charter (IOC 2007, rule 34). Only this full candidature can lead
to the selection as a host city. The candidacy file turns into a contract between the IOC
and the city upon awarding the city with the right to host the Olympic Games. Within the
following seven years preceding the Games, these plans shall not be altered and if so,
modifications require the consent of the IOC. The preparation of this Host City Contract
(HCC) is a considerable project with high cost (20 to 40 million USD (2005)).
24 1. Government support, legal issues and public opinion, 2. General infrastructure, 3. Sports venues, 4.
Olympic Village, 5. Environmental conditions and impact, 6. Accommodation, 7. Transport concept, 8.
Safety and security, 9. Experience from past sports events, 10.Finance, 11.Overall project and legacy.
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The Olympic transport challenge
The Olympic transport task is immense (as of 2004): 26 sports25, 300 competition
events, 16500 athletes and technical officials from 202 countries, over 5,000 IOC, NOC
and IF members, over 21,000 media, over 30,000 sponsors and guests, over 50,000
volunteers, between 50,000-75,000 workforce staff members, between 4-8 million
ticketed spectators, and between 2-13 million residents to be moved within three weeks
(Bovy 2004a; Bovy and Liaudat 2003, p. 122)(Bovy, P. IOC transport consultant, Email
correspondence, February 3rd 2007).
The function that Olympic transport assumes is to connect competition (sports)
with non-competition venues, such as the Olympic Village, hotels, the airport, etc. (Bovy
2005). Extraordinary high traffic peaks occur frequently and can reach 1.2 to 1.7 million
Olympic person trips per day (Bovy 2004a, slide 7). Transport's role, as the crucial
backbone of the city, is to maintain stable linkages and ensure that almost all other major
Olympic city functions can operate unimpeded (Bovy and Protopsaltis 2003). At the
same time, Olympic transport has to maintain normal traffic conditions for residents.
Transport has to fulfill six fundamental objectives according to the IOC transport
consultant Bovy (2004a, pp.19-20)26:
* Transport must be safe and secure.
* Transport must be "absolutely" reliable.
* Transport must be efficient, comfortable, convivial and must guarantee short
travel time especially for athletes and the media.
* Transport must be flexible to mitigate risk of interruptions.
* Transport shall be environmentally friendly.
* Transport shall contribute to a strong host city and regional mobility legacy.
Transport systems during the time of the Olympics must perform extraordinarily
well. For IOC transport consultant, Bovy and the head of the transport management team
in Athens, Panos Protopsaltis, mis-execution of the transport task carries high risk,
25 Aquatics, archery, athletics, badminton, basketball, boxing, canoe / kayak, cycling, equestrian, fencing, football,
gymnastics, handball, hockey, judo, modem pentathlon, rowing, sailing, shooting, table tennis, taekwondo, tennis,
triathlon, volleyball, weightlifting, wrestling (Olympic Movement 2009).
26 Worth noting is the switch from "must" to "shall" in the IOC's objectives, whereas these objectives are
hard to measure.
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because it is highly vulnerable, prone to dysfunction and to vivid criticism by the
international media (Bovy and Protopsaltis 2003). Failure to perform perfectly can lead
to severe congestion, overcrowding, and athletes even missing competitions. These
outcomes can severely damage a city's global image (Rushin 1996).
The vision about the Olympics means a vision for the city
In terms of transportation, I believe that the IOC's vision about the Olympics
imposes a vision for the city. Nas (2005) defined directors of change as having a clear
"vision about the city", by which he meant its future development. For the Olympic
Games, this vision has to be interpreted somewhat differently. The IOC's primary focus
lies on the Olympic ideal, which for transport means ensuring smooth operations for all
Olympic client groups during the event. Hence, the vision the IOC has about the city is
the functioning of the transport system during the Games. Only of secondary importance
then is to ensure modifications benefiting the city's future development.
The transport priorities cities must adapt when planning transportation for the
Olympics lend strong support to my claim. The IOC advises cities to establish a hierarchy
in transport service, placing the Olympic associates, such as athletes, IOC members,
heads of state, media, referees and other VIPs on top, followed by visitors and then
residents (Bovy 2004a, pp. 47-49):
* Priority 1: Athletes between the Olympic Village 27 (OV), training, and
competition venues, as well as technical officials, rights, holders broadcasters,
selected VIPs have designated travel routes. This client group requires the best
service - primarily on demand - and holds the highest requirements in terms of
frequency, reliability, punctuality and security. Additionally, special shuttles are
required for the sporting equipment.
27 The Olympic Village accommodates the athletes during the time of the Olympic Games. Munoz argued that this
village should fulfill a dual function. Besides accommodating athletes, its design and structure should be considered for
after event usage. Until the 70's the villages have been used for social housing, since then either student
accommodations or more frequently in the latest Games for high-quality housing. Munoz observed that this change
corresponds to the parallel evolution of athletes, with a Spartan life styles change to a model of the athlete as a tourist.
(Munoz 1997)
* Priority 2: Media and press officials and specific workforce, which is required to
be present well before the competition, require almost exclusive transport services
running 24 hours a day.
* Priority 3: National Olympic Committees (NOC), International Federations (IF)
officials and Olympic Family28 frequently use individual cars and limousine
services; the service is very time-sensitive and is mostly on demand.
* Priority 4: Holders of this priority class are frequently high-ranked Games
sponsors, such as Coca Cola, McDonalds, etc.
* Priority 5: Workforce, volunteers and spectators belong to this group.
* Priority 6: General public. The Olympic traffic must be managed to minimize
hindrances to the general public.
Mobility and accessibility requirements
To ensure the priorities are met, the IOC sets requirements on hosting cities to
ensure that their Olympic vision about transport becomes reality. Ultimately, those
requirements may have the potential to alter urban areas. Cities theoretically have power
over two issues in implementing measures to comply with the IOC transport priorities:
the land-use choice for venues and the provision of transport services for Olympic client
groups. Their power, however, is heavily constrained by a superimposed IOC transport
structure and 'known' best practice solutions. The IOC sets out a framework of explicitly
and implicitly stated accessibility and mobility requirements which cities have to comply
with. Based on experiences from previous hosting cities, the IOC provides
recommendations aimed at supporting cities in preparing for the Olympic transport task.
The venues and their accessibility requirements
Venues29 are the central entry and exit points of mega events. Hence, their
accessibility for athletes and visitors alike is crucial. Compulsory by IOC requirements,
each of the venues has to have two distinct functional areas strictly separated from each
28 Olympic Family members are directly associated with the athletes. These can directly related family
members, team coaches, personal trainers etc.
29 The The IOC distinguishes competition and non-competition venues. Competition venues are stadia in
which Olympic competitions take place, non-competition venues are central points of interest within the
Olympic system, such as the airport, the media center, and the Olympic Village.
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other. Both areas also must have clearly distinct access routes for security and reliability:
one for "front of house" (FOH) traffic and one for "back of house" (BOH) traffic and
emergencies (Bovy 2004a, p. 52). The FOH traffic includes ticketed spectators and
sponsors with no access to individual vehicles. The BOH traffic consists of transport
priorities types 1 through 4 and other important functions, such as emergencies (Bovy
2004b). Around each venue, a security perimeter separates "city domain" from "mega
event domain" (Bovy 2004b).
Accessibility in between venues is a further crucial element in planning transport
for the Games. The bidding questionnaire requires the cities to report travel distances
between the Olympic Village, training facilities and the venues, between the venues and
non-competition venues, the airport and non-competition venues, etc. (IOC 2000, p.
46).30 The estimated travel time matrix has to consider congestion levels, proximity to
public and exclusive transport, and future infrastructure developments (Bovy 2004a, p.
33).
The travel time matrix and the distance matrix are crucial evaluation criteria, by
which cities are rated (IOC 2000, pp. 46-47):
* Linkage of main Olympic venues to high performance transport
* Quantity and amount of transport needed for Games operations
* Transport efficiency and clustering - the geographical parameter
Good
Bad
Total dispersion Full concentration
Figure 4.1: : IOC Evaluation of venue clusters
Source: (IOC 2000, p. 46)
Figure 4.1 describes the IOC preferred layout of the competition and non-
competition venues: total dispersion or full concentration is to be avoided. Dispersed
30 It contains a preliminary budget and the proposed position of Transport within the OCOG (organizer).
The file also needs to cover the relation to public authorities in charge of transport, security, and the
environment (Bovy 2005).
venues create heavy and expensive logistics between many venues. Clustered venues put
high pressure on the transportation system and huge amounts of people need to arrive and
depart from the same area. From a transportation point of view, the IOC believes that the
optimum lies between the two (IOC 2000).
During the applicant city seminar of the 2012 Olympics, Bovy and Protopsaltis
laid out the risks and benefits for concentrating or dispersing Olympic venues (Bovy and
Protopsaltis 2003, slide 45). The concentration of Olympic venues downtown or in
clusters well served by public transport is a major advantage. Transport services can be
grouped and offer high service frequencies and high capacities. At the same time, the
disadvantage of a downtown location and Olympic clusters is the risk of transport
congestion and more difficult pedestrian crowd management. Comparatively, for
outlying, stand-alone venues access design and operations are simpler, but they have
inconveniences linked to much longer travel time and higher cost of transport services for
all client groups.
Even though the IOC points out risks and opportunities for certain accessibility
arrangements, detailed mobility preferences limit the land-use choice of cities. Evidence
to this fact leads to statements like: the Olympic Organizing Committees (OCOG) must
design a system to minimize distances and travel times for the Olympic Family,
especially athletes and athlete travel time shall be less than 45 minutes (Bovy 2004a, p.
19). As well as stating their preference of having the Olympic village and very large 24
hour/day traffic generators like the Main Press Center (MPC) and International Broadcast
Center (IBC) close to the Games center of gravity does encourage cities to cluster (Bovy
2004a, p. 26). Implicitly, the rule is: the lesser the travel time for athletes, the better for
the city's bid.
The transport customer groups and their mobility requirements
Besides the accessibility requirements for and in between venues, the IOC
requires cities to transport their Olympic client groups in a specific manner guaranteeing
free flow conditions (IOC 1992, p. 44). The different Olympic transport services are
numbered from Tl through T5, each associated with different vehicles and service
levels. These requirements are necessary, according to the IOC because of security
measures, equipment needed, and speed of access to the competition venues (Bovy
2004). The set-up of Olympic transport is complex, whereas large user categories, such as
spectators, must use public transport and sensitive logistical and guest categories will use
private transport means.
Table 4.1: Services required during the Olympics (I
Olympic Olympic Associate
Service
T1 T VIPs 31
2 nternational Federations,T2 International Olympic Committ,
iNational Olympic Committee,
T3 Organizing Committee,
etc.
T4 Athletes and Team officials,
!Technicians, Media, Sponsors
T5 - Staff, Volunteers, Spectators
Athens 2004)
Transport Service
Required
SAccredited car and driver for exclusive
,use by a single passenger
Accredited car and driver for exclusive
ee,
,use by two passengers
Accredited car and driver for use by up
Ito three passengers on call-up service
Ifrom the car pool
iAccredited Olympic Family bus
transport
Public transport and other modes
Source: (ATHOC 2001, p. 1.5)
As evident from Table 4.1, each of the client groups requires different levels and
hours of service. TI through T4 levels require private transport, whereas there is no
flexibility given to Olympic transport organizers on what type of private transport they
choose; it has to be cars and buses. Transport for the first four client groups is, of course,
free. Defined in the Olympic Charta, the OCOG has to cover local transport costs of
accredited national Olympic delegations, technical officials, the Olympic Family, medical
commission, Olympic museum, world anti-doping agency, etc. The fifth client group, the
staff, volunteers and spectators, requires different transport means, which must be 100%
public transport according to the IOC. For mega events "only very high performance
public transport has the necessary capacity to meet the very peaked and high traffic
demands" (Bovy 2004b, p. 20). The transport consultant Bovy, gets even more specific in
suggesting that the spectator traffic shall only be supplied by high capacity rail transport,
because they can deliver traffic demand peaks of 50,000 - 200,000 persons/hour. Light
rail and medium capacity subway help "but are often not sufficient for mega events"
31 Very important persons (VIP's) are, for example, heads of state.
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(Bovy 2004b, p.23). Furthermore, parking for this client group is a no-go (Bovy 2004b, p.
22).
In order to coordinate the travel flows, a single entity for transport is needed to
oversee all traffic functions. A single transport spokesman must take responsibility for all
internal and external communications via all media (Bovy 2004a, p. 56). The traffic
command, control, and communication center is the heart and brain of this games-time
transport system. It allows efficient and real-time transport and security management,
communication is an increasingly important function within the organization and towards
the public and the media.
Olympic planning recommendations
Having provided the cities with a long list of accessibility and mobility
requirements, the IOC aims to support the cities in preparing for such a massive transport
task. The first step was realizing that these requirements cannot be fulfilled by most
existing transport infrastructure and operations. "Mega event organizations often imply
major public investments in transport infrastructures and mobility equipments:
compressing 25 years of projects in 5 years" (Bovy 2004b, pp. 52-53). Hence, "the IOC
places a strong emphasis on "sustainable legacies" aiming to improve the cities future
travel. The Olympic Charta in force since September 1, 2004 has as its 14th mission
statement to promote "a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and
host countries" (p. 12).
What exactly legacies are, however, is heavily debated. David Richmond, the
head of the Sydney Olympic Organizing committee implied the subjectivity of the matter
by stating that "legacy like beauty is in the eye of the beholder" (Richmond 2003).
Implicitly he suggested, sustainable legacies are positive and can include venue
infrastructure, expertise and experience, and overall major legacies should not be "add-
ons" but integral to the bid. Richmond's recommendation was to "align and integrate
Games planning with 'big picture' city planning and development" (slide 22). The
golden question, which remains to be answered by the IOC, is how?
The IOC and associated city officials have tried to give planning
recommendations to help achieve "sustainable legacies". Recommendations made by the
transport consultant Bovy emphasize long-range planning goals, designated for local
communities (Bovy 2004b, pp. 52-53): "Mega event infrastructure must be planned and
designed "in priority" to serve long-range community development goals"; "Long-term
components are to be cast 'in concrete' and 'mega event overlays' built as temporary
structures." "Mega event transport infrastructure especially heavy rail, motorways, and
tunnel projects must be primarily conceived for long-range community benefits and
metropolitan sustainable development." These goals can be achieved by "integrating
legacy projects in Olympic plans in parallel with examining each project in terms of
sustainable development" (Cartalis 2003, slides 20-21). Overall they cover the basics, but
as I will argue in Chapter Six, these basics might be insufficient, in some cases even
incorrect.
Olympic legacies: a win-win situation for cities?
The answer to the question "what comes out of these planning
recommendations?" is provided by the IOC upfront. By claiming a variety of Olympic
benefits, the IOC provides for many cities a further hook to buy into the Olympic idea.
The results for urban planning and in particular for transportation, have remained
unquestioned so far.
Promising Olympic benefits
According to the IOC, the Games carry a strong momentum for development and
can act as a catalyst for urban development. Because of this opportunity, most Olympic
host cities have taken this Olympic advantage and substantially upgraded their transport
system and built a metropolitan legacy (Bovy and Protopsaltis 2003, slide 27; Cartalis
2003, slide 2). The Olympic Games impacts and legacies are positive in transport (see
also Bovy 2004a, p. 59; Bovy, p. 45).Bovy and Protopsaltis further added, specifically
regarding transportation, certain legacies hosting cities can expect:
* Integrated public transport system expansion (new or improved transport systems
as well as reserved bus lane networks) is a major Olympic legacy.
* Games' specific transport improvements (public transport and highways)
developed can support long-term metropolitan and community needs.
* Games' innovative transport and traffic-management concepts can be used for
other events and for general traffic improvements.
* Adoption of improved traffic incident or accident management techniques.
Out of this evaluation, the IOC launched the Olympic Games Global Impact
(OGGI) project in 2001 with the goal to achieve sustainable development economically,
environmentally, and socially. The program required using 150 indicators during the bid,
candidacy, and preparation efforts of the city up until 1 year after the Olympics.
Evaluations of these measures comprise volume 4, as the fourth part of the obligatory
deliverable for Olympic Games host cities. The problem with these measures is three-
fold. First, they did not include any qualitative measures, which are hugely important for
a holistic assessment of the Games (Leonardsen 2007; Pyo et al. 1988). Second, the
evaluation stretches only two years after the Games. Third, no city is accountable for
unfulfilled outcomes.
Remaining Olympic doubts
Planning recommendations and legacy promises made by the IOC have stimulated
expectations about what the Olympics can-bring to a city. As early as 1988, Pyo
recognized that "above all, the Olympic Games should be recognized as an investment
for the future and an image building event rather than a profit generating opportunity"
(Pyo et al. 1988, p.144). The expectations have gained momentum and are advertised
positively. Common newspaper headlines in the run-up to the Olympics, like "mass
transit crisis could complicate city's Olympic prospects" (Hersh 2008), promise massive
improvement in the public transport systems in the wake of mega events.
Whether these claims are actually substantiated or not, has yet to be proven.
Long-term evaluations of impacts of mega events barely exist, and, if they do, they are
primarily descriptive. The key question is whether, given Olympic priorities and
requirements, it is realistic or even possible to accomplish true sustainable development
in cities. Are the promises made and possibilities offered by the Olympics to hosting
cities realistic?
There are some indications that they are, and some indications that they are not.
For example, Bovy concludes that "mega events are a catalyst for main metropolitan
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transport infrastructure developments, which are needed but would otherwise have been
constructed in a much longer time frame" (Bovy 2004b, p. 45). Those academics, who
have challenged general promises on urban development, expressed doubts about the
purely positive nature. "In their enthusiasm to be chosen as host city in competition with
other bid cities, many cities succumb to starting huge projects. Olympic Games
politicians push to build sport facilities and also start construction programs for
secondary and tertiary structures, which sometimes are in conflict with the city's long-
term development plans" (Preuss 2004, p. 79). Opponents and proponents claims,
however, are lacking evidence and deserve careful examination.
The IOC primarily paints a positive picture for applying cities, barely mentioning
the risks associated or the other - negative - perspectives on Olympic legacies. For
example, Cartalis pointed out the Schinias rowing center built during the Athens
Olympics as a good example of sustainable planning (Cartalis 2003). Controversially,
local media reports indicated the opposite. They reported that the Schinias rowing center
destroyed the natural habitat for many species and was a "disaster" for the environment
and historical site (Pappas 2003). Because of these discrepancies, I suggest taking a
closer look at legacies and challenge the message publicized by the pre-Olympics public
relations that preparations for the Olympics permanently enhance public transport.
The power to implement the Olympic transport vision
The IOC also has the power to implement its Olympic vision. I provide proof that
the IOC has the tools to influence a city's decision by pointing out involvement and
interference options during the Olympic preparation process, in specific to transport.
The IOC likely has the most power during the bidding and candidacy stage
because of the forthcoming evaluation process. "During the bidding stage, the cities face
the most pressure, because they are in it to win" says Lisa Hindson (2006) in an
Interview. In the bidding file, the city has to make a good argument why it is the best city
to host the event. Hence, it is trying to show itself in the best light possible. This may
mean, implementing measures that ensure superior travel conditions for athletes and
showcasing the potential of the city to handle millions of visitors. These preparations are
crucial in winning the bid. Bovy and Protopsaltis pointed out that "upgrading and
development of new transport infrastructure plays a key role in an Olympic bid and its
evaluation" (Bovy and Protopsaltis 2003, slide27).
Once the city wins the bid, it is responsible for fulfilling the promises made
during the application process. In the seven years following a successful bid, the city is
obligated to build the promised infrastructure, setting up the necessary services.
The medium of influence
To ensure cities meet IOC expectations and keep the promises made, the
evaluation is tightly linked to an extensive monitoring program. The monitoring program
is another way of influencing the cities progress and ongoing decisions. As a threat, -
which the IOC never actually executed - the IOC can take away the Games at any time
form the host and give it to the previous Games organizer in case obligations are not
being fulfilled. During the implementation stage, cities seek best practices and advice in
handling the transport task, which the IOC willingly provides. The IOC gains its
knowledge through the Transfer of Knowledge (TOK) program (Figure 4.2)32. The TOK
program ensures the knowledge transfer from one city to the next, because in Bovy's
opinion cities must take advantage of other very large event experiences and management
techniques. Training the core staff through participation in preceding Games is key to the
success of the Games (Bovy 2004a, p. 27).
32 The TOK program ensures that knowledge and lesson's learned about staging the Olympic Games get passed from
one hosting city to the other. For example, benefits to Games organizers "X+1" (Beijing 2008 monitoring of
Athens 2004) is a strong input into Games bidders "X+2" (candidate Cities for 2012 monitoring of Athens 2004).
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Figure 4.2: Transfer of Knowledge Program
Source: (Bovy, P., IOC Transport Consultant, personal communication via Email July 3 0 th 2008)
The tools of influence
Olympic Games Knowledge Management (OGKM) seminars and more than 40
Olympic Function Technical Manuals complete the Transfer of Knowledge Program
(Bovy, P., IOC Transport Consultant, personal communication via Email July 30" 2008).
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With a clear timeline in mind, seminars and personal advice to candidate cities paralleled
by frequent monitoring processes ensure the applicant cities meet their targets.
The pre-selection visit
Before selecting a city as a host, the official evaluation commission of the IOC
arranges a full pre-visit briefing and analysis of the whole candidacy dossier. This visit
includes two days of "in house" comprehensive presentations of all 17 themes, two days
of visits of all proposed competition and non competition venues, and a full wrap-up
session and evaluation commission press conference. This visit concludes with a
qualitative risk assessment of all 17 themes based on the initial bid report and
complementary information provided during this official IOC visit.
Evaluation of mandatory questionnaires
Candidature procedure and questionnaire distributed by the IOC are part of the
bidding process (IOC 2004). The questionnaire has a specific theme #14: transport. The
questionnaire requests information on existing, planned, and additional transport
infrastructure, the main parking areas, fleet information, distance and journey times for
the application year and the year the city is hosting the Games (between the competition
venues as well as the training venues) the goal is to establish a Candidate City's transport
network and operational plans for the Olympic Games (Bovy 2005). Selected candidate
cities can use the "acceptance evaluation to orient, adjust, and improve their bid quality
and coherence" (Bovy 2005).
The in-house evaluation and informal inquiries
The option for "in house analysis" of technical themes by IOC experts (security,
transport, economic development, etc) always exists. These experts are available for
confidential inquiries throughout the bidding phase (Bovy 2005).
Seminars and supporting documentation on how to prepare the bid (TOK)
Since 2002, IOC organizes a four-day "acceptance of candidate cities" seminar on
Games structure, content, main organizational functions, past most "successful"
experiences and key transfer of knowledge lessons. Furthermore, candidate cities receive
large amounts of material from the IOC on "how to bid". These include the Transfer-of-
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Knowledge material from previous Games as well as mandatory preparations. The
documents can amount to six 650-page dossiers including maps, CDs, and evaluation
reports (Bovy 2005). The acceptance of these recommendations by cities is manifested
through the statement by Bovy (2005) that the two-step bidding process and very
substantial transfer of knowledge program led to very high quality "competitive" bids.
Live Observer Program
City planners participate in Live Observer Programs other cities hosting the
Games prior to them; specific critical functions include sports management, transport,
security, accommodation, technology, media, arrivals departures etc.
TRANSPORT
* TRANSPORT DIRECTOR APPOImTED IG-6
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Figure 4.3: IOC influence on Olympic transport planning process
Source: (Bovy 2004a, p. 7)
These tools of influence are manifested in Figure 4.3 in the Box labeled "most
critical milestones" in transport. The IOC influence continues beyond the initial bidding
stage throughout the preparation process. The round shapes on top, labeled G's indicate
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the time left to the opening ceremony, e.g., G-5 is equivalent to the beginning of the
Games minus five years.
Approval of transportation plans
In transport the most crucial and central concern is the establishment of the
Olympic Transport Strategic and Business Plan. Cities have to submit this plan for
approval to the IOC (44 months prior to the Games). Final transport plan approval occurs
at G-12 (12 months prior to the Games). Any further changes to these plans have to be
approved in writing by the IOC.
Monitoring of the transport implementation process
Two monitoring streams exist: M1 and M2. Ml is the monitoring of promised
infrastructure and its implementation, which receives its final update 4 2 years prior to
the Games. M2 monitors the operational systems, including the testing a year prior to the
Games.
Overall, the tools of influence of the IOC carefully evaluated by its transport
consultant P. Bovy are trying their best to make sure the transport requirements for the
mega event are met (Bovy 2004a). In transport the most outstanding successful features
of former Games are "intelligently" incorporated in the transport strategic bid scheme
(Bovy 2005).
The recommendations given by the IOC on how to integrate Olympic plans into
the development of urban areas and transport system are vague. The downside of such
knowledge transfer is that a critical review of measures as well as the innovation of new
measures to handle the peak demands is neglected. Measures and tactics applied in one
city might not be the best choice for other cities given the circumstances of the city.
Furthermore, unsustainable practices can be passed on from city to another, especially if
the evaluation period of the OGGI program extends only two years after the Olympic
Games.
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Conclusions
In an attempt to ensure that the city is prepared for the Olympic transport
challenge, the IOC exercises power over hosting cities driven by their Olympic ideal and
the city's motivation to stage the 'perfect transport Olympics'.
Through the setting of objectives, demanding of priorities, and putting a strong
weight on transport during the evaluation process, the IOC has a strong influence on
Olympic transport, and hence its legacies. This influence lasts not only during the two
years leading up to election of the host, but also during the implementation stages.
Therefore, the challenge then lies in aligning the short-term strategy for the event and the
long-term strategy for city development early on in the bidding process.
During the bidding stage, competing interests show the greatest potential to clash.
I note that the desire to win the bid can lead cities to promise exceptional alterations to
urban areas. Once the bid is won, they are locked into their promises through the host city
contract.
The basic conflict in preparing the city lies in the motivations of actors. Getz
(1999, p. 24) hypothesized that the scale might tip in favor of the Olympic short-term
needs: "the event organization will likely be dominated by people whose mission is to
produce the event on time and within budget so the task of planning and monitoring
related effects is left to the government or 'watchdog' groups". Which of these two
actors, the city or the Olympics, dominate local thinking I will test in this study.
Even though the city and the event owner largely share the goal of making the
visitor experience an excellent one, the city has broader goals. They not only include
transport services and infrastructure to meet event needs, but also long-term development
objectives. For the city there is a clear tradeoff between short-term service delivery and
cost. The organizing body does not feel this tradeoff, because it only pays a
comparatively small amount; thus, it is likely to demand more and better services than the
city is likely to want to provide and pay for. The city also may or may not find tradeoffs
between short-term service delivery for the event and long-term development strategy. I
discuss the potential clash between the IOC's priorities and the city's goals in the next
chapter.
Chapter Five
THE FOUR CITIES
Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney, and Athens are intrinsically different cities, located
on three continents, and with unique histories, economies, political institutions, urban
forms, and transport networks (Table 5.1). Each city approached the Olympic planning
process differently, but with the same goal: to stage "the best Olympics ever." Each city's
leaders, trying to use the Olympics as an opportunity for change, considered individual
transport and urban goals in the city's spatial context. I argue throughout my analysis that
these goals were constrained by Olympic requirements and the interplay between the
IOC's requirements and metropolitan planner's visions resulted in a change of the
original cities' urban and transport plans. In the process, I identify gained and missed
opportunities.
Table 5.1: Cities' characteristics
Characteristic Barcelona Atlanta Sydney Athens
Country Spain USA Australia Greece
Year of the Olympics 1992 1996 2000 2004
Year of election 1986 1990 1993 1997
Year planning began -1979 -1986 -1990 -198833
Number of visitors 3,033,050 8,384,300 6,700,00 3,581,000
Number of athletes 9,400 10,400 10,600 10,600
Olympic main clusters 4 1 1 3
Public Transport 3 train 2 metro 12 train 1 metro line, 2
modes before Olympic companies, lines, lines, buses train lines, buses
Games 4 metro buses
lines, buses
Source: compiled by author
In this chapter, I tell four different stories about each city, mostly in chronological
order by tracing their trajectory over approximately 20 years. I divide each city story into
four sections. In the first section, I review the existing master plan for urban development
in each city and the sociopolitical context before the Olympic candidature. In the second
section, I analyze the bid and how the city prepared for the Olympic Games by focusing
on the influence of the Olympic requirements on transport and urban plans. In the third
33 Athens bid for the 1996 Games and used most of its ideas for the 2004 bid.
section, I briefly review the transport situation during the Games. In the fourth section, I
analyze the long-term impacts the Olympic Games had on transport in each city.
Barcelona (1992) - remodeling the city
The effect the Olympics had on Barcelona was expediting Barcelona's
development and completing projects within five years that would have taken 30 years
without them (Mosby 1992). Barcelona's planners decided to establish four Olympic
areas, placing one at each entrance gate of the city. All areas received significant
governmental funding to revitalize them, which included building hotels, removing old
industrial facilities, creating artificial beaches, and constructing a new port. As for
transport, the city added a ring road circling the metropolis, a tunnel connecting
Barcelona's northern suburbs, a mountain train, and escalators.
Barcelona, the capital of Catalufia, is located in the southeast of Spain on the
Mediterranean Sea. In the summer of 1992, Barcelona staged the Olympic Summer
Games, through which the city transformed itself. This transformation became an
inspirational model for future Olympic hosts, setting the highest standards on how to use
the Olympic Games as a stimulator for urban development and competitor in the global
realm. This transformative scheme became known as the "Barcelona model" (Capel
2007).
Figure 5.1: Barcelona
Source: ESRI, ArcGIS Resource Center, World Street Map;
http://resources.esri.corn/arcgisdesktop/index. cfm ?fa=content&tab= World Maps
Barcelona's history and transport situation
Under Spain's dictator Francisco Franco, Barcelona and Catalufia experienced 40
years of neglect of investment in public amenities. During this time the city grew mostly
uncontrolled, only constrained by natural boundaries: the sea, the rivers Llobregat and
Bes6s and the Serra de Collserola ridge (Sanchez et al. 2007). During Barcelona's
development years (between 1960 and 1970) the city experienced rapid industrial and
economic growth, accompanied by urban chaos and a lack of planning. After Franco's
death in 1975, Barcelona was left with both a legacy of economic and social isolation,
and the problems of its recent rapid urban growth. To make things worse, Spain was
stricken by a severe social and economic crisis marked by inflation, a declining
population, and an increase in unemployment.
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The neglect of investment in public infrastructure was also apparent in
Barcelona's transportation system (Corporacion Metropolitana de Barcelona 1986). The
public transport system had been in steep decline, while motorists pushed onto the city's
already clogged road network, resulting in increased air pollution in Barcelona's center.
After a democratic city government was elected in 1979, two entities were
established by the Catalonian Parliament for transport: in 1986, the Center Metropolitan
d'Informacio i Promocio del Transport S.A. (CETRAMSA), the metropolitan transport
company; and in 1987, the Entitat Metropolitana del Transport (EMT), which was a
coordinating committee formed by 18 municipalities in the Barcelona metropolitan area
with the task to provide joint public passenger transport services. The public transport
system consisted of three rail carriers: the Spanish railway company called renfe; the
metro; and the Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat de Catalunya (FGC), the regional railway
system. Bus systems were operated under the umbrella of the Transports Metropolitans
de Barcelona (TMB) (TMB 2008, p. 4).
A way out of the urban crisis - a metropolitan strategy
After years of neglect, Barcelona sought a way out of its urban crises. The goal
was to emerge as a global city with a revitalized Catalan identity and a strong political
leadership (Borja 2004). Nationwide, Barcelona experienced political stability and
continuity in the run-up to the Olympics. 34 Among all political parties, there existed a
strong sense of agreement regarding the Olympic dream (Sala-Schnorkowski 2007).
Interestingly, after the Games, a lack of political stability has stalled further rapid
transport and urban investments in Barcelona (Pamies Jaume 2007). For urban
regeneration, the Ajuntament de Barcelona (Barcelona's city government) sought to solve
Barcelona's main problems (the degradation of the city center, the lack of urban
consolidation of Barcelona's outskirts, and the need for rejuvenation of the sea front) and
established aspirational goals that were to guide the future development of the city under:
to foster regeneration of Barcelona and its individual city quarters, to open a discussion
34 Starting in 1982, the central Spanish Government was led by the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party until
1992. From 1980 until 2003, the autonomous government of the Generalidad de Catalunia was led by the
conservative nationalist coalition "Convergencia i Uni6"' 34 . Since the first free elections in 1979, Barcelona
City Council has been led by the "Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya" 34 in coalition with other progressive
political groups (SAnchez et al. 2007).
of grand schemes of change on the metropolitan scale, and to develop metropolitan
services such as transport, public spaces, etc., which would satisfy the needs of the
citizens (Argilaga and Benito 1997).
To make this strategy happen, there were three distinct plans, two of which had to
be modified due to Barcelona winning the Olympic bid:
* Plans for the New Center Areas (ANC = Arees de Nova Centralitat (catalan))
selected 10 undeveloped areas, which were to receive a concentration of services
and facilities that would make them new focal points in the city. The locations of
these 10 areas are marked in Figure 5.2 with yellow circles.
* Plan General de Metropolitano (PGM) of 197635, which included the development
of Barcelona and its 26 surrounding municipal areas laying out "la reconstrucci6n
de la ciudad" (the reconstruction of the city). The PGM sought to establish a new
urban order through a clear layout of public spaces and a road system that was to
prevent further congestion in the urban network.
35 Barcelona's Road Plan of 1983 was a close follow-up to the PGM.
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Figure 5.2: Plan General Metropolitano 19761
Source: (Guardia i Bassols et al. 1994, p. 89) modified by author indicating development areas
according to (Satnchez et al. 2007, p. 15) reproduced from (Esteban 1999)
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Besides supporting Barcelona's central road axes36 with a ring road, Mayor Serra
announced additional goals specifically for transport: to connect Barcelona to other cities
in the Catalonian area with systems of regional transportation. In reality, these were road
projects. Of particular relevance to my argument, is the dotted ring road around
Barcelona's center and the small black road to the north of Barcelona's center, passing
through the Serra de Collserrola.
Olympic candidature
In the socio-economic decline of Barcelona, the Olympic candidature became a
collective dream guided by its metropolitan vision. Barcelona's Olympic aspirations first
surfaced in 1980, when the mayor, Narcifs Serra, discussed with Juan Antonio Samaranch,
the IOC president at the time, the idea of Barcelona hosting the 1992 Olympics. In 1981,
four-and-a-half years before the official IOC application was due (1986), Serra officially
announced Barcelona's desire for the Olympics, which the Barcelona City Council
unanimously supported shortly thereafter. Plans and reports (e.g., the Cuyas Report of
1982) contributed to the creation of the preliminary report of the candidature (1983).
Following the planners' idea to take advantage of the Olympic opportunity to regenerate
Barcelona's and Catalufia's urban areas, Millet (2007) said: "It is not good that the
politicians are involved from the beginning [in the planning]. First, it had to be the
planners, the masterminds. It is not a political problem. It is a technical one." His
statement suggests two important planning features that contributed to Barcelona's
development. First, good planning not political motives should drive the alignment
between the metropolitan vision and the Olympic requirements. Second, planners have to
guard their plans against political influences. In these critical planning stages, Millet
(2007) and a few other architects prepared plans, supported by "very strong relations with
the mayor."
In the following years, Barcelona secured support from Madrid and started the
preparations for the Games by giving presentations to the IOC and forming the Barcelona
Candidature Governing Council. Barcelona's city council quickly realized the strong
influence of the IOC in the wake of the Olympics on urban politics.
36 The main access roads before 1992 were the Avenida Diagonal, Avenida Meridiana (north-south) and the
Gran Via, connecting east and west (Brunet 1993).
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In this sense, the institutional consensus created during the Olympic
Games broke with a negative inertia in the way of doing things in
Barcelona, characterized basically by the fact that traditionally, it was
only the municipality which confronted itself with urbanistic and sectoral
policies, which, because of their nature had to be the object of shared
attention with the central and autonomous [Catalonian] governments.
Source: (Acebillo Marin 1992, pp. 25-26) translated by author.
The election of Barcelona as the host of the 1992 Olympics took place in
Lausanne, Switzerland, on October 16, 1986. On March 12, 1987, COOB'92 -- standing
for "Comite Organizador Olimpico de Barcelona '92" - was officially constituted as the
supreme governing body of the Olympic Games. Even before Barcelona was officially
named the host of the '92 Olympics, the city had begun to enlist volunteers and had
started construction (NBCSports 1991).
Throughout Barcelona's candidacy and preparations, Olympic planners faced
extra scrutiny. Samaranch, born and raised in Barcelona, was the IOC's president at the
time of Barcelona's bid, candidature, and victory. He communicated intensively with the
planners and influenced Barcelona's planning process 37
Samaranch was in our favor. He was our worst enemy. And we had to do
it much, much, much better, because he was our worst enemy. He was our
worst critic: "this one no....this has to be that.....this" [quoting
Samaranch]. We had to do it much better. We knew more than them (the
other candidate cities). We were talking with everybody and we were
always better than what other cities were presenting. It was the only way
to win. Today, Barcelona would not win, impossible. I am very clear about
this.
Source: Interview with Millet in 2007, translated by author.
Overall Millet (2007) says the IOC itself - not their requirements -- barely
influenced the planning work of the Barcelona Organizing Committee, because at the
time Barcelona was hosting the Olympics, the IOC did not have the necessary expertise.
In fact, according to him, Barcelona was the foundation stone for future expertise used.
37 How much this personal relationship influenced Barcelona's election as the 1992 hosting city is not
discussed here. It was important, however, that Samaranch took a personal interest in the city of Barcelona
and hence fostered and guided Barcelona's comprehensive future development.
Dynamics of transport change - the macro perspective
The preparation of the Olympic candidature led to a change in priorities: "The
right to organize the 1992 Olympics ... evoked at first an enormous wave of enthusiasm
and satisfaction, and immediately a global reorganization of priorities of all kind..."
(Barreiro et al. 1993). How these new Olympic priorities affected the urban projects in
Barcelona was tremendous.
The modified urban plan for the Olympics
The urban land-use choices were guided by existing sporting facilities: 37 were
required, 27 were already built, 5 were under construction (1985-1986), and the other 5
were in the planning stages. Four areas within Barcelona served as centers of Olympic
activity, which - combined - fulfilled what was necessary to stage the Games (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Barcelona's four Olympic areas
(1) Montjuic (2) Diagonal (3)Vail (4) Parc de
d'Hebron Mar
Area in Fig. 5.3 southwest northwest northeast southeast
# of venues 5 6 5 2
# of sports 13 7 5 4
Source: compiled by the author: NBCSports 1991, BOCOG 1993
Note the change in priorities and directions of urban planning that is visible when
the layout (Figure 5.3) is compared with the ANC of 1976 (Figure 5.2). The Olympic
areas of Vall d'Hebron (3, corresponding to 8 in the PGM) and Parc de Mar (4,
corresponding to 5 in the PGM) were included in the initial ANC plan, while the areas of
Montju'ic (1) and Diagonal (2) were added by way of the Olympics as areas of
refurbishment (Corporacion Metropolitana de Barcelona 1976). This set-up clustered
sports venues and contained most of the athlete's and IOC's accommodations within a
circle of 5km, in which 85% of the sporting activities would take place. This change in
priorities - so Millet (2007) -was also beneficial for Barcelona: "the city needed a
structure to accommodate its future growth. We put an Olympic area at each entrance
gate of the city. It was easy, a clear vision."
Figure 5.3: Barcelona's Olympic ring road (1992)
Source: (Holsa 1992a)
With this change in priorities for areas of urban refurbishment, transport
investments also received different priorities in the run-up to the Olympic Games. While
Barcelona's regional road network expansion seemed in retrospect perfectly aligned with
Barcelona's urban vision, only the ring road38 surrounding the central city but not the
tunnel Vallvidrera had been in the 1976 PGM plan. Olympic spectator movements did
not require major changes in Barcelona's urban transport system, as the existing metro
lines efficiently linked all Olympic areas.
The new ring road
For the Olympics, the ring road was an absolute necessity said Millet i Serra
(2007). Each Olympic area was adjacent to the newly built rondas (marked as red roads
in Figure 5.3) providing an essential connection between the four Olympic areas:
Montjuic, Villa Olympica, Vall d'Hebron and Diagonal (HOLSA 1992b).). The Games
catalyzed the ring road guaranteeing the completion of the circuit before 1992 (Millet
1995). Seemingly, giving priority to the road infrastructure was in the interest of the IOC.
As Sala-Schnorkowski remembers, the IOC's priority was "to easily transport the
Olympic Family members and hence improve the transport networks of the roads and
38 Ronda de Dalt passed the city to the north and Ronda Litoral passed the city to the south along the coast
(HOLSA 1992b)
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streets of the inner city" (Sala-Schnorkowski 2007). Given that all the VIPs and athletes
were being transported by car, building the ring road seems to have been an important
consideration in the planning stages. Cross concurs writing that the Olympics changed
transportation plans in Barcelona. "A drastic rethink of the planned road network led to
the adoption of a much more ambitious scheme, involving the construction of a 21 km
outer ring system" (Cross 1992, p.12).
For Barcelona, the ring road "was an absolute necessity" said Oriol Pamies Jaume
(2007), the press contact of TMB, during an interview. The reasons were many to go
ahead with the road project at the time of the Olympics. Many studies in the planning
stages of this ring road39 stressed the city's inadequate capacity to satisfy current and
future travel demand between the region and the metropolis.40 Building the ring would
result in a significant drop in inner-city traffic. 41 Furthermore, the ring road would reduce
noise and pollution levels and enhance access to the airport (Preuss 2004). However it
was clear to the planners that the new road would only relieve congestion for a few years
(Riera 1993). Furthermore, the powerful Olympic stimulant erased many and varied
problems that had hindered building the roads earlier on (Servicios Tecnicos de la CMB
1993). Since 1970 the ring road had encountered fierce resistance from the residents of
the neighborhood adjacent to the ring held massive protests opposing the construction of
the Ronda de Dalt (Sanchez et al. 2007). The residents opposed the idea of having a large
highway cut through their city, and demanded instead additional metro lines to be
installed.42
The Vallvidrera tunnel
The Vallvidrera tunnel (marked in the Figure 5.3) was one of the basic elements
of the road infrastructure connecting Barcelona the city's northern suburbs, Terrassa and
Collserola (Holsa 1992a). At the same time, the completion of the tunnel was crucial for
39 The ring road first appeared in the Plan de la Red Arterial de Barcelona in 1963 (Barreiro et al. 1993, pp.
9-11)
40 According to coordinator of the Transport and Traffic Area, Alfred Morales Gonzalez, that would require
increasing the capacity of the metropolitan region from the current 588,000 to 900,000 vehicles per day.)
Otherwise, the road system would reach saturation in 1995 (Servicios Tecnicos de la CMB 1993)
41 According to the simulations, the ring road would cause a 15% reduction of traffic density by removing
the through traffic and reduce travel time more than 90% (Servicios Tecnicos de la CMB 1993)
42 Interview with Albert Recio, Associaci6 de Veins de Nou Barris (Nou Barris residents' association),
05/07/05, in Sanchez et al. 2007.
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the Olympics. "Is of crucial importance for the celebration of the Olympic Games ... "43
(CEAM 1987, p. 82). Starting the Vallvidrera tunnel also required building an additional
five smaller tunnels to connect Sant Cugat and extend the road network to join a further
highway up north. Interesting to note here, is that the Vallvidrera tunnel was not planned
in the original PGM plan of 1976 (see Figure 5.2 of PGM 1976). The Vallvidrera tunnel
did appear before then, in the Plan Comarcal of 1953 (Guardia i Bassols et al. 1994).
Dynamics of urban and transport change - the micro perspective
Each of the four Olympic areas required modifications to make them accessible
for the expected passenger demands. The following sections discuss each area, identify
and explain the transport bottlenecks, and describe the solutions that were sought because
of the Games.
The MontjuYc Mountain
The mountain of Montjuic was the heart of the Barcelona Games. Located 70
meters above the city with the Olympic Park and 13 of the Olympic sports, it contained
more venues than the other Olympic areas. The area around Montjuic required significant
infrastructural investments in old and new stadiums and were to integrate Montjuic into
the city. In 2007, the area was primarily a destination for tourists, and occasional
festivities still gave life to the area.
Solving the Transport Bottleneck
The Montjuic area has always had serious accessibility problems from the city
(Holsa 1992a). The primary means of access to MontjuYc was by foot. Given that
Montjuic was expected to welcome close to 2 million spectators and thousands of athletes
for the Olympics, several access alternatives were considered. For BOCOG, it was clear
that private cars had to be constrained, but the capacity that could be provided with taxis,
shuttles, and buses alone was insufficient. After long political battles and conflicts within
governmental organizations, visitors to the Olympics were provided with three alternative
modes of transport to Montju'c:
* A bus shuttle service from the Plaza Espafia to the Olympic area,
43 I la seva importancia per a la celebracio dels JJOO es evident... (translated by the author from Catalan)
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* Mechanical escalators embedded in the slopes of the mountain. Specifically for
the Games three new escalators from the Plaza de Espafia to the Olympic Ring
were installed, permitting access to the sport venues within 15 minutes (Holsa
1992a). This system was considered to function well during the Olympics because
of its high flexibility and reliability.
* The funiculars, a mountain train from the parallel metro station. This option was
expected to attract the most passengers. Due to the exhibition in 1929, the
funiculars already existed, but the Olympic Games required the complete
refurbishment of the mountain train (Sala-Schnorkowski 2007).
Funiculars de Montjuic
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Figure 5.4: Ridership of Barcelona's funiculars
Source: (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1993, 1995, 1999)
After refurbishing the old system, the funiculars carry about twice as many
passengers yearly, most of them tourists. 44 In 2007, the funiculars were running regularly
up the mountain.
Extension of the metro - a missed opportunity?
Prior to the bid in 1986, four metro lines were in operation (Sala-Schnorkowski
1986). One possibility discussed among the decision-makers to access provide access for
spectators to Montjuic was to refurbish an old but since the 80's abandoned metro line
(marked in the Figure 5.5 with L2 with the thick black line) and extend it underneath the
44 In 1991 the train was closed due to the reconstruction works. In 1992, the year of the Olympics, the
ridership spiked.
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Montjuic Mountain to Barcelona's airport El Prat (dotted line). The political focus on the
existing lines and the cheap alternative of the escalators available overrode any
discussion to revitalize prior to the Olympics.
Unea 2 AM
Figure 5.5: An alternative access to Barcelona's Montju'ic - metro line 2
Source: (CEAM 1987, p. 88)
Both the mayor and the public transport committee supported such a metro
refurbishment, because the main section of Line 2 already existed and forecasts predicted
a the line to carry 45.8 million passengers yearly after the Olympics (CEAM 1987; TMB
1988). The TMB president at the time, Sala-Schorkowski, was hoping for support of the
extension of Line 2 by the IC, but was told by Samaranch that the time frame for such a
project was simply too short for implementation 45 (Samaranch 1989).
The more powerful reason seems to be somewhat different. For the Games, it was
impossible to start operating the metro, because there was not enough funding available -
it had been tied up through more important Olympic projects (Millet 2007). Because the0 0100*046W i4
Olympic Montjuic station would not generate enough Olympic demand 46 and other -
cheaper - alternatives were available, the metro line received lesser priority among the
projects that had to get implemented prior ransporthe Games. Thtee revitalization of the metro
L2 was started in 1995, and within two years the entire line was revived (Mateu Cromo
1996; Schwandl 2004).
pr45 Olympic Archives Summer Olympic Games Barcelona 1992 - "lieu competition to transport position
du CIO"
46 Olympic Archives / Summer Olympic Games Barcelona 1992 - internal transportation access
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The Diagonal Area and Vail d'Hebron
In the Diagonal area, competitions in seven sports were held. The Diagonal was
one of Barcelona's upscale areas, with an established university, high-class hotels
(lodgings of the IOC members) and expensive shops (NBCSports 1991; Sanchez et al.
2007). The Vall d'Hebron, which hosted competition in five sports, used to be a remote
neighborhood with a middle-class residential area (NBCSports 1991) Residences for the
referees, judges and media were added (Barreiro et al. 1993). Both areas seem to have
remained active, but Vall d'Hebron is characterized by large empty parking lots - likely
white elephants of the Olympics. Transport connections were good thanks to the existing
Line 3 and the newly built Rondas.
Parc del Mar
Placing the Olympic Village in the run-down area of Poblenou was the key
decision to inaugurate the recovery of the sea front and make Barcelona's metropolitan
vision come true. This area, one of the most traditional districts of Barcelona, was the
location of old factories, workshops, and many abandoned buildings. With Parc del Mar
hosting competitions in four sports, within this area 2,500 new stores, new residential
complexes, and two high-rises for new offices and hotels were built in the run-up to the
Games (Barreiro et al. 1993). In designating this area as the home to the majority of the
15,000 athletes, it had to have a pleasant atmosphere, and guarantee optimum security
(Martorell et al. 1991). Therefore the Ajuntament de Barcelona undertook vast
improvements to the area including a new metro station, a new Sport port, new beaches,
and new sewage systems.
The sports marina, the Olympic Village and restaurants as well as evening leisure
facilities turned the former industrial area into a center of urban life, which it remained
fifteen years later. Eventually, though it became evident that the Olympic Village was no
place for families. Because public amenities, such as schools and kindergartens, had not
been provided for, the area was not attractive to families, according to Brunet (2007).
The cooperation among public entities to transform the sea front, so Sala-
Schnorkowski (2007) believes, was only possible because of the Games and very
influential people involved in the process. After the Olympics were over, the unique
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cooperation that had been in existence for the Olympics dissolved (Sala-Schnorkowski
2007). Hence, the Olympic Games provided the catalytic momentum to bring forth
Barcelona's revolutionary development plans
The tracks must go - a new strategy for renfe
In order to recover the sea front, the two renfe train tracks excluding the old
Municipal "Sant Marti" from Barcelona had to be removed. The problem of the train
tracks blocking access to the sea and thus hindering the reurbanization of Barcelona was
already evident in 1981, but only in February 1986 - 18 months before Barcelona was
elected as the 1992 host city -- an agreement between the presidents of renfe, the
Ajuntament de Barcelona, the Ministry of Transport, Tourism and Communication, and
the Metropolitan Corporation was reached, announcing the plan to remove the tracks and
transform the Franca train station (Delegacion de la 5a zona 1989). 47 To compensate for
the removal of the existing train tracks, a formerly freight-only line to El Clot junction
was upgraded to allow suburban trains access to the city center (CEAM 1987).
The Artificial Beaches
After the train tracks were removed, the Auntament de Barcelona created six
artificial beaches (San Sebastia, Barceloneta, Nova Icario, Bogatell, Mar Bella, and Nova
Mar Bella) and a new port, where Olympic regattas could be held (Ajuntament de
Barcelona 1993; HOLSA 1992b).
Serving the airport El Prat
The airport is located approximately 10 km to the west of the city center. In the
wake of the Olympics, the airport was improved with a new international passenger
terminal, new aircraft parking platforms, and new car parks (Bofill 1993; CIO-
Documentation 1985). Before the Games, the airport was exclusively served by renfe and
private motorway access. For the Games, a new airport bus service was introduced in
December 1991. It was expected to attract close to a million passengers a year (Cross
1992). 15 years later, the airport service is still in operation.
47 The Franca train station was later on abandoned, remaining only as a historic building.
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Estaci6 del Nord
Estaci6 del Nord (Northern Station), a former train station, was renovated for the
1992 Olympics. It was used as a depot as well as a major hub for Olympic bus services.
In 2007, it served as the terminus for long-distance and regional bus services.
During the Olympics
Infrastructural improvements alone were not enough to satisfy the requirements
the Olympics placed on Barcelona (Association of Summer Olympic International
Federation 1990). Hence, the city undertook a wide variety of temporary measures to
accommodate the traffic and transit flows. In the end, "it was planning for a lot more
people than were really coming" as Vilalante (2007), the former head of the transport
operations of the Barcelona Games, said in an interview.
Traffic and transit management strategies
For the Olympic Family and IOC members, Barcelona implemented special lanes
for the Olympic Family, which ran on exclusive sections of inner-city roads and Rondas.
Cars and buses allowed to travel on them had priority over public transit and private
traffic (COOB'92 1990). Only during the first day of the celebration, so Vilalante (2007)
remembers, "the buses for the Olympic Family had problems with reaching their
destinations, because the bus drivers were from all over Spain."
The general public was encouraged to take public transport, which was free of
charge for Olympic ticket holders.48 Several public transport routes provided access to
the venues, whereas metro lines 3 and 4 carried the largest passenger loads (COOB'92
1990, slide 36). Besides the existing rail and bus networks, Barcelona's city council
provided additional public bus routes to and from the Olympic venues and to central
locations (TMB 1992). Overall, Barcelona's bus network was expanded by 20%. Priority
was given to public transport through a special traffic light system that had been
experimentally introduced before the Games (COOB'92 1990; Cross 1992). Overall, the
bus systems received a harsh critique. On August 10, 1992, an experienced journalist for
48 IOC Archives / Summer Olympic Games of Barcelona 1992 - special conditions 1989
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the Games stated that it was not easy to report on the Games due to the unreliable bus
service.49
Park-and-ride facilities along the rail systems were provided so residents and
tourists could easily access the inner city (COOB'92 1990). The base load on Barcelona's
road network was reduced through the implementation of traffic demand measures, such
as flexible working days and bringing forward summer holidays. Residents criticized the
noise during the Olympics: "The cars of the Olympic Games jammed the Passeig de
Gracia area, their roar nearly drowning out the birds in the trees" (Mosby 1992). During
the Games, COOB established traffic-control zones around the old city with strict parking
and access restrictions were established (Cross 1992; Culat 1992).
In a tourism survey measuring the Olympic experience of visitors, the access to
Olympic areas, the park and rides, as well as the parking restrictions scored below
average. In comparison, the Olympic ticket for public transport received very high marks
(Brunet 1993, p. 110).
Fleet modernizations to ensure comfort
Barcelona's public transit agencies used the opportunity the Olympics presented
to modernize their fleet. Buses were modem and fully air-conditioned, the metro received
new cars, and renfe bought new suburban electric multiple-units, as well as an electronic
passenger information system (Cross 1992). Even though the upgrade was mentioned in
different documents, most of it benefited metro Line 3, which was and did carry most of
the Olympic load.
Traffic and transit management systems to ensure control
In the wake of the Olympics, Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) for access
control and speed regulation were installed on Barcelona's road system. The ITS were
capable of issuing immediate maintenance warnings and likely resulted in time
reductions in emergency response. To coordinate these measures, Barcelona built a new
technology operations info center. In the long term, Barcelona's city council hoped that
these high tech systems would maximize social benefit through time savings and enhance
49 "Some scheduled buses did not run on time and some did not exist" (Klein 1992).
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environmental protection through emission reduction. The system could also be used to
give priority to public transport (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1988, 1989a, 1989b).
An evaluation of transport outcomes
"The planning focus was on after the Olympic Games" emphasizes Sala-
Schnorkoski (2007). Because of this mindset, a clear vision of Barcelona's future, and
stong leaders to guard this vision, Barcelona looked fundamentally different after than
before the Games. The Olympics provided the impetus for radical transformation of
Barcelona to a beautiful Mediterranean city (Botella 1995).
Investments in transport infrastructure, during the seven years leading up to the
Games, however, were split very unevenly; about 95% went into new roads (calculated
from Brunet 1993). Officially, these investments were justified by Barcelona's long-
standing problem of continuous traffic congestion in the inner city and the lack of
capacity to meet traffic demand from the outskirts. Unofficially, and as argued in this
Barcelona narrative, the roads were an absolute necessity for the IOC and Olympic
athletes, whereas public transit to serve the peak passenger demands was already
sufficient.
The Rondas
According to Sala-Schnorkowski (2007), the CEO of TMB during the Olympics,
the Olympics brought improvements primarily to road infrastructure. Even though the
plans to upgrade Barcelona's roads had been around for a long time, the Olympics
provided "la facilidad para decirlo50" (Sala-Schnorkowski 2007). Building the Rondas
changed the traffic-flow patterns immediately from centralized axes to a circling ring and
hence relieved congestion in the inner city (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1990, p. 387, 1993,
p. 427).
Five years after the Games the Fundaci6 Barcelona Olimpica conducted a survey
measuring citizen's satisfaction with the infrastructure built for the Olympics. The
Rondas were selected as the most important infrastructural change, ranked even ahead of
the Olympic Port, the new sea front, the Olympic Village and the sport installations
50 the setting to say it.
1--
around Barcelona (Anguera Argilaga and Gomez Benito 1997). All Barcelonan
interviewees agreed with the Director General for Land Transport on the fact that "the
Rondas were an absolute necessity for the city, from which the residents still profit
today"(Villalante 2007).
Autobus and Metro
Figure 5.6: Ridership metro and buses in Barcelona between 1986 and 1998
Source: (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1993, 1995, 1999)
Arguably, because of the Rondas the city's metro ridership declined after the
inauguration of the roads (Figure 5.6; between 1991 to 1994). In 2007, however, the city
continued to face the same old/new challenge of traffic congestion in the inner city and
some citizens called into question the decision not to implement a pricing structure for
road usage at Games time (Phmies Jaume, 2007).
Public transit system
According to Sala-Schnorkowski (2007), public transport did not experience
major changes, because it played a minor role during the Olympics, primarily solving
access to Montjuic (Sala-Schnorkowski 2007). Some urban projects, as Brunet (1993, p.
82) summarizes, were not implemented in the run-up to the Olympics. In particular to
transport, he mentions the metropolitan transportation system and the construction of the
high-speed rail line linking Barcelona with Montpellier and Madrid.
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According to Pamies Jaume (2007), there were two major transport initiatives that
were inaugurated during the Olympic Games, but not immediately continued afterwards.
First, an integrated fare system that allowed passengers to switch freely between transport
modes.51 Second, accessibility for disabled people was started with thousands of low-
floor buses and the adaptation of the metro for these passengers. 52 Furthermore, PSunies
Jaume (2007) acknowledged that a few parking restrictions and methods (such as the
"green zone" 53) have been kept after the Olympics had left.
Conclusions
In all the existing literature on the Olympic Games, Barcelona has been hailed as
the perfect model of how to plan for them. The alignment of mega-event requirements
with the metropolitan plan was superb, while investments in public infrastructure prior to
the Olympics have been described as catalytic. My analysis largely agrees with this view,
but differs with the claim that the Olympics have a purely catalytic effect.
In this city narrative about Barcelona, I have shown that the Olympics had a
decisive influence on the city's urban and transport-planning process. The decision to add
two Olympic areas to Barcelona's original urban plan made further changes to the
transport system compulsory in order to accommodate the peak movements of visitors
and athletes between all Olympic areas. These included adding subway stops,
refurbishing the green metro line, overhauling the traffic management system, building
the Vallvidrera tunnel, providing escalators, and the funiculars to guarantee access for
spectators to the venues on Montjuic - all projects that were not slated to be undertaken
prior to winning the Olympic bid. Accordingly, the IOC exercised a decisive influence on
Barcelona's development. At the same time, Barcelona also undertook projects that were
planned prior to the Olympics and sped them up (catalyzed them), such as a ring road
circling the inner city. The Rondas for the city's future and the IOC's preference for road
transport aligned well strategically. Most of the investments in the run-up to the
Olympics benefited private rather than public transport. This fulfilled Barcelona's
51 It took Barcelona 15 years to implement integrated ticketing into its transport system.52 By 2007, the process was finally completed (Pamies Jaume 2007).
53 The green zone allows residential parking for 1 Euro a week, whereas non-residents have to pay 3 Euros
per hour.
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transport goal to relieve inner-city congestion and connect Barcelona's suburbs to the
center. Conversely, other urban projects - especially in public transport -- were delayed
because of the establishment of new priorities imposed by the Olympic requirements
(e.g., revitalizing an old metro line). The main investment in public transport - the
funiculars - primarily benefits tourists. Removing the train tracks along the coastal lines
definitely improved public access to the sea front, but by no means improved
accessibility within the city of Barcelona; rather, it constituted a rerouting of passenger
movements in Barcelona's vicinity.
Even though the Olympics imposed many requirements on Barcelona (e.g., the
number of sports), in 1988 -- the year Barcelona won the bid -- Olympic requirements
were comparatively lax. Responsibility for success lay with the city, including learning
from previous experiences. As cautionary examples, Barcelona had its two immediate
Olympic predecessors - Montreal and Los Angeles. The former ran up a tremendous
public debt; the latter staged private Games without public input. Barcelona's goal was to
use the Olympic Games optimally for a positive future, revamping a city that had been
neglected for decades. Strategically and with a very long planning horizon, Barcelona
aligned the Olympics in exemplary fashion with its urban vision and transport goals.
Atlanta (1996) - the vision of staging successful Games
Atlanta missed the chance for the Olympics to bring about major change to its
transport system, even though the city's goal was to evolve out of the Olympic
preparations as a modern multi-modal transport city. Atlanta's Games were driven by the
private sector, whose interest lay in revitalizing downtown while spending a minimum on
public infrastructure. Through the Olympics, Atlanta received a new inner-city park and
new housing developments adjacent to Olympic venues. In terms of transport, road
expansions were undertaken, high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes implemented, the
metro expanded, and the city equipped with a new traffic management system.
Atlanta, the state capital of Georgia, is located in the southeast of the United
States of America. In 1996, the Atlanta region counted a population of slightly more than
3 million people. During the summer of 1996, Atlanta hosted the Games of the XXVI
Olympiad, unofficially known as the Centennial Olympics.
Figure 5.7: Atlanta
Source: ESRI, ArcGIS Resource Center, World Street Map;
htto://resources.esri.corn/arceisdesktop/index.cfnm ?fa=content&tab= World Maos
Atlanta's urban and transport history
Atlanta originated as the terminal point of the Western and Atlanta Railroad in
1839. After World War II, the city experienced an explosive growth and sprawled
extensively. With the creation of a metropolitan planning agency in 1947 (later named the
Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC)) regional planning and coordination among the
intergovernmental agencies for the 10-county Atlanta region began (ARC 1996).
According to Beaty (2007), however, despite the establishment of the ARC, there was
rarely any visible evidence of coordination in Atlanta's subsequent development. The
agency principally concentrated on the development of the central business district
(CBD), which resulted in uncoordinated land use and weak regional facilities
accompanied by a rapid outward expansion of the metropolitan area (Nelson 1993).
Atlanta's history has been marked by a social and racial divide. By the 1980s, the inner
city was dominated by an African-American population, most of whom were poor,
jobless, and homeless (Beaty 2007). Whites had moved to the suburbs, almost completely
abandoning Atlanta's center. Redevelopment and revitalization of downtown Atlanta was
on the political agenda, especially under Mayors Andrew Young and Maynard Jackson in
the 1970s and 1980s. As a solution, they sought to conquer the hospitality industry,
starting with the Democratic National Convention in 1988.
Atlanta's transport system has been and still is mostly based on its extensive road
network (Chapman 2000). Atlanta's freeway system was first planned in 1946 (the
Lochner Plan) and continuously expanded, e.g., through the National Defense Highway
Act, which made Atlanta the juncture of 3 interstate highways (Helling 1997). Streetcars,
trackless electric trolleys, and automobiles were the primary means of transport until
1963, after which private cars and buses dominated the streets and finally displaced other
means of public transport. Only in 1975, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority (MARTA) built MARTA's rail system, to open by the end of 1996 (Helling
1997, p. 75). Racial tension also played a significant role in transit decision-making
(Helling 1997, p. 74):
..., the whiter counties have long avoided anything that might bring them
any closer to the black core. That is the real reason why links to MARTA
(which was said in its early days to stand for "Moving Africans Rapidly
Through Atlanta") have been resisted and why, even in a much more
tolerant city, people in the outlying suburbs stick doggedly to their cars.
(Anonymous 1999) in The Economist
Use of an automobile to access the suburbs was an unaffordable option for people
of color, forced to reside in downtown Atlanta. Any expansion of public transportation
met resistance from political leaders, because with it would come "those people" (Beaty
2007, p. 41). With limited public-transit options available, the sprawling city had rapidly
increased residents' dependence on the automobile, and investments in modem
superhighways 54 became a necessity for accessing Atlanta. The highway system
developed further, radiating from Atlanta's CBD in six directions (ARC 1996). "Traffic
was nightmarish for commuters" (p. 19) and "transportation was legendarily chaotic,
late, [and] crowded" (p. 31); thus Beaty (2007) describes the transport situation before
the Olympic Games.
54Exhibition on Olympic Games, Kenan Research Center, Atlanta, USA.
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Atlanta's metropolitan plan
Given the socio-economic disparity in Atlanta and its impact on public and
private transport services, Atlanta's future development plans only called for a small
expansion of the MARTA's rail (Figure 5.8) but a significant upgrade in road
infrastructure ( Figure 5.9) until 2010.
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Figure 5.8: MARTA ex ansion plan in 1999
Source:(ARC 1999, p. 52)
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Figure 5.9: Atlanta's new highway lanes
Source: (ARC 1999, p. 56)
Atlanta's infrastructural plan clearly focused on improving highway
infrastructure.55 Buses were planned to be the primary means of public transport,
including radial and cross-feeder buses to MARTA, running on Atlanta's freeways.
Exclusive priority was not given to those buses; they had to share HOV lanes with other
55 Until 2010, the city was planning to add 162 miles of new roads, to widen 759 miles of its highways, and
to upgrade 87 miles of its road network. The plan also suggested twenty-one park-and-ride facilities along
major highways and MARTA's rail stations.
vehicles. These HOV lanes were to be implemented by 2010 according to the dotted lines
in Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10: Atlanta's HOV lanes
Source: (ARC 1999, p.57)
As we shall see later, more HOV lanes, specifically on 1-20 (the east-west
connection), were added to the HOV lanes of the original 2010 transport plan. The
stimulus of the Games for the HOV lanes likely stemmed from the IOC's free flow traffic
requirement.
Cities bid for a win-win situation: the Olympic vision
Aligned with the mayors' desire to foster Atlanta's hospitality industry, Billy
Payne, a real estate lawyer in Atlanta, had the idea in the mid-1980s to host the 1996
Olympic Games. Embracing Payne's vision, he and his friends, informally known as the
"Atlanta Nine," formed an informal bid committee that lacked any political support,
because the local authorities did not believe Atlanta would stand a chance of winning the
Olympic competition. In 1987, Atlanta submitted its bid (along with 14 other cities) to
the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to become the candidate city of the USA
(Senn 1999). After winning the US bid, Atlanta entered the international competition for
the Olympic Games in February 1990. The application to the IOC had strong support
from private businesses.56 Public authorities, instead, only reluctantly supported the bid,
declining to take on any responsibilities for the Games. In September 1990, the city was
awarded the right to stage the 1996 Olympic Games by the IOC (ACOG 1993c, pp. 6-8).
The Atlanta Nine had been the driving force behind the bid as the core of the
Atlanta Olympic Committee (AOC). In early 1991, the AOC reconstituted itself as the
Atlanta Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (ACOG), a private, non-profit
corporation. Billy Payne headed ACOG, as president, with the former mayor of Atlanta,
Andrew Young, as his Co-Chair (ACOG 1995a; Beaty 2007). ACOG was in charge of
planning and staging the events for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games.
What distinguished the Atlanta case from the other three cities in this study in its
planning approach was that the city of Atlanta refused from the very beginning to
financially participate in the Olympics. Like Atlanta's U.S. predecessor, Los Angeles
(1984), the Games were to be privately financed Olympics (Preuss 2004). The city
leaders' decision was driven by the reluctance of the public towards the Olympic Games,
who feared heavy tax increases to finance the Games just as had happened in Montreal
(1976). Because the major portion of the Games was financed by the private sector, the
focus of the organizing committee was to raise funding and cut expenses to a minimum.
56 In 1989, businesses began preparing for the possibility of Atlanta winning the Games. To take advantage
of the potential monetary influx and the associated tourist spending, they fostered the creation of the
Metropolitan Atlanta Olympic Games Authority (MAOGA), which was eventually established through
House Bill 659 (Blair et al. 1996). MAOGA would become the public authority responsible for review of
ACOG construction contracts, financial statements and budgets, approval of venue changes, and
construction of the Olympic stadium.
Political leaders saw Atlanta evolving through the Olympics into the next great
international city (ACOG 1993a; French and Disher 1997; Yarbrough 2000). With this
vision, it became necessary to revitalize Atlanta's CBD to display a clean and glorious
image of a world-class city. With the Atlanta Nine as the growth regime in place
dominating as the corporate elite, the Olympics "gave the business/political power elite
the excuse they had longed for to tighten their grip on Atlanta's development" (Beaty
2007, p. 6). The result showed, as Short (2004, p. 107) argued, in a push for "major urban
restructuring that primarily benefited business and corporate interests."
Location and access - the Olympic Ring in Atlanta's CBD
Atlanta's plan for the 1996 Centennial Olympics had as its core idea to
concentrate most of the Olympic venues in the center of the city. Located in this Olympic
Ring, which was an area conceived as within 1.5 mile radius, were 20 sports hosted in 11
Olympic venues, and the main Olympic Village - located at Georgia Tech (Figure 5.11).
Housing for athletes, officials, and the Olympic Family was spread within the ring. Also
within the Olympic ring were the main press center, the international broadcast centre
(located in the Georgia World Congress centre), and the Olympic Family hotel.
Concentrating the Olympic venues in a tight ring seemingly offered easy access to most
venues (ACOG 1995b, p. 7). Near the centre of the Olympic Ring, the only two subway
lines of MARTA intersected for easy access to the venues for spectators. This
concentration, as we shall see later, caused significant challenges in transporting athletes
and officials to their respective venues by bus.
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Figure 5.11: Atlanta's Olympic Ring
Also included in the bid, was the creation of Centennial Park, which was to
become Atlanta's most visible imprint of an Olympic legacy. ACOG's motivation for
creating it was primarily for the Olympic Games as "a gathering place for hundreds of
thousands of visitors during the 1996 Olympics" (ACOG 1995a, p. 79).
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With most of the venues being located in the central city, this set-up promised the
revitalization of 15 decaying neighborhoods adjacent to the Olympic venues. In charge of
planning and executing Atlanta's revitalization efforts in the downtown neighborhoods
was the Corporation for Olympic Development in Atlanta (CODA) (Rutheiser 1996).
Their efforts, however, primarily focused on creating a worthy Olympic image. Without
public funding at hand, AOC built only for the most visible, front-row communities new
homes, becoming "living advertisements for how well Atlanta treated its poor
neighborhoods" (Beaty 2007, p. 6).
The transport promises and expectations
"Atlanta sold its bid principally on its transport" believes Powell (2007), the
athletics correspondent for The New York Times for 18 years. The IOC had doubted that
Atlanta's strongest competitor for the Centennial Games, Athens, would be able to handle
the traffic volume associated with the Games, given the infrastructure at that time (Senn
1999). The bar for transport was set high from the very beginning, in that transport was to
"allow the guest to move comfortably from event to event breaking new ground in
efficiency and techniques and surpassing past Olympic transportation systems in
efficiency" (ACOG 1993b, p. I-1).
The Olympic legacy for transport was to "establish integrated, multi-modal
transportation systems which move people and goods in a more efficient and
environmentally sensitive manner" (Atlanta Department of Planning and Development
and Corporation for Olympic Development in Atlanta (CODA) 1993, section 1, p. 3).
Organizers foresaw as the long-term benefits to the city such as "repairs to key
transportation facilities, an advanced traffic management system, high occupancy vehicle
lanes on the freeway system, the multimodal Atlanta transportation centre, travel
behavior changes, pedestrian facilities, the use of alternative fuel vehicles and a
continued spirit of cooperation and pride" (ACOG 1993b, p. 1-7). "We're hoping the
commuting changes will be the legacy of the Games for transportation" (Kelly Love cited
from Goldberg 1996). Advertised to the IOC throughout the bidding, candidacy, and
preparation period was the technology and advanced infrastructure with which Atlanta
would present itself to the world (ACOG 1995b). Specifically, ISTEA allotted additional
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funds for the Atlanta region to develop the Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS)
demonstration project. With these improvements in place the city was expected to run
"like clockwork, ensuring mobility for all" during the Olympics (ACOG 1993b, p. I-1).
Preparing for the Olympic Games
Transportation planning for the Atlanta Games started in 1989, when a group of
transport agencies developed the first 1996 Atlanta Olympic Transportation plan (ARC
1996): however, at that time, venue locations, and in particular, the Olympic stadium's
location had not been fixed (ARC 1996). In 1992, ACOG, which was responsible for
providing transport to the Olympic Family and spectators attending the 1996 Centennial
Olympic Games, put two agencies in charge of transport planning, the Olympic
Transportation Support Group (OTSG) and the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC), the
agency primarily responsible for transportation planning and programming in the Atlanta
region (ACOG 1993c). Throughout the candidacy and even shortly before the Opening
Ceremony, important locations, such as training facilities, parking lots, and bus depots,
continued changing, which was to become a key obstacle for robust and reliable transport
planning (ORTA 1998b, Appendix A, p. ii). Furthermore, traffic estimates kept on rising
as Atlanta approached the Olympic Opening Ceremony. In the end, planners grossly
underestimated the actual demand, which would lead to traffic congestion and severe
overloads on the Olympic transport system. Atlanta staged the largest and most compact
Olympic Games ever with 11 million tickets sold(Dahlberg 1996).
Transportation systems of the Games
ACOG's role was to coordinate and manage the Olympic Transport System
(OTS) for the Atlanta Olympics, which comprised three different transport systems (U.S.
Department of Transportation 1997) (ACOG 1994): (1) The Olympic Family Fleet
System (OFFS), which consisted of operating the Olympic Family motor pool, primarily
automobiles and other light vehicles. (2) The Olympic Family Transport System (OFTS),
which was to provide transport for 150,000 people, including all athletes, technical
officials, NOC, and IOC members classified as being in the A-category (ACOG 1995a, p.
11). The Olympic Family OTS (bus and van) was outsourced by ACOG to a private
management company and bus provider, which had no former experience in handling
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large volumes. (3) The Olympic Spectator Transportation System (OSTS), which
consisted of the 46-mile MARTA rail system with 36 stations, and MARTA's 150 bus
routes, on which express buses operated from Olympic park-and-ride lots to downtown
Atlanta venues, and shuttle buses ran from selected rail stations to outlying venues, and
of shuttle buses from Olympic park and ride lots to outlying venues, which were operated
24 hours a day (MARTA 1996). MARTA, under contract to ACOG, operated the OSTS,
defined as the interconnected network of park and ride lots, shuttle buses and rapid rail
cars which would serve all Atlanta venues (Bulkin 1995, p. 25). For spectators,
transportation to and from the venues was integrated into the spectator's ticket (Dahlberg
1996).
All three transport systems were run on a one-way street system in downtown
Atlanta and on the high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane system on the highways (ACOG
1993b; U.S. Department of Transportation 1997).
Transport infrastructure and the promised legacy
The Olympics required infrastructure investments to prepare Atlanta's transport
systems (ACOG 1993b, pp. 11-1-111-4). In the run-up to the Olympics, Atlanta added
freeways and arterials at a fast pace. Furthermore, MARTA, the agency responsible for
public transport in Atlanta, completed more than 20 major projects in time for the
Olympic Games.
Table 5.3: Atlanta's transport investments for the Olympics
Road infrastructure Public transport ITS
Ten road construction projects Extension of the East advanced traffic
in the inner city Line services through management system,
Kensington to Indian including combined state-
Creek Station in June of-the-art traffic control,
199357 freeway surveillance, and an
incident management
57 For the first time, the rail line went beyond the 1-285 perimeter highway. Please refer to Figure 5.8 for
details. To enhance access to Olympic venues at Stone Mountain, the host of Georgia's international horse
park, MARTA.
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system
Street improvements in Three new stations IVHS 59
downtown58  Buckhead, Medical
Center, and Dunwoody
Stations
High occupancy vehicle Enhancements at transit multi-modal transportation
(HOV) lanes60  rail stations center
"Olympic landscaping"6' of MARTA mid-life
many sections of the 1-20, I- overhaul, including an
75, and 1-85 institution of automatic
train announcements
Renovation and enhancements Perry Boulevard CNG
of key bridges Bus Facility
Source: compiled by the author. (MARTA 2009), (ACOG 1994).
The Olympic momentum, according to Waters (2009), a state traffic engineer for
the Georgia department of transportation prior, during and after the Olympics, was
tremendous: it "allowed the city of Atlanta and the department of transportation to
advance its ITS plans and to implement those not over a 10-year period but over a 4-year
period." Besides this catalytic affect, Waters (2009) also acknowledged a change in the
original transportation plans "the implementation of the HOV lanes on 1-75 and 85. HOV
lanes had been planned for many years; [they were] just redone in the fact that [planners]
utilized an existing lane and its shoulder width to add another lane rather than take away
a lane that had been designated before."
Active transport
In the run-up to the Olympics, 12 projects for pedestrian access to venues
downtown were completed. In addition, new bike paths stretching 17 miles connected the
Olympic village at Georgia Tech to Stone Mountain Park, where a smaller cluster of
venues was located.
58 Those were necessary not only to accommodate the increase in the expected traffic flow but also to
represent Atlanta as a clean new city to the visitors
59 Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS) was a demonstration project implemented in the greater
Atlanta region before, and tested during, the Olympic Games.
60 HOV lines are dedicated to vehicles with two or more persons, emergency vehicles, motorcycles, and
buses. The first HOV lanes opened in mid-December 1994 (18 lane miles on 1-20 from downtown to I-
285). In 1996, sixty additional lane miles opened on 1-75 and 1-85 (Department of Public Safety 2009).
61 Beautification along arterial and inner city roads.
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Airport upgrade
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport gained $500 million of improvements,
including a $350 million international air terminal, a $24 million atrium, and a new
extension of the underground train to connect with Hartsfield's concourses. All the
projects were part of the airport's master plan, but the Olympics created a catalyst to
move the projects forward sooner (Dahlberg 1996; Vaeth 1998).
Transport operations
The Games, as the organizers were very well aware, brought the risk of heavy
congestion in the inner city due to Atlanta's high share of private transport. Key
strategies to reduce demand during the Games were essential, based on the understanding
that "a significant reduction in normal daily traffic into and through the city [was]
necessary in order to make room for Olympic-related traffic and prevent gridlock"
(Dahlberg 1996, p. 11). The key characteristic of Atlanta's transport system during the
Games was a heavy reliance on pedestrian movements (ACOG 1995a, p. 80) and public
transportation (ORTA 1998b). Furthermore, during the Games the city promoted biking
(providing 40 miles of new bike paths) and walking as modes of linking the venues of the
city centre. Given that Atlanta had a car-dependent population, an intensive
communication campaign was necessary to shift residents to public transport. ACOG
intensively promoted the use of public transit and urged employers to institute flexible
working hours, ride-share programs, offer telecommutes, and other efforts to help control
traffic, basically minimizing the number of trips wherever and whenever possible.
During the Olympics
Atlanta became known as "the chaos Games" due to significant glitches in the
transport and technology systems. "If Atlanta was not the best, it may rank in one of the
top three Games, where the most world records were achieved. However, Atlanta is
mentioned not for its tremendous successes, but because of the transport failure," said
Protopsaltis in a 2007 interview.
The disappointing transport performance had led to athletes missing competitions
(Rushin 1996), angry spectators waiting to get on MARTA (Applebome 1996), and
endless drives on the gridlocked freeway system. In the closing ceremony, Antonio
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Samaranch, the IOC president at the time, said Atlanta had hosted "great Games," but he
stopped short of saying they were "the best Games ever," the usual phrase with which
presidents end the Olympic Games.
Media and athlete transportation
"Most of [the transport problems] were Olympic Family members and media
access problems," according to Graham Currie's (2008) assessment of the transport
problems in Atlanta. Because journalists had to travel between venues mostly by buses
and shuttles with ordinary spectators, the long waiting hours in the humidity and heat of
the city and the 15-minute walk to the MPC explain "the headlines of some newspapers
on the 'great Olympic chaos in Atlanta"' (Billouin 1997, p. 161). Another factor, so
Currie (2008) argues, is that the media always need a great story. Confirmed was this
claim by several other interviewees wishing not to be cited.
One of the facts is that the international media pays for the Games. A
simple fact is that they will find a story. They have to find one. The story
they found was, before the Games, many people from different
organizations saying how good the Games were going to be, [and] then,
during Games time, a city struggling with over demand. And in fact the
Olympic Family transport system was under a huge stress because of a
lack of resources, and this was a huge story for the media.
The problems with media and athlete mobility emerged early on in the Games.
ACOG, which was responsible for the Olympic Family transport system, "had run [it] so
poorly that the IOC directed organizers to fix it, and fix it fast" (extract from Newspaper
article Hill 1996b).
The reaction of the press and the consequent damage to Atlanta's image in the
world led to Olympic advisors recommending to ensure that, in the future, the Olympic
Family, particularly the media are well catered to (Currie 2007). This, in return, requires
more buses, newer buses, and excellent road conditions during the Olympics and, of
course, direct access to each of the venues by private vehicles.
Spectator transport
At the beginning of the Games, people seemingly complied with the imposed
traffic laws (Hill 1996b). Thereafter, however, the situation started to deteriorate,
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presumably because commuters got wind of "gypsy parking" spots in the inner city and
opted for their cars instead of public transit (Hill 1996a). More evidence for such
behavior came from journalists observing "vacant parking spaces at MARTA lots"
(Goldberg and Hill 1996). Seemingly, the transport problems stemmed from people
driving despite the urgent message not to that was continuously sent for over two years
prior to the Games (Monroe 1996). Interestingly, however in ARC's post-Olympic report,
a quite different transport picture is described: "traffic congestion was almost non-
existent except for a few recurrent hot spots" (ARC 1996, p. 37).
Demand estimations vs. capacity increase
Traffic estimates were well below the actual attendance. MARTA Rail, for
example, carried 15 million passengers instead of the expected 9.6 million (Booz*Allen
& Hamilton 1997). This "increase of close to 50% beyond expectations," in Currie's
(1998, p. 7) judgment, "proved impossible [to handle] without significant service quality
deterioration." 62 In Currie's opinion MARTA "did amazing things during the Olympics.
It carried volumes you would never ever have thought possible, but it was far too small to
carry the [Olympic] volumes" (Currie 2008).
Undersupply of transport stock
Besides relying heavily on MARTA's rail system, the second backbone of the
Olympic transport system was the buses. Initially, Atlanta had asked for 2,000 new buses,
but only 1,800 were available. The buses, which transport organizers had to borrow from
other cities and states, were hoped to be in good condition, but the actual vehicles they
received were in poor condition and broke down very often (Billouin 1997; Booz*Allen
& Hamilton 1997; Monroe 1996).
To run the Olympic bus systems, over 2,000 additional bus drivers were required.
These could only be obtained from sources "out of state", unfamiliar with the road
network in Atlanta (Billouin 1997; Booz*Allen & Hamilton 1997). The media
62 As an example of the task at hand for MARTA: its usual weekday load was 230,000 boardings. The
expected Olympic average was 588,000; but the actual Olympic average was higher than four times the
normal weekday load, amounting to 953,000 boarding on average (Booz*Allen & Hamilton 1997). The
maximum load MARTA carried on its peak day was close to 1.3 million passenger trips per day (Monroe
1996).
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complained about unfriendly bus drivers who abandoned their buses on the road,
describing the phenomenon as inexplicable and rude. Another part of the story offers
Currie (2008) in an interview: "when you have undermanning of these resources you end
up having the drivers [have] to work harder. As a result, they are getting very tired. You
have reports from the media they are unreliable, not turning up, and lazy. It is not because
of that, they are exhausted!"
Non-coordinated transport systems
Another reason for Atlanta's traffic problems was that the transport systems
during the Games were managed and organized by three transport entities (Gonzalez et
al. 2000). As a result, BoozeAllen & Hamilton (2001, p. 43) pointed out, in their report
on the Sydney and Atlanta Olympics, that "special event transit operations should be
managed under a single organizational umbrella."
After the Games left the city: what is left?
Atlanta is left with a bitter after-thought to its poor transport performance. For
Currie (2008) the facts of why Atlanta experienced such transport problems were clear:
If you look at the simple fact of Atlanta as a city: it is not a good Games
city, it has an extremely poor public transport system and very poor bus
system, and there is another fact in that the Atlanta Olympic Games was
one of the largest ever. What we got here is a city that is not designed to
handle mass volumes at all, handling the biggest volume ever.
Yet understanding how this apparently obvious fact could have been overlooked -
by the IOC and Atlanta, is worth revisiting:
The official and unofficial IOC story - the blame goes to...
The IOC took the stance that Atlanta's organizers had not listened to the advice
the IOC had given the city during the preparation for the Olympics. " The IOC was
putting the responsibility on the ACOG, with some IOC members saying that 'the
Americans had refused to listen to advice or pay any attention to previous experience"'
(Billouin 1997, p. 161). Interviews conducted after the Games led Atlanta organizers to
blame themselves: "we have never seen a single document from Barcelona, because we
were too lazy to translate" (Interview with Macey 2003). So, the official IOC story.
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My research, however, sheds a different light on the story. In fact, the IOC never
saw a problem in Atlanta's transport preparations. The evaluation commission of the
Association of Summer Olympic International Federations visited Atlanta in 1990 and
concluded that "no major traffic problems can be expected in Atlanta for the 96
Olympics" (Boitelle et al. 1990, p. 12). Also, regarding the operations of the public
transport systems, there were no major issues or potential pitfalls detected. The
impression the public transport system made on the IOC evaluation commission was very
positive: the traffic conditions were experienced as fluid and MARTA as a rapid, efficient
modem transport system (Ericsson et al. 1990). MARTA was expected to carry high peak
loads easily (ACOG 1992). In contrast to Macey's claim above, Atlanta planners
observed in detail the Barcelona Games (ACOG 1993b), to which over 100 delegates had
been sent to analyze each organizational effort of the Games (ACOG 1993a). Confirmed
was ACOG's claim by the interview with Vilalante (2007) in Barcelona, who
remembered that the commissioner of the city of Atlanta was his co-pilot during the
transport operations of the 1992 Games.
This analysis sheds light on the rather minimal interference of the IOC on
Atlanta's transport problems. Because the IOC did not anticipate any transport problems,
they did not see a need to interfere in the transport-planning process.
Missed opportunities?
From today's perspective, there were not many opportunities Atlanta had missed
given the public reluctance in backing the Olympics. Therefore, revolutionary changes to
Atlanta's transport system could not be undertaken. Because the IOC did not foresee
transport problems, they did not see a need to interfere in the transport planning process.
Hence, most of the projects that had been implemented into Atlanta's transport system
during the Games had a long-term perspective. As Waters (2009) states in an interview:
All of the projects, [except] one63, that I can think of were sustainable and
were in the overall transportation projects list. The only exception was a
different exit into the Stone Mountain Park on US 78. .... And the state did
63 This one exception that was, according to Waters, implemented solely for the Olympics did indeed
become useless for the city and the state after closure of the events: "[The exit ramp] was added because of
the Olympics and then it was abandoned about five years after the Olympics."
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build that. The anticipation was that it would become an emergency or
overflow exit.
The ITS technologies, which were a "shining star" for the bid and during the
Olympics, have since been beneficial to Atlanta and the entire region, stated Dunn
(2009), the ARC's spokesperson for external relations in the transportation planning
division, in an interview. But she admitted that "with funding challenges, keeping it up to
speed has been an issue."
From a transport perspective, Waters (2009) could not recall any instances in
which Atlanta could have gotten more out of the Games than it did. He described the
planning approach as follows:
The professionals that have been involved in this have asked themselves
over and over and over again [whether they could have done anything
different]. The answer is "No." Most of the professionals in the Atlanta
area became involved very early on and mutually engaged in a pledge that
we would do everything that we could, humanly possible, to make the
Games a success. We did not want to have the situation after the Olympic
Games, where we would say" if we had just tried a little harder, we could
have done better." I sincerely believe we did the very best we could and
we fully utilized every resource that was made available to us.
Conclusions
Because Atlanta's government shied away from backing the bid, it missed the
opportunity of the Olympics to bring about major change in how people would travel in
Atlanta in the future. Investments went primarily into expanding the existing road
network and a brand new traffic management system. Public transport companies
catalyzed only minor extension of existing lines through the Games, which did not
deviate from their original plans. Dunn (2009) and Waters (2009) agree that the Olympics
overall expedited transport projects that had been planned before the Games, and that
Atlanta used the resources it had wisely for the future of its transport system beyond the
needs being faced for the Olympics.
Hence, the changes the city had to undergo solely because of the Olympic
requirements deviated from the original city plans only to a minimum. Part of the
explanation is that overlaying the expected Olympic peak passenger flows onto the
regular commuter flows would require minimal investments in new public transport
111
infrastructure and likely result in sufficient transport systems capacity - so both the
IOC's evaluation committee and the Atlanta Organizing Committee (AOC) believed.
Retrospectively, the investment choices in transport were beneficial to the city,
but came at a high price for Atlanta's future in remaining a car-dependent city and for its
reputation in the world. Currie (2008) comments on the choices that Atlanta made:
What Atlanta did was to invest into a railway extension which was of
modest benefit to the Games. And they invested a lot in technology, such
as the new traffic center. What did that do for the Games? You could not
get the volumes of people in on the road system; you needed a transit
system. Another example of this is that Atlanta implemented a lot of
resources on smart cards/ticketing. Of what benefit is that? What it did
was take a lot of resources away from the Games.
There are three important lessons the IOC learned from Atlanta. First, media had
to be handled with kid gloves, since the press was crucial for broadcasting a positive
image to the world. Therefore, in future Olympic Games, they received dedicated buses
and cars to serve their exceptional needs. Second, there is a need for extensive mass
transit systems to cope with the peak passenger demands for the Olympics. This lesson,
as we shall see later in the case study of Sydney and Athens, had a tremendous impact on
existing transportation plans. Third, a single entity for Olympic transport was essential,
with responsibility for overseeing transport operations and equipped with cross-
institutional power.
Sydney (2000) - the Olympics dictating a local strategy
Sydney rarely used the Games to foster its transport vision and failed to
implement the urban vision it had foreseen for a transformed brownfield. In the run-up to
the Olympics, Sydney invested in urban freeways and rail systems. As the center of
Olympic activity, Sydney chose to transform a heavily polluted brownfield into a
greenfield. To make this area accessible for Olympic peak loads, a rail loop, stations, and
access roads had to be built. In downtown, Sydney built a monorail and made its center
pedestrian-friendly.
Sydney is located in the southeast of Australia on the Pacific Ocean. The city
counted a population of just fewer than 4 million in 2001, which made it Australia's most
112
populous city64 at the time. On 23 September 1993, Sydney was selected as the hosting
city for the Millennial Olympics to be held in the summer of 2000.
- in
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Figure 5.12: Syndey
Source: ESRI, ArcGIS Resource Center, World Street Map;
http://resources.esri.com/arcgisdesktop/index.cfm ?fa=content&tab= World Maps
Metropolitan history
Starting in the early 1950s, Sydney and its greater metropolitan region
experienced an unprecedented growth stimulated by the postwar economic boom.
Industrial clusters spread along the coastal areas; commerce and retailing were located in
central Sydney with coastal sub-centers in Newcastle, to its north, and in Wollongong, to
its south. Public transport was the primary means of travel anchored in Sydney's central
business district (CBD) at Central Station, from which a radial public transport system
served other central areas and outer neighborhoods (Punter 2005).
The rapid growth of the region changed Sydney's character as it continued to
grow substantially through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. High-rise commercial buildings
were built in the CBD, while people moved to the suburbs, driven by the desire for
detached homes in low density. With this population shift came the rise of the private
64 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001 Census data; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Sydney Statistical Division
population, June 2002.
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vehicle. Eventually, the tramway lost its competition with the private cars. Physically
aged, run-down, and judged to be unsuitable for their radial role in Sydney, the tracks
were removed and replaced by buses, which could perform essentially the same service
as trams but were more comfortable, cheaper, safer, faster, and more efficient (Gibbons
1983, p. 176).
In the past 20 years, this trend to population sprawl followed the relocation of
employment activities, which led to an inner-city decline of manufacturing, making room
for the new service sector. As Sydney continued to grow beyond its original boundaries,
the patronage of the rail systems declined further, resulting in a 12.8% drop in the
number of trips taken by public transport between 1981 and 1991 (Gee et al. 1996, p. 14).
Throughout this transition, Sydney has kept its old CBD, and even though it remains
largely car-dependent, high-density development has occurred along existing rail
corridors (Department of Planning 1995).
The metropolitan expansion strategy: one region - several cities
Following the County of Cumberland Plan (1948), Sydney's first attempt at land
development of the region, the Sydney Region Outline Plan in 1968 proposed two
transport strategies to guide the future growth of the largest metropolitan area in
Australia. First, linear expansions along communication and rail corridors should be
fostered. Second, a strong Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong corridor along the coast
should be developed as one interrelated linear urban complex (Department of Planning
1968). In transport, meeting current and future car demand was a priority (Department of
Planning 1988, 1995).
Transport and its integration with land-use along with an emphasis on
environmental protection became one of the top priorities for Sydney in the late 1980s,
when it became evident that the lack of coordination between them had reinforced
Sydney's outward growth and demanded a continuing investment in road infrastructure
(Department of Planning 1992). The new key targets were clear: extending the public
transport system and its services while simultaneously reducing the need for new roads
(Department of Transport 1995).
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As Sydney spread upstream towards its hinterlands, secondary employment
centers started to evolve. Pursuant to a Department of Planning discussion paper (1993),
a new emphasis was placed on strengthening Parramatta's role as the second CBD of
Sydney. Parramatta is located 15 kilometer (km) west of Sydney and close to extensive
parklands and the wetlands of Millennial Park.
Figure 5.13: Sydney's strategic transport opportunities
Source:(Department of Transport 1995, p. 101) originally published (Department of Planning 1993, p. 42)
Strategic transport opportunities were identified in the early 1990s. From a
transport perspective, Sydney and Parramatta presented the best opportunities to
encourage public transport use (Department of Planning 1995, p. 101; Department of
Transport 1995). Parramatta being the second largest employment center in the Sydney
region, the Department of Transport suggested making it a major bus-rail interchange and
establishing new transport corridors from the lower North Shore, Hornsby, Rouse Hill
and Hoxton Park (Department of Transport 1995, pp. 36-41). Throughout the following
years, other departmental plans called for the promotion of public transit and reduction of
individual reliance on cars (Department of Urban Affairs and Planning 1997).
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Sydney's bid
Sydney's aspiration to host the 2000 Games, started in mid-November of 1990
when the NSW government informed the head of the Australian Olympic Committee that
Sydney was interested in bidding for the 2000 Olympics, pending the Baird report, which
was assessing the financial feasibility of Sydney staging the Games. This report came out
in December of the very same year, concluding that the Games could be staged at a
profit. That same month, the Federal government announced it would release 84 hectares
of land at Homebush Bay for the Olympics, which was to be the prime location for
Olympic facilities (Whitten 2000).
Other location
choices followed, building a
linear pattern along an east-
west axis stretching from
Penrith in the west, to
Holsworthy, Bankstown,
ey Bondi, and Darling Harbour
in the east.
Figure 5.14: Sydney's Major Olympic Locations
Source: (Department of Planning 1995, p. 36)
The facilities were located in two primary Olympic Zones (14 km apart from each
other), Homebush and Sydney Harbour (CBD). Twenty-one out of 25 competitions
would take place in the two centers, with 80% of all the events held in Homebush (De
Frantz et al. 1998).
Transport promises for the Olympics
For transport, these location choices meant that the heaviest travel demand would
occur between the Olympic Park at Homebush and Sydney's CBD, as predicted by the
IOC transportation working group (De Frantz et al. 1998). At the time, Sydney Olympic
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Park area and the Sydney Harbour zone were located relatively close to road systems, rail
networks, and water-based services. However, given that Sydney residents' were
generally car-oriented, the working group believed that significant communication efforts
would be required to divert them towards a high-capacity rail transport mode. The
enquiry commission of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) praised Sydney's
bid, because it presented well-thought-out planning and required at most travel time of no
more than 30 minutes to all venues (Ericsson et al. ca. 1993, pp. 63-65). The commission
also noted that the bid offered conditions over and above what was actually required by
the IOC; certainly an advantage in the competition to win the Olympic bid.
The Department of Transport (1995, p. 54) ensured the general public that
"Olympic transport plans will ... be consistent with integrated plans for the region
explored in this [transport] strategy". This goal also was reiterated in the strategic master
plan by the Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG, p. 42) and
the Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) continued to vow in their "state of play"
report to the people of NSW, "to make the most of the opportunities the Games present to
the city" (OCA 1997, p. 9). In contrast to these promises, the Sydney's metropolitan
plans laid out other tasks. Because the Olympic Games fostered the east-west connection,
Sydney could not realize most of the strategic transport opportunities identified by the
Department of Transport (Figure 5.13).
Persons put in charge of running transport, such as the director for strategic
planning within the Olympic Road and Transport Authority (ORTA), Steve McIntyre
(2008), recall a different approach to the transport-planning process. "Given that ORTA
was created late in the preparation for transport for the Games, he argued he had to take a
very pragmatic approach. Legacy issues for Sydney were second-order; the first-order
issues were that we actually understood the scope of the task, that we defined
responsibilities for what needed to be done, and that we had a robust planning approach."
Institutions and their power
Due to the streamlining of planning controls for the Olympics, the level of control
held by local councils over their respective local areas had been reduced. Throughout the
preparations for the Olympic Games, this caused some conflicts between local councils
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and the state government, which was "single-minded in its approach to Games planning"
(Connor et al. 2000, p. 9 ). For the Olympics, decision power laid within the Sydney
Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG), the communication center
between the IOC, Australia's Olympic Committee (AOC), and the governments (Dunn
and McGurick 1999). SOCOG's decision-making power trickled down to agencies with
specific functions, which were legislatively empowered to direct state and local agencies.
In charge of running the Games on the ground was the Olympic Coordination
Authority (OCA) established in 1995. OCA was a cross-department body set up to ensure
a coherent approach to the Olympic planning process, including the task to identify and
realize a legacy for Sydney and NSW. Equipped with clear authority control, OCA was in
charge of master planning and developing the Games site (Dunn and McGurick 1999).
For transport, a centralized Olympic Road and Transport Authority (ORTA) had
been created on April 7t , 1997, primarily as a result of the Atlanta traffic chaos as the
IOC Transport working group and interviewees confirm (De Frantz et al. 1997; McIntyre
2008; SOCOG 2001). The working group acknowledged that due to traffic and transport
experience at the Atlanta Olympics, a fundamental restructuring of transport planning and
operational structures had taken place for Sydney.
ORTA's task was to integrate and coordinated transport to and from all
competition and non-competition venues and the city centre (Curnow 2000; ORTA
1998b). Existing transport agencies such as the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), State
Rail Authority (SRA), and State Transit Authority (STA), along with the private service
providers Bus 2000 and Coach 2000, had to deliver transport results in response to
ORTA's plans and specifications (ORTA 1999b). In principle, ORTA had two clients:
the Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games for the delivery of Olympic
Family transport, and the NSW Government for transport of spectators, visitors, and the
general public going about their usual business. ORTA also believed that the Olympics
provided Sydney with a unique opportunity to promote maximum public transport use
and launch innovative transport management practices (James and Myer 1997, p.
9).ORTA's hope resided in the assumption that if the transport system performed well,
more people would use public transport regularly even after the Games.
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Sydney's preparations for the Games
Sydney marketed itself to the Olympic Committee by placing a strong emphasis
on environmental protection and promising to stage "Green Games" (ORTA 2001).
Urban and transport planning, just like all other Olympic changes, were to be guided by
strict environmental guidelines (State Environment Planning Policy No. 38) (Dunn and
McGurick 1999). A year prior to the 2000 Games selection process (in 1992), the IOC
had decided to adopt the principles of sustainable development set forth at the UN
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro by UNEP (IOC 1999, p.
9). Retrospectively, Sydney's choice of the "green" theme might have increased
Sydney's chances of winning the bid.
Selection of Homebush and defining its future
Heavy industry had abandoned Homebush by 1988, leaving the area polluted,
degraded, and contaminated. Homebush was flood-prone and hence unattractive to
private investors, yet its surroundings were beautiful. The NSW government had been
wanting to purpose-clear Homebush and had been struggling since the mid 1970s to
choose between three general development ideas.
* The Bunning Scheme (1973) proposed Homebush as a host for international
standard sporting facilities and related administrative buildings. Among the other
nineteen alternatives around Sydney, Bunning had identified Homebush as
owning significant advantages: its size, its centrality to Sydney, its nodal location
in transport network, its public ownership of the land, and the relative lack of
development (Waghorn 2000; Weirick 1999). Starting with Sydney's intention to
bid for the Olympics, more and more studies supported this scheme, including the
Premier's department scheme (1988) and the Homebush Bay development
strategy (1989).
* The MacLachlan scheme (1982) combined three development purposes at
Homebush - employment, residential, and recreational (Waghorn 2000).
* The Hub Scheme (1983) proposed that Homebush should be Sydney's first
technology, industry, and business park, with industry and employment zones
located in its heart. Just before bidding for the Games, Sydney had bid for the
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"multi-function polis" (in 1987), an Australian - Japanese cooperation. Under this
scheme, Homebush was to become a centre for future-oriented high-technology
and leisure facilities (Black 1999; Searle 2008; Waghorn 2000).
Due to the Olympics, the Bunning Scheme prevailed and already in 1992, a year
before the IOC had to select the 2000 host city, construction work in Homebush Bay had
begun. It was planned to contain 14 of the 28 sports venues, all of which had to be built.
In close proximity to Homebush, the Olympic Village was built in the Newington urban
district, housing all participants and team officials, and some of the judges and the media.
Figure 5.15: Sydney's Olympic Park and railway loop
Source: Tourist center handout in Homebush, obtained February 2008
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Plans for "Homebush's legacy" officially existed: the venues were built for
multipurpose usage after the Games and Homebush's master plan (1990) suggested the
relocation of the Royal Easter show 65 , previously held in Moore Park, to Homebush.
Because it was designed for the throughput of large numbers of people, later usage of
Homebush facilities could also include exhibitions and rock concerts (Department of
Transport 1995, p. 54). In the broader scheme of metropolitan planning, Homebush was
to mirror Moore Park close to the Sydney CBD. As what Moore Park was to Sydney,
Homebush was to be to Parramatta (Waghorn 2000).
Early on, these long-term intentions were in doubt. Myer (1996), for example,
questioned the long-term planning approach the authorities had pledged to take: "the
primary motivation for most of the current activity at Homebush Bay is meeting the
requirements of the 2000 Olympics - and longer term planning issues generally appear to
receive a lower priority" (Myer 1996, p. 2). In the following analysis, his impression of
the planning process became reality for most of the changes Sydney undertook prior to
the Olympics.
Transport modifications to access Homebush
Along with planning Homebush came suggestions on how to provide transport
services. According to Juliet Grant, a transport strategist for Homebush, the key concerns
were the green theme, the capacity needed for the Olympics, and long-term vision for the
site. After considering a variety of transport alternatives including exclusive bus transport
via an extensive road system, light-rail access, and heavy rail lines, the cabinet decided
on the presumably optimal solution (Grant 2008): a rail loop into and rail station for
Homebush, a ferry wharf, and an extensive road network within the Olympic park
accompanied by many cycling and walking paths. In the end, to provide Homebush with
a transport network suitable for the Olympics, $(AUS)97.7 million for rail and
$(AUS)190 million in road would have to be invested (Jacana Consulting Pty Ltd 1996).
Many grassroots groups opposed the access alternative that had been selected for
Homebush. Greenpeace, the Clean Air 2000 Project team and local communities argued
for a proposal to build more public transport for the long term, no further roads for the
65 The Royal Easter show is a yearly agricultural show drawing hundreds of thousands of visitors to
Sydney.
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Olympics, and a public transport-oriented Olympic Village, which would reduce the need
for local car traffic (Clean Air 2000 Project Team 1996; Greenpeace 1995; James and
Myer 1997). Reports and protest, however, came too late to have an impact on the
decision. The NSW minister for urban affairs and planning had given consent to the new
rail and road infrastructure in February 1996, a year before ORTA was even founded.
Given the time pressure to stage the successful Games, there was not enough time to
rethink the strategy and include the long-term vision of the Olympics. The option to do
such long-range planning had passed; it could (and should) have happened either between
1995-97 or during the bidding stage (McIntyre 2008). As Daniels (2008) confirms in an
interview: "the focus becomes so much on the event itself, the completely immovable
deadline, and so you have to have everything done by then. Most people focused on what
we have to deliver on this date. Not many people thought about what to do afterwards."
The rail loop and the Homebush station
In 1995, OCA proposed a single rail loop, 5.3 km in length, broadly following an
old rail route(OCAe 1995). Searle (2008) recalls that in the beginning, Sydney's transport
planning committee for Olympic transport had thought to handle the Olympic masses
exclusively with buses. This idea did resound well with the IOC, likely because of
Atlanta's bad transport performance (De Frantz et al. 1998).Construction of the rail loop
began in August 1996, connecting with the Main Western Line at Flemington Junction
(OCAe 1995).
The rail loop from the Main Western Line to the Olympic Park was not part of
any metropolitan strategy, as Searle (2008) recalls in an interview. This extension of
Sydney's rail system to the Olympic site was rather a necessity, in fact "vital as part of
the city's commitment to holding the first public transport-only Olympic Games in
modem times" (Palese et al. 2000, p. 62). These statements support my claim that the
Games do not only have a catalytic effect on transport plans, but rather altered them in
favor of Olympic objectives.
The construction of the rail loop and the expected passengers to be transported
during the Olympics made it necessary to build a high-capacity rail station at Homebush
Bay and revive an old one at Lidcombe. Criticism of the rail loop and its junction was
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also evident. The report by Jacana Consulting found it unlikely that the rail loop would
sustain an economically viable and frequent weekday service after the Olympics,
particularly as the station would be at least two kilometers from the residential village
(Jacana Consulting Pty Ltd 1996).66
The ferry story and the brickpit
New ferry wharves were planned in close proximity to Homebush Bay in order to
provide exclusive waterways for premium VIP travel service (Department of Transport
1995, p. 54). The ferry terminal was located at the northern end of the Bennelong road to
be operated as a permanent commuter wharf and incorporated into the Sydney Parramatta
Rivercat services (OCAc 1995). It was clear from a transport point of view that the wharf
was to be built solely for the purpose of athlete and VIP travel and had not been planned
before Sydney won the right to stage the Games. As McIntyre (2008) judges the Olympic
bids and their later influence on transportation planning in an interview:
I think bids by their definition need to be aspirational. Things get included
that are not particularly useful from a transport point of view. You know,
using ferry transport for athletes and officials, I mean, that is a wonderful
concept and I am sure it is great at the time when bids are considered, but
from a transport point of view it is a complete annoyance, really.
Originally the wharf was to be built into an existing Brickpit, allowing direct
access to the venues at Homebush. However, these plans had to be changed rapidly when
an endangered species of frogs, the green and gold bell frog, was found on site (Allachin
2008). OCA had to relocate the wharf, likely because Sydney had promised it in the bid
files. It is evident from this example that in planning for the Olympics a lot of uncertainty
hovers over the realization of the plans and there is a clear need for flexibility and
contingency planning.
Road development
Sydney's road system also had to bear an increased load, and hence key road
enhancements for the bay area and the east-west Olympic corridor and other important
66 The residential village referred to the permanent Olympic Village, which would have some 6,000
residents. Not only was the train station 2 km away, its access would involve a mode change (shuttle bus),
and another train change at Lidcombe.
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access corridors had to be constructed (Department of Transport 1995, p. 54).
Furthermore, external road upgrades were essential for access to Homebush (OCAd
1995). The site also had to be equipped with 10,000 parking spaces to facilitate the
movements of the buses on the site. As Black (2008), a professor at the University of
NSW and long-standing advisor to the government including the Olympics Games,
recalls, the commercial pressure for even more parking was immense at the time.
Protesters called for a massive reduction in the 10,000 car park and the road
infrastructure of the Olympic site, which was in their perception designed around road
transport with a 60 meter-wide Olympic boulevard (6 lanes), and an urban core that was
bounded by four main avenues, each four traffic lanes wide (Jacana Consulting Pty Ltd
1996, p. 9). As a result, the critics predicted that the expenditure on internal road works
and the large number of car parking spaces would make travel by private motor vehicle
attractive for most events during the year (Jacana Consulting Pty Ltd 1996, p. 3). These
developments hence were likely to encourage motor vehicle use for 97% of the year,
excluding the Royal Easter show.
Unfortunately, OCA had no choice in that matter. Stronger emphasis on public
transport, biking, and walking had definitely been thought of; however, it could not be
implemented to the extent suggested. As Black (2008), a member of the Olympic
transport planning panel assigned by the NSW government, describes the influence of the
IOC on planning Homebush's transport during an interview: "The Olympic Village,
which is at the other side of the creek, is actually, in my opinion, walking distance. So I
pointed out that the athletes could walk, until I was told that under the IOC competition
rules, they must be taken everywhere on an official bus." This strict requirement forced
the authorities to implement an extensive road network throughout the Olympic Park and
provide parking spaces close to each of the 14 venues.
Bicycle and pedestrians
Cycle paths and pedestrian walkways were built mainly in the Olympic Park for
easier access to the venues. The goal is to increase public transport use and cycling in
Sydney as a legacy of the Games (James and Myer 1997). Cycling and walking is
fantastic at Homebush, as Grant (2008) describes in an interview. According to her, the
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long-term vision for Homebush, to be primarily accessible by public transport, has been
fulfilled.
Selection of Darling Harbour
The second center of Olympic activity was located close to Sydney's CBD,
hosting 11 out of the 39 sports. Darling Harbour was supposed to stage five sports (De
Frantz et al. 1998) and host the international broadcasting centre, the media, and some
villages for officials (Department of Planning 1995, p. 37).
Monorail
A monorail running from Ultimo to Pyrmont opened on 31 August 1997.67 Over a
stretch of about 800 meters, it was to serve the redeveloped inner-city areas of Darling
Harbour linking downtown and the retail core (Department of Transport 1995, p. 54).
From the beginning, the proposal to build a circular monorail aroused major antagonism
in the city (Punter 2005). Reflecting on the decision taken to build the railway, Allachin
(2008) a private developer, believed that it was not a good idea. Rather than taking the
monorail, residents would walk, and the rail has become purely a tourist attraction. Given
important IOC delegates, referees and judges resided in Ultimo, a new modern rail to the
retail core might have been an attractive feature to Sydney's bid.
Road improvement in downtown
Street improvements were made in the Central Business District, mostly to
provide a showcase image for visitors and ensure walkability to the venues.
The airport to city center connection
At the time of Sydney's bid, the city's main airport was poorly connected to its
center, and the NSW government decided to build a rail link and a new highway to
connect them. Both infrastructural projects were "seen as a necessity for the successful
running of the Games" (Ben et al. 2000, p. 48). Interesting to note is that both of these
developments had been on the political drawing board since the mid-1980s (Black 2008;
67 MLR - Technical Stats, Metro Light Rail, retrieved 29 August 2007.
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Searle 2008), yet their entry onto the government agenda might have been a direct result
of the Sydney Olympic bid.
Rail
In May 2000, Sydney launched its first airport rail link in the run-up to the
Olympics for $(AUS) 700 million (Palese et al. 2000). The route runs underground,
taking passengers from all terminals via Mascot and Alexandria to Central Station. Black
(2008) stated in an interview that the line was never intended to be a direct airport-to-
city-center link; it stopped at various suburban stations. As Daniels (2008) described the
catalytic effect and how Sydney planners used it to their advantage: "With the Olympics
in mind, we realized we needed that link to get people from the airport. But it is really
designed to integrate people from the eastern part of the city; it just runs through the
airport."
Eastern Distributor
The Eastern Distributor - a major new freeway link and tunnel from the city's
south to Sydney airport - opened in December 1999 amidst vigorous public protests. In
1993, the NSW government had promised that no major road infrastructure development
would be required for the Olympics (Sydney 2000 1993, p. 84). Yet in November 1997,
the NSW government allowed the building of the Eastern Distributor, claiming it was
necessary for the Games (Palese et al. 2000, p. 63). For critics, it was unacceptable that
new road projects were promoted on the basis that they would help to ease Olympic
transport congestion (James and Myer 1997, p. 29).
An explanation for the development in road infrastructure might be that ORTA
considered the primary mode of transport for the Olympic Family to be via Sydney's
State Road network (Traffic and Transport Directorate 2001, p. 8). Searle (2008) recalled
in an interview that "the Olympic roads authority always had been very keen on
completing the Eastern Distributor." Given that the road was proposed by a private
developer at no cost to the government, the project was easily approved and completed
before the Games (Black 2008).
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Traffic management infrastructure
In the wake of Sydney's transport restructuring process, motivated by the poor
traffic conditions during the Atlanta Games, a new Transport Management Centre for
Sydney was built (De Frantz et al. 1997, p. 2). The center was intended to keep its
function for large events at the Sydney Olympic Park (De Frantz et al. 2000) and was
turned over to Sydney's Road and Traffic Authority (RTA) after the Games (SOCOG
2001). To feed the center with real-time information, the RTA installed about 350
cameras on the road network by the beginning of the 2000 Olympics (Traffic and
Transport Directorate 2001).
During the Games
During the Olympic Games, 38 million trips occurred on Sydney's public
transport system. Most of the demand occurred on Sydney's extensive rail network. It
was supported by two temporary bus networks: one serving athletes, the other one
serving spectators (see Appendix 3). Of the 28 routes there were 10 Olympic primary
routes established for the transportation of athletes, their equipment, and other Olympic
Family members. The other 18 were spectator routes, of which 9 were to serve ticket
holders to the Olympic Park and the other 9 to serve other Olympic venues. The bus fleet
comprised 3350 buses, 1000 only for the Olympic Family, 1700 for spectators, and 650
for sponsors. Officially, public transport captured 75%-85% of the total traffic demand of
spectators, volunteers and workforce (Bovy 2000; Hensher and Brewer 2002).
The - from the IOC desired -- free flow of public traffic was supported by parking
restrictions and road closures, as well as park-and-ride facilities close to rail stations. The
operation was supported by various travel demand management measures, specifically
for businesses and other institutions (Traffic and Transport Directorate 2001). In transport
management, a key element was the integrated ticketing system (each Olympic entrance
ticket provided free public transport access to the venue).
The key to the successful staging of the Olympics according to the IOC
evaluation commission was also attributed to the extensive test events at the Royal Easter
Shows, held prior to the Olympics (De Frantz, McLatchey et al. 1999; ORTA 1999a, p.
29). Because of these tests, better predictions of Olympic traffic could be made (ORTA
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1998a). In the IOC's assessment, ORTA was providing "optimal transport services for
the Sydney 2000 Games" (De Frantz, Palmer et al. 1999, p. 53). The IOC was thrilled by
Sydney's transport performance: "the Sydney Olympic Games have been a showcase of
environmental protection and a tremendous transport success with 100% of spectators
moved by public transport" (Bovy 2004b, p. 50).
"Under-promise, over-perform" was the motto Sydney had adopted for transport.
As Daniels (2008), a representative from the Department of Planning, describes the
media message: "Our focus was on traffic demand management. Before the Olympic we
had a program to scare people, so they would take public transport." Currie (2008)
explains that Sydney was very careful in managing the expectations for the event. Due to
the low expectations people had of the transport services, they were pleasantly surprised
by the efficient outcome. This lesson, Sydney likely adopted due to Atlanta's transport
performance. Olympic planners in Sydney were aware how crucial residents were in
taking public transport. Because Atlanta's friendly encouragement did not work,
Sydney's planner used the "big scare."
After the Games left the city
The Games could have been seen as a watershed moment for introducing some
key measures that were acceptable to the public and would significantly improve
Sydney's transport. Using the Games momentum for resolving problematic issues, such
as traffic congestion, parking policies, and integrated ticketing, would have been a few
of them. Unfortunately, Sydney rarely took advantage of the momentum the Games
provided. "We did a lot of good things during the Olympic Games. We should have
learned a lot. But the day after the Olympics, everything went back to normal. And we
went back to the mess of transport we have in Sydney and it got worse since 2000" states
Dobinson (2008). For this outcome, he blames the state government and their exclusive
focus on making the Games an outstanding success. In some instances, however, the
Games had created two incentives for the city to pursue in terms of transport.
Sustaining the mega event travel experience
Contrary to ORTA's hope (ORTA 1999a), Sydney's Olympics did not change
commuting habits in a general sense (Dobinson 2008). The Games, however, changed the
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culture for travel to very large events Black (2008). "The Olympics were a deliberate
attempt to refocus, away from the car. To the Royal Easter Show at Moore Park, visitors
used to arrive 60-70% by car. When the Easter show moved [to Homebush], [people
arrived] 60-70% by public transport. We turned that around" (Grant 2008). Furthermore,
operational traffic practices and organizational structures that were used during the
Olympics are now implemented for other major events held in the Olympic Park, such as
the bus routes for the 2003 Rugby World Cup or the World Youth Day (Grant 2008;
Searle 2008).
The introduction of cross-town buses
Because the concept of cross-town buses worked extremely well during the
Olympics, Grant (2008), Daniels (2008), and Brockhoff (2008) believe the idea for
strategic bus corridors originated during the Olympics. "Some of those bus corridors"
Grant (2008) claims, "mirrored very closely those bus corridors that had been used during
the Olympics." By 2003, there was a system of 43 bus corridors serving Sydney and its
region.
Missed opportunities
To run public transport as smoothly after the Games as before, significant
resources and large investments would have had to be put into public transport. Because
no effort was made to sustain the Olympic operations for the long term, everything went
back to "business as usual" (Black 2008). Particularly evident is this short-sighted view
in the case of Homebush Bay. Here, further development around the park took place, and
poses transport access challenges to the city center. This outcome could have been
anticipated and should have been planned.
The legacy of the Olympic park at Homebush
A vision for Homebush was only thought of after the Olympics had been staged.68
Allachin, a planner working on the Post-Olympics Master plan for Homebush, states that
the development of Homebush became a big issue after the Games had taken place.
68 As an attempt to bring life and frequent use to the site, the government established the Sydney Olympic
Park Authority (SOPA) in 2001, in charge of organizing events, maintaining the Olympic park site, and
developing its adjacent property (Daniels 2008).
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Daniels (2008) confirmed in her interview that there was no real plan on how to proceed
after the Olympics. The first developments to occur close to the Olympic Park were
residential dwellings shortly followed by commercial office development, as Searle
(2008) states in an interview. After the Olympics had been staged, the public authorities
had realized that with costly public space at hand and excellent facilities, it was best to
lease the land in order to develop it, remembers Searle (2008). So, he further argues, "the
strategic plans really adjusted to the fact that the Olympic Games were held in that
location."
With no decent plan in place to develop Homebush and transport infrastructure
designed for exclusive mega event usage, local feel the burden of this legacy. The
Newington area, where the Olympic Village was located, was supposed to be a green
model for urban design. Transport-wise, however, it did not live up to its billing. A
current (2008) resident complained about his journey to work: "But what they
[government] did was this silly loop back thing" which required a 20-minute walk and an
interchange of trains to reach the city center - way too long for a regular commute. The
movie shown regularly (observed on February 15h, 2009) in the tourist shop in Olympic
Park claims that currently the Olympic Park receives 8 million visitors a year, of which
over 80% arrive by public transport. Contrary to this claim seems to be the following
statement by a Lidcombe resident, whom I encountered at the Lidcombe train station
waiting for the Olympic Park train: "You are the only person I have ever seen on this
platform. I go to the Olympic Park quite frequently." He believed the loop was
experiencing an incredible lack of use, but stated it was now being used as a test ground
for new train drivers.
This situation is unlikely to change, because demand for transport services is not
high enough. Even though there was a 7.9 meter wide corridor maintained in the median
of the Olympic Boulevard to allow for a future light rail transit system, which could
provide a link to Camellia/Parramatta and/or North Strathfield/Darling Harbour, "the
development of a light rail transit system is not envisaged in the short to medium term"
(OCAc 1995, p. 21). Almost 10 years later (2008) the envisioned light rail has not been
extended to Newington, where it could potentially serve new housing development
(Black 2008).
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The development that has occurred since 2000 in Homebush raises questions
about the implementation of the rail loop. With Homebush's large public spaces and
beautiful surroundings, planners have argued that the rapid rise of land value could have
been anticipated.
There were other alternatives for building the railway loop, such as opting to
integrate it into Sydney's rail system network and provide Homebush with a regular CBD
service. Dobinson (2008) described this alternative as more costly, but with the result of
having "a loop for the future. [The Games] would have been a great opportunity to do it."
Leveraging this opportunity, however, was not the task for which the Olympic
transport specialists were hired. As Black (2008) stated: "It was very clear that the rail
loop was there to serve large crowds associated with major events for Homebush ... and
possibly for major football events, soccer, etc. that attract 50,000 people. [For that,]
special rail services are run on that loop. The answer is very clear: it was to serve these
major events and the Royal Easter Show on an ongoing basis."
From the perspective of 2008, this transport development task is seen in a
different light. Allachin (2008) argued that a better connection, running the rail north to
south, routing it through the Olympic Park, and terminating it in Parramatta would have
been a much better choice. In fact, his suggestion matches the strategic transport
opportunities by the Department of Transport (Figure 5.13). Daniels (2008) admitted that
the transport link had always been problematic. Due to the loop's poor connection to the
main rail network, patronage had significantly declined in ridership and frequency. In the
NSW Department of Planning newest Metropolitan strategy Homebush was identified as
one of Sydney's strategic and "specialized centers." Hence, she concludes: "We'll
probably need to improve transport links to really function and match [Homebush's]
potential. We spent a fair bit of money in the first place and now we have to spend a fair
bit of money more to make sure that it works."
Conclusion
Sydney's attempt to align its urban vision with the Olympic requirements fell
short on the necessary broader investments, especially in public transport infrastructure.
Realizing the vision that Homebush was to mirror Moore Park would have required
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public transport connections to downtown Parramatta and fostering Homebush's future
growth to downtown Sydney.
The Department of Transport viewed the Olympics as a case study for transport
planners rather than an opportunity. "As such, Olympic transport plans may prove to be a
valuable case study of the task which every day faces planners concerned with getting the
most out of Sydney's transport system for the least expenditure and environment impact"
(Department of Transport 1995, p. 54). Viewing the Olympics from such a perspective,
the potential such a mega event can bring in terms of its catalytic role is neglected.
Sydney did use the Olympics as a catalyst in selected examples: to clean up a long-
abandoned area by turning a former brownfield into a beautiful leisure park, and
enhancing their airport city-center connection while improving access for communities.
However, the influence of the IOC on local plans is reflected in the designation of
Homebush as a mainly sports-oriented park.
The long-term transport impacts governmental agencies had promised the public
do not exist. No thorough plans for Homebush's use (besides for other mega events) have
been made, and the city is still in the process of developing sustainable solutions, forced
to work with the infrastructure that had been implemented during and exclusively for the
Olympics. The public-transport infrastructure (a rail loop) allows only poor access to the
city center for potential adjacent communities and employers, whereas the extensive
parking spaces around the Olympic park allow for car access - a good (yet more
polluting) and frequently used alternative. In downtown, the Games brought the impetus
for a light rail train, probably to provide access for referees and judges to the main
shopping district. This train - barely 800 m in length - is now primarily used by tourists;
most locals opt to walk the short distance instead.
In retrospect, an integrated planning process building the case concurrently for the
Games and the post-Games scenario would have been essential. For that, a separate entity
would have been needed, because ORTA was so busy with the delivery of the Olympics,
that there was neither staff time nor mental capacity to worry about a sustainable legacy
(McIntyre 2008).
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IOC's perspective and its influence on hosting cities
Sydney, following Atlanta, was in a special position to prove a car-oriented city
could stage successful and efficient Games. For the first time, an Olympic transport
advisor, Bovy, was exclusively assigned to evaluate transport and advise on potential
hazards and offer solutions. According to IOC's transport advisor, Olympic transport
functioned outstandingly during the Sydney Olympics. As a lesson for future hosting
cities, he identified 12 factors that contributed to the success of Sydney's Olympic
transport (Bovy 2000). These factors all fell under the rubrics of significance for future
hosts, transport policy, and transport management and operations. But his report
completely ignores the legacy of the built infrastructure and its potential future use. In
Grant's opinion, the IOC had clear priorities in inquiring about transport - none of which
included legacy:
The IOC had an interest in athlete [and] VIP transport as opposed to the
visitor and spectator transport. They had a role and interest in setting the
standards of what we [ORTA] had to provide for those athletes, and there
was this whole hierarchy of who got what level of service. There was this
whole contract the government had to provide to the IOC. So [the IOC's]
role was really setting the standard of what they were expecting. They did
not set quantities [for cars and buses], they set times and levels of service.
It was up to us how to fulfill those. We worked on how to best meet that
level of service.
Source: (Grant 2008)
It is abundantly clear that IOC transport working groups and their advisors
primarily seek to ensure that transport during the Games works perfectly; the later use of
the facilities is left to the city. Frequently, this responsibility is too much to handle for
cities under a tight deadline and with only seven years of preparation. Even if cities
understand the need to plan for the city's long-term development, the hurdle of winning
the bid while ensuring the city's future development seems too high. Black, a member of
the strategic planning team, recalls the task at hand when a transport strategy had to be
identified for Homebush: "[Potentially, some] commercial development up close. [But]
not housing - that wasn't part of any discussion, certainly not the understanding of what
we were actually trying to design for" (Black 2008). With the IOC's dominating
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influence on local planning and its power to decide which city is going to win the bid,
candidate cities are extra careful in ensuring the requirements are met.
Athens (2004) - changing a congested city?
Athens, like Barcelona, attempted to use the Olympics as a catalyst for urban
change, primarily focusing on its transport system. After the Games, Athens was left with
an Olympic legacy encompassing a new airport, more than 100 km of new and modem
roads, 90 km of upgraded roads, transportation accessible to all people with disabilities,
9.6 km of metro line extensions, 23.6 km of tram network, 32 km of suburban rail, many
new parking lots in various locations, new management systems, modem train stations,
and a new, ultra-modern traffic management center (ATHOC 2002, p. 121). The
Olympics gave Athens a tremendous momentum to finally move the city's transport plans
towards more public transit. Retrospectively, Athens could not have used the Games
better than they did - as a stimulus. In my assessment, however, they fell short of using
them entirely for the benefit of the citizens and instead gave in to the pressure of the IOC.
Athens, located on the peninsula of Attica on the Mediterranean Sea, is the capital
of Greece. On 5 September 1997 at the 106th IOC Session in Lausanne, Athens was
elected as the Host City for the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad in 2004. At the time of
the Olympics, in 2004, the city counted a population of nearly 4.5 million people.
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ligure 5.16: Athens and Attica region
Source: ESRI, ArcGIS Resource Center, World Street Map;
http://resources.esri.conm/arcgisdesktop/index.cfm ?fa=content&tab= World Maps
Athens urban and transport history
In the absence of any land-use regulations, Athens has grown uncontrolled,
spreading from its port, Piraeus, to its hinterlands and along its coastal areas. The growth
has resulted in a colorful mix of incompatible land uses, (e.g., adjacent industrial and
residential areas) without social amenities and green spaces. Adequate infrastructure
facilities to support a growing metropolis were lacking, "particularly those related to
mass transport," which resulted in traffic congestion and air pollution (Ministry of the
Environment 2009). Efforts to improve the situation and develop a comprehensive urban
and regional plan for Athens and its surrounding areas started after World War II. More
or less successful attempts, such as the Master plan of 1965 for the greater Athens area
and the framework-plan "Capital 2000", provided the first legislative context and set
goals for the city's further development, which was primarily build around road
infrastructure (Ministry of the Environment 2009, Law 2052/92; OECD 2004). Even
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though the plans had been established, no significant process had been made until Athens
was awarded the right to stage the Olympic Games. As Stathopoulos (2007) believes:
"Atlanta and Sydney did not need the Games, Greece needed them."
Transport before the Games and a new transport planning approach
Because Athens was designed around an extensive road network, it had severely
neglected its public transportation network and lagged far behind developments
compared to other European cities in the mid-1990s (OECD 2004). The random spread of
the road network, according to Milakis et al. (2008), caused major problems for the
operation of Athens' public transportation system that was mainly based on buses.69
Additionally, there were two railway lines operating, connecting Athens to other Greek
and European cities. Inner-city residents were served by a metro system consisting of a
single line (Line 1).70
Calling for a fundamental approach in 1996 to remedy current traffic conditions,
the Greek government established the Attiko Metro S.A., tasked to expand the current
metro line into a network for the Athens metropolitan area by 2020 (Attiko Metro 1997).
The metro development study of 1996 set forth a key strategy for Athens' further
development based on the current and expected land-use patterns, projected employment
zones, and Athens' future transport needs. According to Deloukas (2007), all
infrastructural developments up to today follow this general transport plan.71
The metro development study identified three major problems. First, car
ownership in the greater Athens region had seen a rapid increase and led to severe
congestion in the inner city.72 Second, the number of illegally parked vehicles was
69 Two bus companies, ETHEL (buses) and ILPAP (trolley buses), covering a 5000 km network with 7000
bus stops served 1.3 million passengers daily.
70 Since 1869, it has connected the port in the south with the city center and Kiffissias in the north, serving
300,000 passengers daily.
71 As we shall see later, this statement does not hold up under analysis.
72 From the first transport study by Smith (1973) to the OAS study (1983) to the metro study (1996), car
ownership had almost tripled. In 1996, out of 7 million trips per day, 31% were taken by public transport,
and 55% by private transport (including 6% motorcycle and 10% taxis). By 2020, the metropolitan
transport study predicted a further 83% increase in car ownership, if no further measures to control this
growth were taken.
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extremely high (22,000 vehicles per day).73 Third, the public transportation system
performed well, but was facing a severe overload (Attiko-Metro 1996b).
To solve these urgent problems, the metropolitan development study issued policy
recommendations on how to tackle the task lying ahead and concrete plans were set forth
to develop a road and public transport network that could potentially alleviate the traffic
congestion(Attiko-Metro 1996b).
The road plan
The road plan called for the completion of four ring roads, in order to relieve
inner-city congestion and to serve new developments in the region. Furthermore,
upgrading of the congested arterial roads was necessary. In total, the plan called for 187
new road infrastructure projects to be completed by the year 2020 (Attiko-Metro 1996b,
pp. 24-33).
The public transport plan
The public transport plan entailed a massive expansion of the metropolitan public
transport network. First, it laid out the plan for two further metro lines (Attiko-Metro
1996b, p. 34).74 Second, an extensive tram network was to span the central city and
extend to the west to Salamina and to the east to Alimos (Attiko-Metro 1996b, p. 37).
Third, the commuter rail network would gain a new circular line, connecting the new
airport to the city center and serving more distant neighborhoods of Athens (Attiko-Metro
1996b, p. 39).
Transport organizations
Responsibilities for transport development and operations in Athens were divided
between the "Ministry of the Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works", which
was responsible for the construction of any type of transport, and the "Ministry of
Transportation," which was responsible for operating all urban public transport systems
and networks on the built infrastructure (Athens 2004 1997; ATHOC 2004). Because
intensive negotiations and coordination were required among the ministries, the Athens
73 This share comprised 45% of all on-street parking, even though 97% of inner city parking was free.
74 Line 2 was to be built from Thevon via Syntagma to Glyfada. Line 3 was supposed to run from Piraeus
via Aegaleo and Stavros to the new airport
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Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (ATHOC), which was established in 1998
by Law 2598/1998, was put in charge of leading such negotiations. Athens Urban
Transport Organization (OASA) supervises the operation of six transport providers and
organizes the provision of public transport services (ATHOC 2004; OASA 2009). From
then on, ATHOC, in conjunction with the National Olympic Committee (NOC), was
responsible for the preparation of the Games, and required to correspond intensively with
the IOC, from which it received direct instructions (Alexandridis 2007).
For transportation, a Transport Division was established within ATHOC, which
proclaimed its mission "to ensure effective and efficient delivery of transport services to
the Olympic and Paralympic families and to the spectators of the Athens Olympic and
Paralympic75 Games while securing optimal financial results and minimum
environmental impacts" in its Olympic Transport Strategic plan (ATHOC 2001). The
person placed in charge of this division was Protopsaltis, who considered a clear strategy
and an integrated transport approach to be essential for the Olympics, and for any mega
event, to be successful (Interview, 2007).
The Olympic Games plan
The Pan-Hellenic Federation of University Graduate Engineer Civil Servant
Unions and independent writers argued that the 2004 bid plan lacked feasible technical
solutions to obvious problems, such as traffic congestion, and assigned an inadequate
budget (Pan-Hellenic Federation of University Graduate Engineer Civil Servant Unions
2001). Overall, the "planning process [for the 2004 Olympics] seems to have been
addressed very superficially" (Telloglou 2004, p. 33).
Land-use choices and Athens' transport vision
For the 2004 bid, ATHOC decided, partly driven by the locations of existing
sports venues, upon two major competition sites: the OAKA complex, located in the
north of Athens, and the Faliro complex, located in the south close to the Piraeus port
(Papadimitriou 2004). The Helliniko Olympic complex, located by the old airport, was
added after Athens had won the candidacy to avoid potential conflicts with existing town
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planning legislations (ATHOC 2005). This decision, so Telloglou (2004) argues, had a
tremendous impact on further development of the city. In moving the stadiums to
Helliniko, the construction of a public-transport mode became inevitable, because the
"IOC was not satisfied with [access being provided solely by private car] and put
pressure [on ATHOC] to create [a public transport option]" (p. 180).
Table 5.4: Barcelona's four Olympic areas
(1) OAKA (2) Faliro (3) Hellinikon
Area in Fig. 5.17 North southwest southeast
# of venues 10 10 7
# of sports 6 4 6
Source: compiled by the author from (Papadimitriou 2004)
Further sporting facilities were located along the coastal lines to the east and west
of Athens and its hinterland. (All venues are marked by the purple areas in Figure 5.17.)
Figure 5.17: Olympic Venues Athens (2004)
Source: (Papadimitriou 2004) modified by author
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The Olympic Village (OV) was built in the north of Athens, in Parnitha, a
beautiful area without an industrial history, but lacking adequate transport connections.
Hence, a road had to be built to connect the village to Athens' arterial roads. According
to Babis (2007), ATHOC chose this site because it was close to all major roads, Attiki
Odos and within a 5km radius of OAKA. Furthermore, it was publicly owned land, easy
and cheap to acquire, and, most important, the site was not in a rundown area (Babis
2007). Other options that had been considered were located in the south, which had
experienced industrial pollution and still faced severe environmental problems. For these
sites to be "Olympically presentable," the entire south would have had to be cleaned up
(Babis 2007). The "Olympically presentable" requirement also influenced the selection of
the Olympic road network: "we encountered this problem when planning the Olympic
route network. You do not want to have an Olympic route passing through a bad
neighborhood; you want them to pass through nice ones" (Babis 2007).
These land-use choices set forth the necessity for vast improvements in Athens'
road and public infrastructure to fulfill the promises made in its bid file. In the IOC
interim evaluation report, the IOC members believed Athens to have two major tasks in
order to be able to handle the Olympic traffic: alleviating congestion in the inner city and
solving the problems with airport access (IOC 1997). Given the current infrastructure and
traffic conditions in Athens, it was clear that the city had to invest extensively in a strong
north-south transport connection passing through the inner city76, a public-transport mode
along the coast for spectators and visitors, improved road connections to all selected
venues, and efficient transport management during the Games (Dimitriou et al. 2004).
Furthermore, the new airport had to be efficiently linked to the city centre and the
Olympic road network. "In preparing for the Games, Athens had a huge transportation
problem at hand, and faced the tremendous challenge of preparing the city for the
Games" (Frantzeskakis 2007). The planner's approach to tackle this task seemed to be on
target as the Athens transport division states: "the goal was to maximize the legacy of the
Games to the Athens transportation system" (ATHOC 2004, p. 6).
76 The important north-south transport connection that was needed for the Games already existed in the
form of the only metro line operating at the time of the bid (Line 1 in figure above). Conveniently, it
connected two of the three main Olympic complexes, OAKA and Faliro.
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Preparing the city for the Games
Even though the need for development was clear, in the first 3 to 4 years Athens
barely made any progress in fulfilling its bid promises and implementing the necessary
infrastructure (Frantzeskakis 2007). Olympic preparations were stalled by inter- and
intra-agency feuds between the ministries, because responsibilities for building and
running the infrastructure had not been clearly assigned before the bid (Alexandridis
2007). Other sources (who wished to remain anonymous) claimed in an interview (2007)
that construction companies purposely delayed public works in order to increase their
payment. As a result, it was feared that the hasty construction led not only to increased
costs but also a significant decrease in the quality of the projects delivered (Pan-Hellenic
Federation of University Graduate Engineer Civil Servant Unions 2001).
These delays did not remain without consequences. Because Athens lagged
greatly behind its implementation schedule, the IOC showed Athens the "yellow card"."
The influence of the Olympic Games on preparations was seen as a dominating influence
and perturbation of the city development process.
Interviewee: "We (Athens) got blackmailed during the Olympics."
Interviewer: "What do you mean by 'blackmailed'?"
Interviewee: "We [Athens] were given the yellow card, which means: DO
whatever WE [IOC] want!"
Extract from an interview with an academic involved in the planning process, who preferred to
remain anonymous, September 3, 2007.
The imminent threat of losing the Olympics led to an internal restructuring
process and replacement of some of the people who were running the Olympic
operations. For Stathopoulos, this step was crucial. "If she [Gianna Angelopoulo-
Daskalaki] had not taken office, the Games would have gone downhill. It is a matter of
the right people at the right time with strong political support. "
The delay of certain Olympic-related construction projects resulted in the need to
complete them in half the time originally allocated. The following years and months
leading up to the Opening Ceremony of the 2004 Olympics became a race against the
77 A yellow card means that the IOC feels the successful staging of the Games is in danger. A red card, then
ultimately means that the Olympic Games are given to another city (Frantzeskakis 2007).
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clock, which came to be famously known as the Syrtaki principle 7 8. "Consequently, many
compromises had to [be made] in order for everything to be ready on time" (Alexandridis
2007, p. 9).
Necessary public transport infrastructure
In the following years Athens developed new infrastructure for its public transport
system, as the bid file had proposed, while all transport agencies renewed their rolling
stock (Kalapoutis 2007; Patrikalakis 2007).
Table 5.5: Athens' public transport modifications
Metro Suburban Tram Special bus network
Lengthening of New suburban rail79  New tram line 180 Olympic Family bus
platforms for connecting the center network 81
Metro line 1 of Athens to the airport
New metro line 2 New tramline 22 Spectator bus
network
New metro line 3
Source: compiled by the author. (Athens 2004 Transport Division 2003; ATHOC 2005, p. 225; Attiko-
Metro 1996a).
Necessary road infrastructure
As the bid file had proposed, Athens underwent significant improvements in its
road infrastructure (see the Figure 5.18). New highways were built and key roads
upgraded to carry the Olympic traffic.
Access from the inner city to the new airport was insufficient at the time of
Athens' bid. A new highway, called Attiki Odos, was planned to bypass the city to its
north in parallel to the proposed suburban rail line. It was completed shortly before the
Games. Without the road, Chalkias (2007) believes, "the transport for the Olympic
Games would have been a nightmare." The plan for the highway had existed at least since
1992, and the Games provided the catalyst for finally building it (Frantzeskakis 2007). In
2009, Attiki Odos provides a connection between two major interstates in the Attica
78 The Syrtaki is a famous Greek dance, whose rhythm significantly increases towards the end of the song.
79 Bypassing Athens in its north, the suburban line intersected with metro lines 1 and 3.80 The new tram lines served the coastal venues from Glyfada via the Hellinikon Complex to the Faliro
venues
81 The Olympic network consisted of 22 express routes, which served 33 competition venues running on
exclusive bus lines called Olympic priority lines (ATHOC 2004).
82 Splitting in Amina, the second line connected with the city centre.
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region and remains the backbone for the transportation network of Athens (Chalkias
2007).
Other major road infrastructure was mainly geared to improve access to the
competition sites by improving the road capacities of the predicted Olympic transport
routes. The decision process on which roads to upgrade, Babis (2007) described as
follows: "You have, for example, 500 buses during 8am and 9am in the morning and they
have to go there. What road is it? And at this road we have one lane, because for normal
traffic you wouldn't expect more. So you have one lane plus whatever you expect for the
Olympics. So what do you do? You build another lane."
Figure 5.18: Olympic transport major road projects in Athens
Source: (ATHOC 2002, 2004; 2005, p. 225; Papadimitriou 2004, slide 12)
* Legend: Kifisos Avenue provides access to the Piraeus port and connects to Poseidonos Avenue. Before
the Olympic Games it was upgraded to a 3+3 lanes roadway. It was the most important section of the
Olympic Ring, the main travel corridor for the Olympic Family. Poseidonos Avenue was upgraded to a
double lane and received new junctions with Amfithea and Kalamaki Avenue. The road runs in parallel to
the newly constructed tramline. Markopoulo Avenue is a newly constructed road connecting the Olympic
venues to the city. Varis Koropiou Avenue connects the coastal zone with the International Airport and was
upgraded to a 2+2 lane. Olympic Village Avenue is a new road construction connecting the Olympic
Village to the National Road from Athens to Thessaloniki.Marathon Avenue is upgraded from the current
road to a 2+2 lane.
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Especially the ring road (marked in red in the Figure 5.18) was essential in the
coordination of the Opening ceremony convoy. The roads had to have a capacity of 200
buses lined up by country without blocking regular traffic (Chalkias 2007). With all these
modifications in place, ATHOC's Transport Division believed that these transport
changes would lead to a new culture of transport behavior - taking more public transport
(ATHOC 2002, p. 121).
During the Olympics - a smooth transport experience
This success was attributed primarily to the coordination efforts among all
transport agencies, which functioned virtually as one entity (Gonzalez et al. 2000).
According to Frantzeskakis (2007), the Games provided for the first time the necessary
impetus for coordination between the Ministry of the Environment, Physical Planning,
and Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation, supported by three main
circumstances that made possible implementing the Olympic vision: a concrete
implementation plan was in place, everyone had a fixed deadline, and the need to fulfill
obligations to the IOC provided the necessary pressure.
Public transport
The Olympic transport vision was to give priority to public transport and to meet
the target of being 100% on time (Babis 2007). During the Games, a 90% public transit
share was achieved, while public transport operated under excellent conditions
(Frantzeskakis 2007). Additional shuttle lines connected the metro stations to the
Olympic venues (Kalapoutis 2007). Free transport for all modes was provided for
Olympic ticket holders.
Private transport
During the Olympics, transport officials believed, Athens had very good traffic
management (Kalapoutis 2007; Patrikalakis 2007). The planners believe strict
enforcement was essential. "During the Olympics, the traffic police [were] almost the
Siamese [twin of] Olympic transport" (Protopsaltis 2007). Strict parking controls in the
inner city, high fines for using the exclusive Olympic lanes, and crowd management
within a 3km radius around the venues were all implemented (Frantzeskakis 2007).
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The role of the media.
The international media pressured transport to perform perfectly during the
Olympics. "Transport is very sensitive, very exposed. Olympic buses made more than
10,000 trips. Each one of these trips had a significance of its own. If even one failed to
make it - either it was too late, or had lost its way, or had broken down, or was blocked
by a car accident - transport was going to make the headlines" (Protopsaltis 2007).
Athens had experienced this bitter taste of media criticism in the run-up to the Olympics
and Atlanta as the warning example that bad media reports could cloud the international
judgment of overall good Games.
The need for intensive planning and flexibility
Flexibility is essential; in the run-up to the Olympics, changes do occur. Even
small changes, according to Babis (2007), can have a great impact on the overall
performance and operations of the transport system.
Leaving the city with a desirable Olympic legacy?
The positive impacts the Olympics have had on Athens lie definitely in the
catalyzing of some infrastructural projects. Through the Olympics Athens was able to
significantly improve the infrastructure of its public transport system (Frantzeskakis
2007). As a result of these investments, the managing director of OASA (in 2007),
Konstantinos Matalas, states that additional riders have been attracted to the public
transport system.
The overall assessment of the long-term impacts, however, is disillusioning: "The
effect the Games have had on the city is that, up to 2004, there was proper planning,
proper implementation, and a very big improvement in everything. After this
improvement, unfortunately, nothing has continued" (Frantzeskakis 2007). In 2008,
traffic congestion was severe and traffic speeds were quite slow (Milakis et al. 2008).
Essentially, Athens had the same traffic problems after the Games as it had before them.
Arguably, though, the current situation might have been worse if no public transport
infrastructure had been built.
Frantzeskakis (2007) also admitted that the rushing of decisions made in transport
planning for the Olympics caused mistakes. By 2007 six or seven studies were underway
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to completely reorganize the public transport system. Overall, Telloglou (2004)
summarizes the common confession of protagonists: "The urban regeneration has been
the greatest failure in the Olympic works" (p. 179).
"Greece did not realize how big of an opportunity it had because of the Games,"
contends the anonymous academic involved in the Olympic planning process who was
quoted earlier (Professor X, 2007). The following sections try to pinpoint these
opportunities Athens seemingly missed in the run-up to the Olympics. The dynamics of
the decision-making process are discussed (whenever possible) and the specific
influences the IOC had on transport planning are identified.
No planning for after-event usage
The biggest chance Athens missed out on was the planning for after-event usage
of the facilities it had to build for the Olympics (Frantzeskakis 2007). Because of the
short time frame Athens was left with after political feuds regarding responsibilities, it
had only 3 years remaining to prepare for the Games. Given this pressure, there was no
time to think about after-event usage (Frantzeskakis 2007). Prime examples of this
missed opportunity are the empty Olympic facilities.
Since the Olympics, seemingly no progress has been made on further
development of these sites, contrary to the promises laid out in Athens' 2004 bid file - for
example, the refurbishment of the old airport, Hellinikon, where the second largest
Olympic complex was located. In 2007, the old airport was still undeveloped. At OAKA,
the picture was not much different: dried-up water fountains, empty sites, and no tourists.
The loss of integrated planning
All Greek planners interviewed expressed a continuing wish that the coordination
structures implemented during the Games would have been kept after the closing
ceremony. Gaining the right to host the Olympics had provided the city with a common
vision through which it integrated the metropolitan planning process and was able to
coordinate efforts among all agencies. The power to implement such vision and
communicate it effectively to the people materialized in the run up to the Games.
Protopsaltis (2007) summarized the change: "our country lacked the background of team
work and cooperation. The Olympic Games brought that into play, very strongly. And
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because of it, we were successful." The Greek planners envision a metropolitan planning
agency in charge of coordinating among agencies while integrating land-use and
transportation planning efforts across all transportation modes.
The main reason, why the coordination efforts can not become a permanent
reality for Athens, so the Greek planners believe, lies in the existing political structures.
In an interview with an academic involved in the Olympic planning process, who prefers
to remain anonymous, he said
The Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Public Works are ONE
Ministry, it is so obvious that this cannot work. What should be done, is to
extract the Ministry of the Environment out of the Public Works one and
unite the Public Works with the one for Transport. This will never ever
happen in Greece. And you know why? Not only because the
Environmental heads are morons.... no, no one wants to lose power in
politics, this is why it can not work.
The same ministerial restructuring process is also supported by Deloukas, because
currently, he argues, there is little cooperation among both ministries and their planning
entities (Deloukas 2007). Communication per se, only takes place at the highest level
between the two ministries (Babis 2007). This lack of coordination originates, so Sermpis
(2007) believes, in the lack of a common policy.83 A lack of resources planners saw as a
further reason for establishing a metropolitan entity (Babis 2007; Kalapoutis 2007;
Protopsaltis 2007). A lack of accountability in the existing political system is an
additional barrier to realizing coordination. The temporary solution of having ATHOC
coordinate between all transport entities had been crucial for the operations during the
Games.
After the Olympics the city was left without a vision of how to proceed, and
without the coordination structure that had enabled Athens to foster its transport projects.
Falling back into the existing structures and old habits, the loss of coordination resulted
in a halt in projects immediately after the Games. "For Greece, even an event like the
Olympics wasn't enough to break how we do things" (Babis 2007).
83 The apparent inability to cooperate and integrate is reflected even on lower operating levels. Metro line 1
is operated by a different agency than metro lines 2 and 3.
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Road infrastructure and missed environmental targets
Road infrastructure plans deemed to be non-essential for Olympic operations, yet
considered necessary for Athens, have been indefinitely postponed. One example is a
proposed highway from Piraeus towards Salamina that would reroute traffic currently
flowing through the city center and hence significantly alleviate congestion. Three-
fourths of the road, though in need of repair, already exists and its refurbishment would
cut driving time by one hour as well as reduce pollution in the inner city (Frantzeskakis
2007). This project is still in the planning stages, whereas Attiki Odos has been built,
even though both were planned around the same time. Hopes for satisfying the ever-
increasing car ownership with the newly built infrastructure for the Games are far away.
Since Attiki Odos' inauguration, it has seen a constant demand increase (Attiki-Odos
2007) and its future seems to be predetermined: "[1]t will be just as congested as any
other highway" (Chalkias 2007).
Since 1985, the Greek government had been emphasizing the need to protect the
urban environment along with urging greater use of public transport and the creation of
walking areas (MEPPW 1985; Psaraki 1994). A year after the Games the Athens
Olympic Committee claimed that the infrastructural improvements contributed to a
significant reduction in atmospheric pollution (ATHOC 2005). Other voices, however,
declared the exact opposite. Organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and
independent researchers rated the Olympic performance with regards to the environment
as poor, and claimed that the environment never had any priority in the planning for the
Olympics (WWF-UK 2004; Zagorianakos 2004).
The failed tram due to a change in plans?
"After the Olympics, let's be honest, the tram has not fulfilled its expectations"
said an OASA employee, who prefers to remain anonymous. The cause of this failure
was, according to Frantzeskakis (2007), the pressure to finish the tram within two years
before the Games. Retrospectively, he admitted that mistakes have been made in the
implementation process. Because of those, he argues, the Athenians do not believe in the
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tram, and hence they do not ride it.84 Problems include the long travel times between
various destinations and the city center, and the stop's locations, which had been planned
according to the venues. Now the venues are abandoned, no further development has
taken place, and thus the stops became useless for residents.
According to Stathopoulos, the tram was intended purely as a hop-on and hop-off
between the smaller coastal cities. The tram as a travel option from Glyfada to the center
is relatively inconvenient. Even though riding the tram along the coastal line is a pleasant
experience, it takes about 80 minutes from its origin in Glyfada to the city center. The
same distance can be covered in a 30-minute car ride.
The decision-making process for the implementation of the tram reveals the
dominating influence of the Games on local transport planning. Given that the tramway
was an absolute necessity for the Games, connecting the venues along the coastal cities
(Babis 2007; Frantzeskakis 2007), the pressure was on Athens to implement this public
transport option, neglecting other options that might have been better for the city. The
anonymous academic involved in the Olympic planning process reports that "the tram
line was originally planned to extend to Piraeus, but Bovy and a few others [opposed]
that plan" (Professor X, 2007). His statement was confirmed by the minutes of the
meeting between ATHOC's Transport Division and the IOC on September 12 and
October 3rd 2003 on the global review of the tram project85; due to the delays in building
the tram, it was considered a high-risk project for the Olympics. Urgent actions had to be
taken, focusing on the immediate needs to provide tram transport to the venues. Hence,
the planned extension of the tram to Piraeus port was pushed back. As of 2008, the tram
from the Faliro to Piraeus had yet to be completed.
Silence is being maintained, however, on a far more important change of Athens'
original transport plans. In the metropolitan plan for 2020 (proposed in the metro
development study of 1996), no tram was proposed along the large stretch of the coastal
zone between Glyfada and Amina, on which currently - due to the Olympics - a tram is
running. Exactly this stretch connected the coastal venues for the Olympic Games. Sugar-
coating of such changes in plans are evident in the statement made by Deloukas (2007)
84 As one mistake, Kalapoutis (2007) points out the constant congestion on Athens roads. With no right-of-
way implemented for the tram, the travel time was enormous. By 2007, the tram had been given priority.
85 IOC Archives / Summer Olympic Games of Athens 2004 - transport (restricted access)
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that the tram had been intended to serve both the needs of the Olympic Games as well as
the future expansion plan of the city. This statement holds for parts of the lines (from
Faliro and Syntagma Square to Amina), but not for the extension to Glyfada. The
Olympics plainly brought about a change in routes for the trams.
Figure 5.19: Planned tram routes in Athens (1996)
Source: Presentation of MDS (p. 60) in 1999, sent by Deloukas via Email on February 27, 2009
The original tram development plans (Figure 5.19) had called for a tram
extending to the west to Salamina, a city that had been constantly growing but was yet to
be integrated in the greater Athens region. Any such tram development has been
postponed indefinitely (Deloukas 2007).
The decision taken for the Olympics to develop the tram differently than proposed
has to be considered in a wider context: given the failure of the current tram performance
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and the halt of further development, will there be further tram development for Athens
and the Attica region? Is this failure a result of the Olympics?
The true traffic problem - illegally parked vehicles
Today (2008), the traffic problems in Athens are still severe and it appears the
Olympics have just delayed of finding a solution to the real traffic problem: illegally
parked vehicles. As Frantzeskakis (2007) sees it, the congestion is inherently founded in
not using the existing road space properly and efficiently. The main reason, in his
opinion, is the illegally parked vehicles in the centre and the ring roads of Athens. They
amount as of 2007 to 30,000 vehicles, frequently parked at crucial locations. "At an
intersection, you have three lanes, but only one is used for movement. The other two are
taken by illegal parking" (Frantzeskakis 2007).
Vehicles blocking trash removal, vehicles parking in signalized intersections,
vehicles stopped with flashing lights at bus stops are common occurrences in Athens.
The reasons for such behavior Frantzeskakis (2007) attributes to the lack of police
enforcement and blames the politicians for not taking action against such behavior. Their
excuse of not having enough police he believes to be invalid, because for the Olympics
another 600 policemen had to be hired, who now are deployed elsewhere. The
politicians' true reason, he speculates, lies in their fear of losing votes if they take such
action.
Athens, culturally speaking, faces two challenges in reducing such behavior. The
first is Athenians' strong love affair with the private car, still seen as a status symbol
(Patrikalakis 2007). The second is the Athenians' nightlife, which finishes well after
public transport has stopped operating (Frantzeskakis 2007). However, Kalapoutis (2007)
has argued that the night bus network, which runs in parallel to the metro, alleviates this
problem.
For such behavior to change, a combined approach is needed: one that aligns the
proper public transport infrastructure and operations with the proper prohibitions. The
first, Athens was able to catalyze through the Olympics; the second not, likely due to the
prohibitions' unpopularity with the voters. With no enforcement in place, the situation
cannot be solved.
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The problem, however, seems to be routed more deeply. In an interview with an
academic involved in the Olympic planning process, who prefers to remain anonymous,
Professor X (2007) said: "Illegally parked vehicles next to waiting police cars, ministers
not using seat belts, not a prime example of how a country should be." 86 If the nation's
role models do not comply with traffic laws, why would the population?
At odds? - four competing transport modes to access the airport
Access to the airport today is provided by several alternatives: private cars and
express buses via the Attiki Odos, and the metro line 3 and the suburban rail, both
running on the same tracks. This, according to Babis (2007), is economically
unsustainable. Competition among these access possibilities is evident, a situation that
Professor X (2007), called "ridiculous." Even the IOC felt that the service of the
suburban rail and metro line 3 would greatly exceed the demand originating at the
airport. 87
This outcome, however, is largely attributable to the Olympic influence on
transport planning. Quite simply, IOC members and Olympic transport advisors did not
believe in the suburban rail as a mode of transport for the Olympics. Because the
operating company, Proastiakos, was expeted to start running its operations only shortly
before the Olympic Games (construction of the rail had been significantly delayed), the
Olympic transport advisors believed the company would not have enough experience.
Even for OASA, it was unclear whether the suburban rail could perform and deliver on
time (Kalapoutis 2007). Hence, Olympic organizers as well as public officials doubted
the suburban rail could perform to their satisfaction and reliably carry the Olympic peak
loads (Babis 2007).
With little time left before the Olympics, a solution was needed - fast, because the
connection between the airport and Athens' centre was considered "one of the most
crucial things for transport during the Olympics" (Babis 2007). A quick fix provided the
extension of metro line 3 to the north, merging with the mostly completed suburban rail
tracks leading to the airport. The meeting minutes between ATHOC's Transport Division
86 While staying in Athens in 2007 , I observed a policeman riding without a helmet on the back of a motor
cycle.
87 IOC Archives / Summer Olympic Games of Athens 2004 - transport (restricted access)
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and the IOC on September 17t and October 3rd 2003 on the global review of the
suburban project 88 shed light on the decision-making process: due to the delays in
building the suburban rail, the entire project was deemed "inoperable" (p. 2). Hence, the
IOC suggested that "during the Games only Attiko metro shall serve the airport with a
very fast service from and to Syntagma every twenty minutes" (p. 3). An alternative
solution to the urgent problem was then suggested by the IOC expert Bovy that was
implemented in the transport plans for the Olympics. According to a fax sent by the
deputy minister Nassos Alevras on October 13th 2003 to Gilbert Felli, the IOC's Olympic
Games Executive Director, subway trains between Doukissis Plakentias and Neratziotissa
can be implemented - the alternative scenario that Bovy had proposed (p. 2).89 According
to Frantzeskakis (2007), the metro people also insisted on extending the metro line with
the aim of receiving a large part of the funding available due to the Games.
The current transport set-up, letting the metro line run in parallel with the
suburban rail, was not planned. Comparing the original plans of the Metro Development
study with the outcomes shows significant differences. The preferred option, as
calculated by Attiko Metro S.A., was routing the metro via a northern route converging
from the north into the Athens airport (Attiko-Metro 1996b). Hence, the new Olympic
metro route - running on a non-selected route (Figure 5.20) - stripped many
neighborhoods located to the north of the current rail lines of an option to access the city
and the airport via public transport.
88 IOC Archives / Summer Olympic Games of Athens 2004 - transport (restricted access)
89 IOC Archives / Summer Olympic Games of Athens 2004 - transport (restricted access)
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Figure 5.20: Planned subway network in Athens (1996)
Source: Presentation of MDS (p. 59) in 1999, sent by Deloukas via Email on February 27*, 2009
The Traffic Management Center - overbuilt and underperforming
The building of a brand new traffic management center (TMC) is an essential
feature for operating the large-scale transport improvement of the Olympics. Or so it is
believed by many organizing cities. For Athens, the new TMC was an experiment, just
using an opportunity the Olympics presented to the city. Sermpis (2007) describes the
decision-making process as follows: "With the Olympics, we had an opportunity to do
something like this. So, let's build it. But we did not really know what to do with it." The
main driver of building the center was, according to Sermpis, the public sector. He
describes its attitude as "a kid who can take money from the government, because they
were very interested in something like that because of the Olympics." The entire center
was started because of the Olympics with the intent to benefit the city afterwards.
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Due to the delayed start of construction, the center started operating just a month
prior to the Olympics. The task assigned, and manageable with such short preparation
time, was the usage of 500 variable message signs, in order to inform people of ongoing
congestion or accidents. Even though for the Olympics 1200 new signal control signs
were installed, the staff capacity and knowledge were only able to operate the 500 most
important ones during the Games (Sermpis 2007). Even though the coordination of traffic
signals would have been important during the Games, it was impossible due to the short
preparation period.90
After the Olympics, the staff was reduced to a minimum and in 2007 was still in
the process of exploring the full potential of the TMC. "You witness failures in
operations like illegal parking, traffic lights not working in a synchronized way, because
the traffic management centre does not work properly." (Protopsaltis 2007).
Sustaining operational measures
Sustaining all priority measures, as they were applied during the Olympics would,
in the eyes of Patrikalakis (2007), face fierce public resistance; hence, he concludes it
would be impossible. However, a few of these new bus lines were kept after the Olympic
Games, such as the X-9 serving the airport (Patrikalakis 2007).
Old habits are hard to break
Despite ATHOC's prediction that the Olympic investments could change public
transport behavior, transport planners assess the current situation differently. "In most
cases we experienced people going back to their old habits" (Protopsaltis 2007).
Unfortunately, with no further enforcements in place compliance with parking
restrictions and obedience to traffic laws dissipated after the closure of the Games. "Und
diese Chance haben wir verpasst; es gab keine Fortsetzung" 91 (Deloukas 2007).
The IOC perspective on lessons learned from the Athens Olympics
Seminars to prepare cities for the Olympic transport task usually point out the
positive aspects, barely warning of the potential pitfalls. Cartalis, who had witnessed the
90 By 2007, it had been implemented.
91 We missed this chance; there was no continuity.
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changes in Athens, made claims in a private seminar for the 2012 Applicant City on
October 9 th 2003 in Lausanne, Switzerland, that do not hold up against the evidence
presented in this chapter. He stated that the infrastructural investments made during the
Olympics "complied with the Master Plan for the development of Athens" (slide 22). As
argued in this Athens analysis, the Olympic transport installations significantly differed
from the original Master plan developed by Attiko Metro in 1996; in particular, the tram
and metro line 3. Other claims, such as that the Games were aimed to "recover"
important sites in Athens, e.g., the old airport of Athens (slide 22), were apparently true,
but the outcomes were different. The old Hellinikon airport site has yet to be developed
(2008).
Further claims about Athens operations also differ from the opinions of local
transport planners. Cartalis (2003) claimed that Athens' planned legacy became a reality
with a well integrated multi-modal transportation system with major post-Olympic usage:
buses, metro extension, subways, and suburban rail (slide 22). The opposite view is taken
by the former head of transport planning for the Olympic Games, Protopsaltis (2007):
"The public transport centre, which does not really have an integration for different
modes of transport, buses, trolley buses, trams, or metros. Metro lines 1 [compared to] 2
and 3 are in different organizations, in different entities. This is ridiculous. This is a joke,
but it still carries on." If hosting cities do not pass on the true lesson's learned and point
out potential pitfalls, the same mistakes are likely to be repeated by future cities.
Conclusions
Athens used the Olympic Games as a stimulus to overcome coordination hurdles
among agencies and break political barriers that had hindered public transport
development in Athens for a long time. No doubt, Athens used the Olympics to bring
forward discontinuous change to their transport system. In my assessment, however, they
allowed the IOC too much influence on their original transport plans; partially this was
the city's own fault. In preparing for the Games, Athens slacked off and lost three
valuable years in its preparation for its future and the Games. Because the IOC saw the
Games and their success endangered, they decided to influence the preparations and push
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forward solutions that were still implementable within the remaining time before the
Opening ceremony.
Different routes for the tram and the metro were built that potentially
disadvantaged not only communities adjacent to the formerly planned routes but also
other transport infrastructure projects that may never get built due to the low ridership on
the Olympics-initiated infrastructure that now exists.
Despite these changes forced by the IOC, Athens managed to catalyze some of the
infrastructure laid out in its original urban plan. Building the Attiki Odos had long been
planned by the city and improved access to Athens's center. Since the road's
inauguration, it has seen a constant demand increase (Attiki-Odos 2007). Yet its future
seems to be predetermined: "it will be [congested] just like any other highway" (Halkias
2007).
Hence, the IOC exercised a decisive influence on the city, evidently altering
existing urban plans, but unfortunately, contrary to what the government had promised
the public, the Games did not solve the city's traffic problems,. Indeed, Athens in 2007
faced the same transport problems as it did before: metro usage was stagnating after
hitting a peak in 2004 (Deloukas 2007), the tram was officially regarded as not meeting
expectations, bus use was diminishing, and the inner city was as heavily congested as
ever. One of the major problems was, and still is, the illegally parked vehicles in the city;
the city lacks strict enforcement mechanisms. One reason seems to be that politicians fear
voter wrath. With no metropolitan planning agency in place, this situation is unlikely to
change. "Because Greece is a small country, resources are scarcer. Integration and
cooperation is the only way forward, if we want to be successful. The state does not have
the courage to integrate [planning] into one operating company. [The Olympic
experience] is an example that demonstrates this lack of commitment and vision"
(Protopsaltis 2007).
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Chapter Six
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Cities implemented various changes into their cities' public and private transport
systems with the goal to provide access to Olympic venues92 during Games time and to
ensure a beneficial legacy for the city after the event. This alignment usually is reflected
in the degree to which cities managed (1) to catalyze urban and transport projects
manifested in their strategic plan (2) to fulfill their urban vision (3) to meet the goals they
had promised the public and (4) to leverage the opportunities the Games brought.
Staging the Games made investments into the transport infrastructure a necessity
for cities. Interestingly this new infrastructure shows a similar pattern across cities, which
I capture through cross-case comparisons in a model of transport change cities undergo in
the run-up to mega events. Hence in this chapter, I support my hypothesis that mega
event owners are not mere catalyst for cities but rather constitute an agent of urban
change. Besides this new infrastructure, cities also invested in temporary measures. In all
four cities, planners implemented numerous common measures spanning management of
transit, traffic, and transport demand, such as parking restrictions, park- and-ride stations,
and free public transport for event ticket holders. Each measure implemented into the
transport system was crucial; combined, they ensured relatively efficient transport
operations in most cases during the Olympic Games. After the event, these measures
retain the potential to enhance the efficiency of existing transport infrastructure. I do not
recount and list all the measures applied, but rather focus on their sustainment within the
transport system.
The chapter consists of four sections. In the first, I summarize and comparatively
analyze the Olympic transport task for each city. In the second section, I discuss the
growing influence of the IOC on the transport planning process. In the third, I discuss the
outcomes of such change process by developing a model of change, which shows a
similar pattern of outcomes each of the cities experienced in staging the Olympics. This
part establishes the IOC as a global force that impacts local processes. Through the
92 Olympic venues are usually divided into competition and non-competition venues. Competition venues
are stadia, in which the athletes compete. Non-competition venues are places that need special high demand
service, such as the airport or the Olympic athlete village.
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analysis, I uncover some of the myths, about what the Olympics are claimed to bring to
urban regions and their transport systems, and I highlight missed opportunities. In the
fourth section, I analyze whether cities aligned their metropolitan plans with the Olympic
requirements.
Comparing the Olympic transport tasks
The Olympic transport tasks hosting cities have to handle are immense. Their
specific transport operations in handling of the Olympic passenger demands, is crucially
determined by the cities' existing infrastructure and the land-use choices for competition
venues. In the following section, I provide a short descriptive analysis of each city's land-
use choices, transport system size, and respective Olympic transport tasks, in order to
shed light on the cities' inherent differences and their individual transport challenges.
Land-use choices and the Olympics
Land-use choices for Olympic venues determine the travel pattern of the Olympic
traffic. Interestingly, in interviews, transport planners reported that first the venue
locations were chosen and then transport routes were designed to accommodate traffic
and transit flows between all venues, central points of interest, and the city center. These
venue locations were primarily driven by pre-existing venues, by the vision the city had
specifically regarding the Olympic Village, and by venue sponsors, such as universities,
who were willing to pay to maintain a stadium after its Olympic usage. Barcelona wanted
to evolve as the new Mediterranean city of Spain and started by placing the Olympic
Village in an abandoned industrial district. Atlanta wanted to revitalize its downtown area
by placing the Village downtown and building the Centennial Park. Sydney intended to
regenerate Homebush by placing the Olympic village adjacent to the area. In contrast
Athens' primary focus was to develop a new urban area in its north. Hence, cities have
attempted to use the Games primarily to revitalize urban areas treating transport
connections as secondary.
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Figure 6.1: Olympic cities' CBD and venue cluster locations
Source: the author.
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As reflected in the Figure 6.1, each city's land-use choice was intrinsically
different, and consequently their transport patterns varied greatly. The sizes of the yellow
areas reflect an approximation of the expected passenger travel demand to and from each
area (Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1: Passenger estimates by Olympic area in each city
Barcelona 1992 Atlanta 1996 Sydney 2000
Sports 13 Montjuic 20 Center 20 Homebush 10 OAKA
7 Diagonal 10 Faliro
5 Vail d'Hebron 7 Helleniko
4 Parc del Mar
Venues 5 Montjuic 11 Center 14 Homebush 6 OAKA
6 Diagonal 4 Faliro
5 Vail d'Hebron 6 Helleniko
2 Parc del Mar
Passengers 100,000 Montjuic 400,000 Center 400,000 Homebush 150,000 OAKA
on peak day n.a Diagonal 75,500 Faliro
n.a Vail d'Hebron 75,000 Helleniko
n.a Parc del Mar
Source: NBCSports 1991, BOCOG 1993, ACOG 1993, BOOZ Allen 2001, deFrantz 1998, ORTA
2001,(Papadimitriou 2004), (Transport Department 2000), Archives du CIO / Olympic Games Barcelona
1992 / transport.
Barcelona organized its Olympic transport system in a radial pattern with the
Rondas providing fast and easy access to all of them, while avoiding the inner city traffic.
Atlanta had almost a 100% match between regular commuter traffic and Olympic Games
traffic. According to ACOG (1993), 80% of the Olympic activities were taking place in
the inner city due to the location of the Olympic Park, the IBC, the MPC, and 11 Olympic
venues hosting 20 sports in the CBD. In Sydney as in Atlanta, the main Olympic activity
was concentrated in one center, but Sydney's Olympic transport drastically differed from
the regular commuting travel pattern. Regular commuters flowed into the city center,
whereas the Homebush area, positioned remotely, required the set-up of completely
different travel routes. Athens' location choices form a triangle. The general commuter
travel overlapped the Olympic travel flows, with the exception of the Helleniko complex
to the east of Athens. For the purpose of my study, it is important to note that OAKA and
Faliro lay outside of the CBD.
Most of the time, spectators were able to travel between the venue clusters
without switching their transport mode or transfering at stations; frequently, one main
line carried all inter-venue traffic. In Barcelona, it was line 3 (the exception was Parc del
Mar - line 4), and in Atlanta, the north-south MARTA rail. Sydney ran special rail
services between the CBD and Homebush on its Western line, and in Athens metro line 1
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Athens 2004
connected the main centers (except Helleniko in the east, which required switching from
metro to tram).
Transport system capacity and the Olympics
A transport system's capacity, the transport system's daily operation, and prior
mega event experience are crucial elements in handling the Olympic peak demands. A
proxy for the transport task ahead is the number of tickets sold for Olympic competitions.
The Figure 6.2 compares the population of the metropolitan area at the time of the
Olympic Games with the tickets that were sold. Atlanta's task was to quadruple,
Barcelona's and Sydney's were to triple, and Athens' was to double the usual number of
people that had to be moved.
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Figure 6.2: Tickets sold and residential population
Source: the author, calculated from Bovy, Currie(2008), Estadistica de Barcelona (1992).
From this comparison, it is evident that Atlanta was going to face the highest
demand for transport services and potentially see the highest increase in ridership on the
city's transport system. Comparatively, however, it had the least equipped public
transport system, as shown in Figure 6.3. What we would expect to see, then, is a
significant increase in available services for public transport during the Games. Instead,
Atlanta offered the least capacity for prospective Olympic riders (Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.3: Capacity of the transit systems
Figure 6.4: Olympic fleet
Source: the author, calculated from Currie(2008), Estadistica de Barcelona (1992).
In retrospect, Atlanta had underestimated the transport volume and was
unprepared to handle the Olympic masses.
Dynamics of transport change
I found that the IOC, till now believed to be mere catalyst in the urban change
process, is rather an agent of change acting as a powerful initiator of the Olympic vision
on the local level. My research suggests that cities frequently succumb to mega event
needs and requirements to change their planning priorities. In all these cities, the global
dominating force -- the IOC efforts to implement changes ensuring efficient transport
during the Games -- has been manifested in local Olympic legacies, which are frequently
different from the cities' original plans. Hence, I argue that the IOC exercises a decisive
influence on transport planning due to the requirements they impose on Olympic host
cities.
Arguably, host cities experienced more or less pressure in providing appropriate
Olympic transport facilities. Over the past 30 years, the IOC has gained experience with
previous hosts and started creating requirements for host cities to meet; cities have to
comply with these requirements and commit to adjustments of their transport systems in
their application and bid files. This host contract likely denies cities the chance to grow
smarter during their preparations (7 years), because they are locked into the promises
they had made during the bidding stage. Through the introduction of the transfer of
knowledge (TOK) program, Olympic organizers wanted to ensure that no knowledge
gained through experience was lost. Thereafter, the IOC and cities have to undergo a
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steep learning curve in the preparation for the Olympics. Because new lessons emerged,
cities had to comply with new rules.
As this experience accumulated and knowledge management became more
prominent, the IOC's requirements grew substantially and became more stringent.93
While the requirements seemed to be rather lax in Barcelona and Atlanta, Sydney and
Athens felt a stronger pressure of transport adjustments that had to be made. Throughout
the decade since Atlanta's Games, the IOC has adopted a more rigorous approach to
ensure athletes reach competitions and are granted secure rights of way. Because
Atlanta's transport performance had been poor, the IOC ensured for future hosts a
different approach, even assigning in 1998 a transport advisor (Bovy) to oversee the tasks
at hand. Another explanation might be that the IOC did not anticipate any problems
(neither in Atlanta nor Barcelona), and hence did not interfere. With that explanation, the
interpretation of my findings would be that the degree of change cities are forced to make
is directly correlated with the city's preparations and how well they are aligned with the
requirements of the IOC. Basically, the more the IOC anticipates problems with the
current strategy, the more it will intervene. 94
Even though staging the Olympics empowers metropolitan governments to
expedite the decision making processes, this intervention by the IOC in local transport
plans is not well received by local planners: "the IOC is not really interested in [long-
term impacts on the city]; all they are really interested in is forcing the Games holder to
do a good job. And that often requires partnerships with the holder to pressure their
government" (Currie 2008). Because the focus of the IOC seems to be exclusively on the
three weeks, without taking the cities' future development into account, poor legacies
have remained in cities, e.g., the Olympic requirement to transport Olympic Family
members by bus increases the need for cities to invest in highways, which long-term
benefits private car ownership. The railway and funiculars investments were a temporary
solution sought by cities to accommodate the peak passenger demands, while planners
now struggle to accommodate the areas development.
93 The IOC placed successively more requirements on cities as Olympic sports proliferated. For example,
the number of competitions to be staged grew between 1992 and 2004 by almost 20%.
94 In Athens the lack of planning and late implementation, made the city susceptible to pressure to change
the original transport plans significantly.
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Maybe out of pride, or for fear of losing public support, cities are reluctant to
acknowledge unfulfilled promises or unsuccessful legacies publicly - as Cartalis'
statements in the Athens case make evident, or as Grant's opinion in Sydney shows.
Silence is maintained, especially about the projects that were supposed to bring a positive
urban and transport legacy to the city, which are frequently the reasons for the public to
support hosting a mega event. Because after the Games the public attention shifts to the
next Games, no research or questioning of the legacies has been undertaken and cities are
careful about keeping negative outcomes quiet.
If these negative outcomes are not brought forward to at least the future hosts, the
same mistakes are likely to be committed yet again. The IOC's transport advisor
earnestly assured me that the IOC was interested in positive legacies for cities, but also
agreed that there was a need for past hosts to come forward and identify poor legacies, so
that he and other IOC members can be more aware of the possible consequences of the
requirements they impose. Ultimately, the power lies within the IOC and so does - to a
certain extent - the responsibility for the legacies. The IOC has to share this
responsibility, and place some value on those bids that match their Olympic plan with the
concurrent metropolitan plan and city vision.
Another pitfall that too many requirements bring to host cities is the almost
immediate agreement by hosts to comply. I have witnessed that many planners submit
readily to the requirements, barely questioning them or even failing to stand up against
the IOC's desires if modifications are not benefitting the city's future with the planner's
own expertise. The focus on winning the bid dominates the planning process; so do the
IOC's requirements. As Daniels (2008) summarized the conflict: "Before the Games, the
focus is on winning the bid, and once you've won the bid, the focus is on delivering the
event."
Future planners for mega events have to be very careful about using the Olympic
requirements for the future growth of the city. This requires long preparation time and
planning different scenarios, in which the land-use choices and transport investments are
considered in the light of the post-Games scenarios. The Games then become a powerful
tool in leveraging desirable discontinuous change.
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The future of IOC requirements
For future cities, some rules seem to be immutable. Use of cars will be heavily
constricted (100% public transport for spectators), an integrated transport management
scheme with one central coordination authority is required, exclusive lines for Olympic
bus travel, the presence of an Olympic ring containing a majority of venues is preferred,
and locations of venues should be chosen close to public mass transport systems (or more
specifically, along one major subway line connecting as many stadiums as possible).
Non-static requirements imply that my theory may need to change as more or
different requirements evolve. On the one hand, peak demand for spectators is not likely
to change and hence the general model of change remains. On the other hand, if the IOC
agrees to let athletes travel by rail, other requirements are being imposed, and the model
of change may yield different results. In this case, building new public transport
infrastructure rather than private roads would be stimulated.
Other world occurrences also have influenced Olympic requirements. After 9/11
for example, security requirements, specifically for transporting athletes, were revised.
Additionally bus screenings, individual body searches were required by the IOC, whereas
the USA required that a separate team of their own would secure the paramount of the
airport and Olympic village. This impact has been most evident in the Games directly
subsequent to 2001, and only now are those requirements being slightly lifted due to the
immense efforts and costs cities have to undertake.
Model of urban and transport change
Transport changes the Olympics brought to hosting cities have resulted in a
similar pattern of outcomes. Conversely, though, each city originally had set very
different goals. Barcelona wanted to evolve through the Games as the new glorious
Mediterranean city - as an equivalent to the capital of Spain, Madrid. At the other
extreme, Atlanta simply wanted to host the Games. Sydney intended, through their
proclamation of the Green Games, to change the mindset of the public towards greater
caring for the environment. Athens proclaimed its goal as to solve the "traffic mess" in its
inner city through heavy transport infrastructure investments stimulated by the Games.
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The following sections analyze these transport changes suggesting a model of change
cities undergo when staging a mega event.
1) Improved airport-to-city-center connection 95
The airport-to-city-center connection was improved, because, I argue, it was a
crucial route in the Olympic transport system that was traveled by virtually all of the
Olympic Family members, and most spectators.
Table 6.2: Infrastructure improvements and new services for the Olympic Games
Barcelona Atlanta Sydney Athens
Highway improved Improved new New
Rail line existed no new New
Metro no Existed no New
Bus service new n.a. n.a. New
Source: compiled by the author.
Barcelona's ring road, according to Olympic planners, improved access to the
airport. Whereas rail services (Renfe's line 10) had been operating prior to the Olympics,
a new bus service was inaugurated and maintained after the Olympics. Atlanta's airport
was served by MARTA's rail system prior to the Olympic Games. Highway systems
were improved during the Olympic preparation period (ARC 1999). Sydney built a new
highway, the Eastern Distributor and a new rail line both serving regional neighborhoods
and passing through the airport. Athens built a new highway, the Athiki Odos, a new
metro line, and a new suburban rail connection, and inaugurated express bus service.
For future hosting cities, these results suggest that airport to city center
connections will be upgraded, because they represent a vital link in the Olympic transport
system.
2) New expressways and additional lanes for roads that carry Olympic buses
All four cities significantly upgraded their road systems. This upgrading spanned
from building new highways, to adding shoulders or lines to the existing roads, to
95 Additionally Olympic city airports underwent significant expansions in the run-up to the Olympic
Games. Barcelona, Atlanta, and Sydney added a new international terminal; Atlanta added a new, and
extended another, runway; and Athens started operating a new airport just before the Olympic Games. As
the entrance gate to the city, so planners argued, the airport was giving the first impression to visitors,
which should be welcoming, clean, and efficient - everything a modern city should represent.
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repairing deficiencies in the old road system. In this section, I propose that precisely
those roads were upgraded that were expected to carry Olympic Family and spectator
buses, whereas other road projects, not carrying Olympic traffic, received lower
priorities.
The most striking features of temporary alterations to the city's transport system
are the two Olympic bus networks. 96 Both bus networks are added to the regular public
transport system of the city. Their routes vary across the cities based on the land-use
choice for venues, the existing public transport system, and the urban form of the city.
The following analysis supports by juxtaposing the upgraded road network with the
Olympic routes my proposition of causality: because of the Olympics, these specific
roads received upgrades.
Barcelona's upgrading of roads was dependent on the travel routes of the Olympic
Family members. The Olympic traffic routes for Olympic Family Members (OFM) ran
every 20 minutes primarily on the newly built ring road: from Diagonal, via Vall
d'Hebron, the Olympic Village, the port, the Montjuic area and back to Diagonal
(COOB'92 1990, p. 28). On the regional scale, these road modifications also match
Olympic travel routes, e.g. the new tunnel Vallvidreira (Appendix 2 vs. Figure 5.2). 97
Atlanta's upgrade of roads seems also mainly guided by the need to ensure smooth rides
for the OFM and spectators, e.g., landscaping projects on I-285.98 Sydney's upgrade of
roads was limited. Overlaying the newly built road infrastructure with the Olympic travel
routes, shows that upgrades to these roads were complete during Sydney's candidacy
stage (Appendix 4). The crucial link for the OFM route to reach the western competition
sites, which is the final section of the motorway M4 connecting Mays Hill and Prospect,
was completed (in 1992) shortly before Sydney bid for the Olympics (Zeibots 2003).
96 As introduced in Chapter Four, the first one, called the Olympic spectator bus network, has the function
to transport spectators across the city and its outskirts to and from various Olympic venues. The second
one, called the primary bus network, is dedicated to Olympic Family Members (OFM). This group
comprises IOC (International Olympic Committee) members, national heads of state, officials of national
sporting teams, the press, and the athletes.
97 For further comparisons also see highway of Garraf, the new access road La Garriga-Vic, the new way to
Llobregat, and the highway between Girona and Banyoles (Albert 1992).
98 Table 5.2 with Atlanta locations of Olympic venues (Appendix 3). For a complete listing refer to (ARC
1996, pp. 8-9)
168
/ 
_~_11~_1~_ _
Athens' upgrade of roads matched the Olympic travel routes almost to 100%. Comparing
Figure 5.18 99 with Appendix 5 powerfully demonstrates a strong correlation.
In conclusion, primarily those roads predicted to carry most Olympic traffic were
the roads that were expanded or newly built. Those roads considered essential for the
Olympics received priority, whereas others - like the Athens west highway (Chapter
Four) - remained on the drawing board.
By comparing the four cities I discern an interesting shift in operations
management. The bus networks for the Games of 1992 and 1996, occasionally shared the
available road space with private car users, whereas the Games of 2000 and 2004 devoted
exclusive lines to the buses transporting spectators and OFM's throughout the entire
network. This shift likely was inaugurated because of the unreliable transport services in
Atlanta, where even some athletes missed their competitions (Rushin 1996).
For future cities, this exclusive dedication of road space to Olympic transport is
likely to be continued. Hence, the need to expand roads along Olympic travel routes is
likely to continue. Public transport in the wake of mega events, which goes beyond the
lengthening of platforms to increase capacity, requires a more detailed analysis, which is
provided in the next section.
3) New measures for road-based public transport
To ensure smooth operation of the road network cities implemented priority
measures for buses. If they are sustained in cities after the mega event, they have
potential to alleviate traffic congestion and improve transport conditions. A few of these
measures have been sustained in cities.
Barcelona implemented a system of bus priority lines in its inner city for the
Olympics, some of which cities kept after the Games and were still operated in 2009.
Atlanta kept some of the HOV 100 lanes they implemented according to their 2010
transport plan(ARC 1999), and additionally kept some specifically designed for the
Olympics (ACOG 1993b). Sydney claimed to have had a good experience with the
express buses serving the Olympic Park and therefore implemented Sydney's regional
99 These were Kifisos Aenue, Poseidonos Avenue, Markopoulos Avenue, Varis-Koropiou Avenue, the
Olympic Village Avenue and the Marathonos Avenue.
100 An HOV line is dedicated road space for cars with at least two passengers.
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bus network. Other voices claim, though, that these plans had been in place for a few
years (Warren Centre 2002). However, both sides agree that these Olympic buses were
the first to run inter-sectorally in the city. Athens introduced and kept some of their
express buses, such as the X9 serving the airport.
This summary shows that some public transport measures were retained as
legacies, if cities saw they met a need. They were not sustained because cities though
about how to leverage these temporary measures for the cities' benefit prior to staging the
Olympic Games. The variety in outcomes suggests that there may be more ways to plan
leveraging these temporary measures for the long term.
Transport Demand Management
The smooth flow of traffic was supported through intensive management of
transport demand, with the primary goal of this management scheme being to reduce the
city's base load demand.101 Through the reduction of regular riders, each city's transport
capacity was partially freed up, making space for spectators and Olympic Family
Members.
All cities applied more or less the same measures to reduce the base loads on their
transport systems. Special consideration was given to rush hour times, between 7-10am in
the morning and 4-7pm in the evening. Most of the measures that were applied focused
on encouraging businesses to implement flexible working hours and telecommuting, to
relocate workers to branches outside the city, and to enable workers to take vacations
during the three weeks of the Olympics. Other measures prohibited certain vehicle types
in the inner city and freight deliveries to stores located in the inner city during day time.
My interviews Currie (2007), a planner, revealed that this transport scheme alone could
result in a base load demand reduction of approximately 20%.
Communication to visitors and residents played a special role in coping with the
increased demands on the city's transport system. Organizers wanted to shift as many
people as possible from using cars to riding public transit during the Games. The city
officials' goal, therefore, was to build public confidence in transportation over the years
leading up to the Olympics. Comparison of the intent and messages conveyed to residents
101 The base load demand is the passenger demand for transport services by regular commuters.
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reveals a shift from encouragement to fear. Whereas in Barcelona and Atlanta the
campaigns were rather informational and residents were "encouraged" to take public
transport, in Sydney and Athens the same messages were stronger, with an implication
that if people would not follow the recommendations, the city would experience severe
traffic congestion and hinder successful staging of the Games.
For future hosts, city officials could think about using the Olympics as a means to
introduce and sustain some measures that easily can reduce travel demand.
Traffic restrictions
Road closures, and driving and parking restrictions, were measures applied in all
cities, specifically around Olympic venues, the inner city, and key roads, which were
predicted to carry higher loads due to Olympic traffic. Special measures to speed up
traffic were implemented, e.g., prohibiting left turns. The combination of measures was
essential for providing security to athletes and allowing free-flowing access to venues for
Olympic Family Members and spectators alike. Overall, cities implemented more or less
the same measures (refer to individual cities), but there is an increase in the amount of
restrictions and the penalties for breaking them observable over the hosting years of past
cities.
In the long term, some restrictions that ease traffic in the inner city could be
introduced during Games time and kept thereafter.
4) ITS solutions and new traffic management centers
In general, hosting cities that did not seem to be equipped to handle the Olympics
had to upgrade their traffic-management operations significantly. This category
comprises Intelligent Transportation Systems measures implemented in the transport
networks for Games time with the intent to ease and prioritize traffic flows. After the
event, these measures inherit the potential to enhance the capacity of existing transport
infrastructure.
Intelligent transport systems for public and private transport
To coordinate and help drivers to comply with both the new Olympic transport
network and the existing commuter transport system, traffic management systems across
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all four cities were improved. These improvements included the installation of
observation cameras along major roads and in close proximity to the venues, information
boards about road conditions on highways, and emergency signs for eventual rerouting of
traffic. Also, most public transit systems received electronic messaging signs. Because of
the Olympics, cities significantly upgraded their incident management systems and were
better able to coordinate road conditions, such as by the sequencing of traffic lights.
Traffic Management Centers
In order to coordinate all these measures in a centralized way, all cities opted to
build a new traffic management center (TMC). That all of my case study cities
established a state-of-the-art traffic management center indicates that significant
upgrading in security and coordination between transport modes is necessary for the
Olympics. The centers generally seem to be built with excess capacity, and lack the
staffing levels or necessary knowledge on the part of the remaining workers to use the
TMCs to their full potential. Atlanta for example built a new TMC, arguably also in line
with the plans for the new intelligent vehicle scheme. However, in 2009 it was still
struggling to find sufficient funding for the center and to maintain it properly. Sydney
turned the center over to the Road Transport Authority (RTA) after the Games, and uses
it extensively during the Royal Easter Show and other events at Sydney Olympic Park.
Athens had too few resources after the Olympics to staff the center and does not use it to
its full capacity. One positive outcome, in the transport planners' assessment, however, is
the substantial improvements for incident management.
5) Beautification -- new fleets and downtown
While preparing for the Summer Olympics all cities underwent fleet renovations
mainly through a rollover of their old fleets towards air-conditioned and environmentally
friendlier vehicles. Modernizing of the current bus and metro fleet had by 2009 become a
standard feature of preparing for the Olympics (Deloukas 2007).
Furthermore, streets and plazas in the centers of all the cities were made
pedestrian friendlier, which Atlanta specifically called "Olympic landscaping." Extensive
walkways, pedestrian bridges, and new open spaces were constructed to allow passengers
and bikers to access the venues easily.
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6) Creating Olympic parks and venue clusters
In the run-up to the Olympics, cities created new public spaces around and in
between the venues, such as Montjuic in Barcelona, the Centennial Park in Atlanta,
Homebush in Sydney, and OAKA in Athens. After the Olympics, most of these spaces
remained empty and unused to a large extent.102
Overall Impacts
The Olympic Games have brought a variety of influences to urban regions and
transport systems. For the purpose of supporting my hypothesis, I have chosen to
highlight the similarities the cities implemented in the run-up to the Games. Referring
back to Table 2.2, I attempt to draw up an exemplary table of transport impacts.
Table 6.3: Olympic transport impact
Type On whom? Impact
Positive Negative
Cultural People Attitude towards public Attitude was not sustained
transit changed during the after the Games
Games, willingness to
travel by transit increased
significantly
Economic City Resources and labor Resources could not be
power were devoted to sustained after the Games;
public transit temporarily public transit ridership
- at the agencies own generally did not increase
expense due to the Games
Physical City Catalyzed transport Infrastructure exclusively
infrastructure built for the Games
Political City Coordination, Coordination momentum
communication across was lost, coordinating
transport entities, transport entity was
establishment of one dissolved after the Games
agency for public
transport
Psychological People Positive experiences with Negative experiences
transport with transport
Social People Car-owners received more benefits out of the Games
than public transit riders
Source: compiled by the author.
an Olympic Park Authority has been a move to counteract such
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102 Sydney's solution to establish
development.
In Chapter Seven, I will make recommendations based on my findings above and
provide suggestions assuming the Games evolve over time how the requirements might
change and hence alter this model.
Aligning the Olympic requirements with the metropolitan plan
Academics, researchers, and the IOC have argued that mega events like the
Olympic Games are a catalyst for urban change. The purpose of this section is to provide
further evidence against their claim, supported by the evidence I have provided so far in
establishing the IOC as an agent of change. In this section, I specifically examine whether
the four cities aligned the transport requirements with their metropolitan goals. I measure
the alignment of transport policies by comparing original city plans published before the
Olympics with the actual modifications undertaken in the run-up to the Olympics. I also
discuss the urban vision the cities had set out to accomplish through the Olympics:
meeting transport goals and leveraging opportunities.
Comparing original city plans with the urban changes cities undertook for the
Games, shows the degree to which the IOC has influenced existing metropolitan plans. In
Table 6.4, I compare the four cases for the changes the transport system experienced
during their Olympic preparations. I distinguish infrastructure developments that had
been made in the run-up to the Olympics (completed between the election of the city and
hosting the Olympic Games) according to Olympic inspired changes, and catalytic
changes. 10 3 Olympic inspired changes include those that were significantly altered or
built solely because of the Olympics (deviates from, not in urban master plan). Catalytic
changes are those that appear in the metropolitan plan prior to winning the Olympic bid.
Table 6.4: Infrastructural developments during the run-up to the Olympics
Not in urban master plan In urban master plan
= deviates from = catalytic
Barcelona Escalators renfe rail tracks
Subway stop: Vila Olympica Rondas
Funiculars
Atlanta Exit 1-78 MARTA extensions
HOV lanes
103 Refer to Chapter 3 - methodology - for a detailed discussion.
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IVHS
Sydney Rail loop Eastern Distributor
Monorail Ultimo-Pyrmont Rail to the airport
Roads around Homebush
Athens Tram (different route) Metro line 2
Metro line 3 (different route) Attiki Odos
Roads around Olympic Ring Suburban Rail
Source: compiled by the author.
In the column for catalytic changes, comparatively more roads have been
improved than there have been investments into new public transport benefiting residents.
Besides the common knowledge that underground systems are more expensive, another
hindering factor planners have argued was that the International Olympic Committee
pushes for an upgrade of the road infrastructure, because all athletes and VIPs had to be
transported by cars or buses. This arrangement, however, is not solely driven by
convenience but also by security. Starting already from the airport hosting cities place an
emphasis on separating the Olympic Family Members from the general public (Kassens
2005).
In comparison, most of public transport infrastructure had not been in original city
plans. In the column for Olympic inspired changes, most of the public infrastructure
invested is used for leisure (escalators, funiculars, rails, trams). A strong deviation from
the master plan driven by the IOC's influence I witnessed in Athens: because the metro
was rerouted to provide the crucial airport to city-center link, it did not pass through
suburbs to the north of Athens and stripped the suburban rail of a substantial customer
base. 104
Mega events bring catalytic effects to transport projects. With the provision of a
fixed deadline and additional funding available, cities can implement transport projects.
Thus, I agree with the many researchers who claim that the Games provide an
opportunity for urban renewal (Coaffee 2007; Essex and Chalkley 1998; Graham and
Marvey 1995). However, in terms of transport developments, I propose that the Games
only serve as catalysts for those infrastructure projects that support predicted major
passenger movements during the Olympics. Thus, Olympic planners should, in the future,
104 It is questionable, whether those suburbs will ever receive a metro connection.
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align land-use planning for event sites and transport to venues in accordance with the
long-term development goals for the hosting city.
Missed opportunities
All the cities had explicitly stated the goal of enhancing urban transport through
the Olympics, ideally by keeping those practices that had proven to be beneficial during
the event. With daily life returning to the Olympic cities, some practices were sustained,
others dropped, legacies discovered, and lost opportunities recognized. With some time to
reflect on the Olympic experience, planners have recalled opportunities that they
regretted not using. Surprisingly, the same two themes echo in each city.
Coordinating transport planning and operations
The institutional policies implemented during the Games all foster the move
towards a more integrated transport system: coordination among agencies,
synchronization of transport services, and jointly developed transport and land-use plans.
And yet most of the efforts cities had to undertake in preparation for the Olympics could
not be sustained. One reason many planners named was the common politician's fear of
losing power within their jurisdictions. Another factor was a lack of resources. With the
Games moving to the next city, resources were diminished and city budgets exhausted.
Institutional changes towards integration and cooperation require a planning process with
a post-Olympic vision that cities already have to start during the bidding for the Games.
Coordination across transport institutions and one agencies overseeing operations post-
event are necessary.
Planning for Olympic legacies
Most cities claimed to have a post-Olympic vision in mind, leveraging the
Olympics for a locally attuned outcome. Yet, most leveraged only physical changes -
some more and some less successful - and neglected operational ones. For all these plans,
however, there seems to be at least one key requirement to make them a reality: pre-
Games commitment for post-Games implementation. Yet neither political commitments
nor a coordinated strategy beyond the event, were common features in the post-Olympic
planning. As an exception to the rule, Sydney established the Olympic Park Authority as
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an entity to oversee the further development of the Olympic Park and attract visitors to
the regenerated area. Unfortunately, because the Park Authority was established only in
2001, it struggles with the uncoordinated legacies the Olympics have left. As two Sydney
interviewees believe, the city now needs to invest even more money into transport, if
Homebush is to prosper (Interviews with Dobinson and Allachin 2008). Insuring a legacy
beyond the Games is a daunting task, it requires the mindset to leverage every single
possibility the Games bring, to expand the planning period as long as possible prior to the
Games, and establish an entity that enforces the legacy.
A strategic planning approach has to be adopted already during the bidding stage.
The strategic planning approach has to lay out a comprehensive legacy the city could
receive out of the Games. A factor that seems to have been misleading cities in their
planning for the Olympics is the "short" planning horizon for the Games. Dimitriou et al.
(2004) believe that "early planning (3 years in the case of the Athens 2004 Olympics) is
necessary [and sufficient] for thoroughly examining all potential operational and planning
aspects of the transportation system" (p. 11). However, more seems to have been gained
from the Games by the cities that planned the longest for their urban development and
just had to take the readymade plans "out of their pockets" or had the functional,
coordinated, and integrated institutional set-up in place. Barcelona, for example, started
the planning for the Games as early as 1977, whereas the bid was due in 1986.
During the bidding, candidacy, and preparations period an entity has to review the
situation consistently. This entity must remain in cities beyond the mega event to ensure
legacies are being implemented. It also has to adapt the legacy vision to unexpected
changes. As an example, Sydney's ferry system, planned for the Olympics, had to be
revisited after an endangered frog species was discovered during construction of the ferry
wharfs. Similarly, Athens metro came to an abrupt halt when ancient artifacts were found
during the digging work. These two examples demonstrate the need for a flexible
strategy, but also the need for additional time buffers to insure meeting the fixed Olympic
opening deadline.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to a set of outcomes all interviewees cited
as positive: the experience gained through the event; the increased confidence of being
able to stage any mega event; the established procedures that can readily be applied to
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other, smaller events; and the better knowledge of workers about the comprehensiveness
of the transport system. So far, only Sydney regularly reapplies its knowledge during the
Royal Easter Show.
Uncovering the Olympic myths
Widespread beliefs suggest that the Olympics bring significant improvements not
only to the infrastructure, but also to operational practices beyond the Games. Switching
car commuters to change permanently to mass transit, better integration of the transport
systems, and introduction of new ticketing systems are said to be common improvement.
Never switching people permanently to public transit
Organizers and city officials wanted spectators to take public transport during the
Olympic Games. Therefore, all four cities implemented extensive measures in public and
private transport. To mention a few outlined in previous chapters: park-and-ride facilities
with access to public transport, shuttle buses, extended operating hours for trains and
buses (24 hours a day), and free public transport was provided to spectators holding an
entrance ticket to Olympic competitions. The combination of transit and traffic operations
induced commuters to switch.
After the Games, commuting patterns returned to the way they were before the
Games. With less enforcement in place and revocation of priority lanes for public
transport, traffic reverted to the same old travel pattern in the inner cities. Planners who
were interviewed cited decreased levels of services due to limited resources - the
standard problem of public transport agencies- as the main reason. During the Games,
resources were plentiful and the many volunteers made the exceptional transport
performance possible. This argument, however, is only part of the explanation. There is a
switch in attitudes regarding public transport during the Games in that people are willing
to wait longer for service (Hensher and Brewer 2002). Furthermore, without most of the
other measures in place, such as free public transport, driving restrictions, etc., the
incentive to use public transport diminishes further. Therefore, it is not the "confidence
for public transport" - as planning documents have stated - that needs to be enhanced; it
is rather the reliability and service of the public transport system along with economic
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incentives, prohibitive regulations, and informative actions that switch users to public
transport permanently.
Never leading to institutional change
Institutional change comprises responsibilities, structure, management, and
operational policies of transport agencies during the Games, their relationship to each
other, and their impact on each other.
Comparing the cities and their institutional changes, I observe a move towards a
centralized command, control, and communication structure during the Olympics.
Whereas Atlanta had three agencies responsible for transport systems management,
Sydney and Athens opted for a single entity. This entity was a special body comprised of
various individuals from transport agencies that inherited exceptional governmental
power for action, spanning across jurisdictions and all agencies present in the city.
Planning for transport became more sophisticated, more detailed, and more
complex in recent Olympic years. It has become common knowledge for hosting cities
that the success of efficient transport requires a highly coordinated approach from all
planning and transport agencies. Even though transport agencies and planners confirmed
the good experience during the event and expressed the desire to continue such
collaboration thereafter, regular policies were not implemented. A prime example is the
combined ticketing scheme.
Never inaugurating a new ticketing system
With the purchase of an entrance ticket, transportation to and from Olympic
competitions was free. The mode was the choice of the spectator. Transport agencies in
the region underwent significant coordination efforts to make this possible prior to the
Olympics. In the long-term, these coordination efforts could not be sustained. Through
2007, Athens' metro system was made up of two separate companies, which individually
charges their users for riding their own lines. In January 2008, Sydney rejected the move
towards an integrated ticketing scheme - even though planners cited good experiences
during the Games. And Barcelona only recently started implementation of combined
ticketing on its transport systems, some 15 years after the Games.
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Conclusions
Without doubt, a mega event requires cities to upgrade their transportation
system. Despite the current belief, mega events are not pure catalyst. Instead, mega-event
owners have influenced cities in their transport-planning decisions and created transport
legacies. Some of them are, in my opinion, not beneficial for the city, e.g., public-transit
infrastructure that is built solely for the Olympics appeals largely to tourist ridership, e.g.,
the Barcelona funiculars. Therefore, I argue, implementations and planning have to be
considered in a long-term perspective for residents, and no investment can be simply
justified as being "good for the Olympics." With this argument, I take an opposite stand
to the claim of Robbins et al. (2007, p. 309): "Even very large-scale festival events
cannot justify ... permanent infrastructure enhancement such as new public transport
facilities or road construction, with the exception of the largest mega events." In the case
of the Olympics, it seems that global forces - represented as the IOC - dominate local
planning decisions. While the IOC exercises a decisive influence on urban projects, local
authorities comply with the Olympic requirements despite different urban plans in place.
Hence, local forces succumb to global ones, as Beauregard (1995) had suggested in her
work.
The influence the IOC has exercised on cities is also reflected in my proposed
model of change, a collection of similar transport developments across my case studies in
the run-up to the Olympics. Global cities seeking to host Olympic Games are likely to
experience the same influences and to undergo the same pattern of change proposed in
this chapter. The IOC, however, cannot solely be blamed for undesirable urban change.
In the end, cities have to provide the crucial counterpart for such change: their own
motivation to stage the perfect transport Olympics in an attempt to display a perfect
image to the world. To change the way legacies have fostered roads, innovative ways of
transporting athletes have to be found - buses cannot be the only way. The TOK program
implemented by the IOC, as of now only perceived as a positive tool in helping cities to
prepare for the Olympics, needs to be constantly revisited. Cities seeking advice and just
complying with established concepts without questioning them, run the risk that common
practice in mega events transport will lead to common mistakes made in fostering
transport.
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To minimize tradeoffs in planning for the Olympics implies taking advantage of
opportunities that the event brings to the city for the benefit of the population. Transport
infrastructure and coordinated transport operations is a tangible benefit for cities hosting
an event and thus yields the potential for improving the commute and travel within the
metropolitan region. In the following chapter, I will provide recommendations on how to
leverage the Olympic for urban transport.
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Chapter Seven
CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this study, I have argued that mega-event owners exercise a decisive
influence on urban and transport planning through the requirements they impose on
cities. The IOC has a specific set of goals that it wants to accomplish with regard to
transport that are the same no matter which city the Games are staged in. Across cities,
the IOC's purpose is the same, its time horizon is the same, its prescribed means of
transport are the same. These prescribed means have a powerful impact on the
transportation plans of the cities, as evidenced by the case studies presented.
Furthermore, I found that these prescribed means led to a recurring pattern of transport
change in hosting cities and frequently both created and squandered valuable
opportunities for the host city preparing for the event. The evidence of the common urban
pattern of past host cities supports my argument that mega-event owners are global
agents of urban change and not - as researchers currently assume - merely catalysts for
urban change.
Transport dreams and urban realities
In my four case studies, I found that cities pursuing the IOC's transport dream -
of highly efficient, integrated, reliable, and all-around excellent transport services during
the mega event -- frequently took a short-sighted view. Once the Closing Ceremony
ended, cities were confronted with unpalatable urban realities, stemming from the lack of
alignment between their own urban vision and the Olympic transport dream. Those
included missed opportunities, infrastructural investments with "no future" (high
maintenance costs, low ridership), and unforeseen negative outcomes of the planning
process. Contrary to the hopes of planners, governments, and residents to use the event as
a driver for major transport improvements, transport implementations (except
infrastructure) were mainly of temporary nature and led only in a few instances to a long-
term benefit for a city's transport systems. The exceptions to this outcome originated
from those city planners who took a long view and leveraged the mega event -
sometimes against the desires of the IOC.
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To help future host cities avoid the pitfalls their predecessors have encountered
and instead reap the benefits some gained (or could have), I offer several
recommendations in this chapter. Their essence is that if the host city is not prepared with
a very clear vision of what it wants to move toward in terms of urban form, if it does not
hew to that vision during its bid, both in the land-use decisions and the transportation
choices that it makes in order to fulfill the IOC mandate -- then the outcome for the city is
going to be short-term changes, likely very expensive, to satisfy the IOC, with minimal
positive long-term impact on the transportation system and urban form of the city.
The four cities in retrospect
Cities have a trajectory of change in their urban development which results from
the working of the market system, political decision-making, and other factors. The
intended long-term future trajectory of change is what can be embodied in a plan. Mega
events become a perturbation of this trajectory, which carry the potential either to be an
opportunity for discontinuous improvement or a diversion, consumer of resources, and
producer of short-term activities. In the latter case, the city is afterwards left to lurch
along minus whatever resources and energy it used up in achieving the Olympic goals.
Maybe it returns to the trajectory it previously had; but basically, there are no long-term
impacts. Alternatively, however, cities that have figured out how to use the currents of
the Olympics to build their urban and transport infrastructure can get a big boost that
yields lasting benefits.
Barcelona's approach of taking the Olympics as an opportunity to redesign their
city was exemplary. Part of this success was that planning began very early - visionary
documents reach back to more than 20 years before the Games. In complying with the
IOC's requirements for stadiums, the city was forced to add two further areas of
refurbishment to the original city plans. The key word here is "add"; while the city
complied with the IOC rules, it never gave up its other 10 areas of refurbishment nor did
it change its overall vision for Barcelona. In terms of urban form, the requirements of the
IOC gave an opportunity to the planners to expand Barcelona's center and redesign the
entrance gates to the city. In terms of transport, which followed from the land-use
choices, the Games acted as a catalyst for creating the ring road (which had been planned
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for 30 years) and other road expansions in the inner city - primarily pushed forward by
the desire to present the IOC delegation and athletes with first-rate traveling conditions.
The ring road brought long-term alleviation of the traffic conditions in the inner city. In
contrast, investments in public transport improvements for Barcelona's residents fell
short because the existing transport infrastructure already served the most important
travel routes to and from Olympic stadiums. Hence, other potential metro expansions
were delayed till after the Olympic Games.
Atlanta's example showed that even with minimal resources, Games can be
staged. The pre-condition for such an achievement was that plenty of existing stadiums
were available for use, and the key transportation approach was to overlay the Olympic
passenger flows on top of the daily commuting of Atlanta's residents. Theoretically, this
approach minimizes investments and maximizes the benefits for the residents' daily
commute after the Games. Practically, however, this approach can - and did, according to
media reports - result in severe traffic congestion during the mega event. On the one
hand, Atlanta remained in control when staging its Games and scarcely "wasted" any
money on temporary transport infrastructure. On the other hand, its reputation for
transport remained bad even years after the Games. If the organizers in the Atlanta case
had paid closer attention to the transport for media and for IOC officials (who influenced
the media), then the outcome would have been viewed more positively. Overall, Atlanta
planners could have used the Games to further their transport vision: an Atlanta that was
known for its modem public transport system. Without the needed funds or public
support, such a vision could not be implemented.
Sydney had to dedicate Homebush Bay entirely to sports. In the wake of the
Games, Homebush experienced a tremendous development boom in its surrounding
areas, which could have been anticipated. Because Olympic planners did not pay much
attention to the period after the Games (or predict the boom, for that matter), many
opportunities were missed and legacies were built that future planners for Homebush
would have to struggle with. The rushed decision to build the train loop resulted in a poor
connection to downtown which consequently is rarely used on any regular basis. To keep
Homebush lively, the Sydney Olympic park authority organizes frequent events at which
ample parking space allows easy and convenient access to the park, and buses are
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frequently used. Citywide, the Games did not have the impact they could have had, if
land use and transport choices had been made in a manner to foster Sydney's urban
vision as laid out in its plans.
Athens, on the one hand, used the Olympic Games to push forward numerous
public transport projects, many of which - so planners and citizens agree - would not
have been completed were it not for the Olympics. On the other hand, while
extraordinary efforts were undertaken to finish the promised infrastructure for the Games
on time, the IOC's pressure to implement certain routes using specified modes
compromised the original transport plans that the city had envisioned for its future. This
change in plans may result in a complete stop of other planned projects due to the success
or failure of the differently implemented train, tram, and metro routes.
Each city has gained something and lost something from hosting the Olympic
Games. In developing my recommendations, I have drawn upon my comparative
analysis, and specifically my model of change to identify the gained and missed
opportunities cities have experienced. I offer planning and policy recommendations for
leveraging the benefits Games bring to a city - drawing directly on the individual
examples from my case studies. The following recommendations highlight that if mega
events are used strategically, they can catalyze not only infrastructure but also operational
transport operating practices and high-tech information technologies that can
significantly improve urban transport in the long run.
Recommendations for sustainable mega events
Based on my analysis, I believe that developments through mega events can be
guided towards sustainability'05 -- if not only planners but also city officials view the
event as an opportunity for discontinuous change. Therefore, I propose that a
transportation strategy contributes the most to urban transport sustainability if it aligns
the mega-event requirements with the metropolitan vision by using the mega event as a
catalyst for sustainable transport infrastructure along with smart land-use choices for
venues and organizing of the excess visitor demand through efficient peak management
strategies that can be sustained in cities afterwards.
105 A definition was given in the introduction chapter.
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In this section, I develop recommendations for cities staging mega events as to
how to ensure the sustaining of best practices afterwards. However, I caution against
blindly adopting all the ideas below. The key to successful implementation lies in a
thorough study of the alignment (or mismatch) between the requirements of the IOC --
which are continuously further developed as new lessons (in its view) emerge -- and the
individual vision of each city. Usually this alignment is constrained by the existing city
infrastructure, the unique culture of the country, and the distinctiveness of the urban
plans.
The four cities I have studied are a good set of cases from which to draw
meaningful conclusions. However, much more research is necessary to identify
completely and understand the broad implications mega events have for cities' transport
systems. Given that the present study is a pioneering contribution to a vast topic, these
recommendations are provisional and merit review and revision in the light of future
experiences.
Policy recommendations for host cities based on the model of change
In this study, I theorized about what impacts the empirical phenomenon of a mega
event has on cities. The significance of these impacts is evidenced in former host cities
every day. Given this tremendous influence, the number of recurring mega events, and
the increasing number of new events and their growing size, there is a genuine
opportunity for better informed planners to make a difference in how cities look, and in
how they function in the future, by using the mega event as a tool for discontinuous
change.
Airport-to-city-center connection
All cities I reviewed upgraded their airport-to-city-center connection (two of
them, Sydney and Athens, completely built it). As a result, future hosting cities can
expect their airport-to-city-center link to be significantly improved during the run-up to
the mega event, because it represents a vital link in the "specific mega-event transport
system." For Olympic transport planners, placing new or temporary venues along
connecting corridors between the airport and the city center may be a good option, as this
direct route will undergo construction or upgrades either way.
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New and expanded road network along predicted Olympic travel corridors
For future Olympic transport planners, the pattern of catalyzed road infrastructure
in the host cities I compared implies that planning Olympic bus routes during the bidding
stages will likely induce the need to increase the capacity of the existing road network
along these corridors. Placing venues close to public transport and existing well-
maintained roads reduces the need to build new road infrastructure prior to the mega
event, as evidenced in the Atlanta case. Careful transport planning along public transport
corridors is essential to reducing the need for new infrastructure. If a host city has
planned to build a new road, placing venues along such planned improvements will speed
up the construction of the road with a "guaranteed" operational start at the beginning of
the mega event, as witnessed in Athens.
Measures for road-based public transport
The summary in the previous chapter shows that some public transport measures
introduced for the Olympics were retained if cities saw they met a need. However, the
variety in outcomes suggests that there may be more ways to plan such a transport system
for the long term. For Olympic transport planners, it indicates that the choice of Olympic
routes carries the potential to introduce bus priority measures across the city, using the
Olympics as an impetus for change. In Atlanta, the introduction of the high occupancy
vehicle (HOV) lanes coincided with the Games and they continued to operate afterwards.
For example, bus priority lanes necessary for the Games could be sustained and
new bus rapid transit (BRT) lines introduced if they promise to serve a significant portion
of regular commuter traffic. Given that surveillance cameras, variable message signs, and
incident management technology, especially along Olympic routes, have become a
necessity to handle Olympic peak passenger flows, these routes are already set up for
BRT and would potentially require - if at all - only minimal additional investment. Here,
as in the Atlanta case, overlaying regular commuter traffic with Olympic traffic is
beneficial to increase capacity on existing travel routes or, as in the Sydney case, by
inaugurating cross-regional bus systems.
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Intelligent transportation systems
As hinted at above, for Olympic host city planners the mega event can be a
watershed moment for introducing high-tech traffic and transit management solutions; all
four cities examined implemented them. At the same time, such investments bear a high
risk of future capacity underutilization resulting from shortages of staffing, knowledge, or
funding, as seen in the case of Athens. To make the upgrade in traffic management a
worthwhile investment, staffing and proper education prior to the Games have to be
arranged to sustain after-Games use.
Beautification of downtown
In the run-up to mega events, the city centers have experienced a move towards
pedestrianization. Giving priority to pedestrians and bicyclists for the long term is a great
contribution to and incentive for sustainable development. Atlanta not only made its
downtown walkways pedestrian-friendlier, but also built a new park for its residents.
Venue clusters
Locating venue clusters to stimulate urban growth or regenerate an area is a
development strategy frequently applied by hosting cities. Sydney is a prime example of
this strategic development approach because it redeveloped the Brownfield at Homebush.
In terms of transport, selecting a venue location, in particular venue clusters, implies that
transport connections to the area will undergo improvements or even construction of new
transport options. Especially big venue clusters generate an Olympic impetus for
construction of new rail (Sydney), metro (Athens), and light-rail (Athens) tracks and
could thereby foster sustainable transport developments.
Olympic planners have several options for improving transport for metropolitan
regions through locating venues. First, it is beneficial if one cluster is located in the CBD
because it stimulates the sustaining of temporary event measures for future regular
commuters. Second, locating a big venue cluster within a future growth center thereby
harnesses the catalytic infrastructure momentum of the mega event. On a smaller scale,
single temporary and permanent venues could be located along planned subway or rail
systems to make use of the catalytic effect. Third, spreading venue clusters means
spreading benefits. As proven by previous hosts and confirmed through the case studies
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of Barcelona, Sydney, and Athens, cities can assume free-flow traffic conditions for the
Olympic Family during the Games due to the willingness of citizens to comply with new
traffic and transit measures.
Cities so far have not found a viable solution for using the new public spaces and
remaining venues to maximize their own benefit; those who tried have experienced
limited success, according to planners. One lesson learned from previous Olympic hosts
is that areas adjacent to the Olympic venue clusters will experience an Olympic "after-
boom," as evidenced especially in the case of Sydney. Cities have to plan for such an
impact prior to the mega event, so that legacies do not hinder the future development of
an area or make it car-dependent. Even though I did not seek to explore alternative
options in detail (and I will leave finding solutions to future work), the key question to
answer with regard to sustainability is: which land uses other than the Olympics require
similar high-capacity transport access?
My answer for the time being is that none do, but a combination of land uses
might. These could include building shopping malls to fill unused open spaces,
scheduling festivities in the venues through a "park authority" -- as the Sydney example
has illustrated -- and concentrating employment centers in high-rise buildings around the
Olympic Park. In contrast, intrusive noise from festivities is likely to cause friction with
housing development residents.
Policy recommendations for host cities based on gained and missed opportunities
The three crucial imperatives are: leverage, leverage, leverage! Many
opportunities in the wake of the Olympics have been missed because no actions were
taken to insure the sustaining of beneficial transport developments the Games had
brought to the cities. After the Games were over, cities had lost the vision, the agency
wielding temporary power, and the special coordination among transport modes. With
this loss, measures were revoked that could potentially have alleviated traffic and
significantly improved transport conditions in the city. To forestall this loss, cities should
seize the opportunities the Games present by using the Olympic momentum to coordinate
transport agencies, to give priority to public transport, and to encourage citizens to use
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transit permanently. Hoping for such change, however, is worthless without thorough
post-Games plans and guardians who defend them.
Guardians for leveraging the mega event
Guardians are the key for establishing a long-term transport agenda and keeping
the good transport practices experienced during the Games. These guardians are strong
leaders that leverage the mega event for the city's benefit - sometimes against the IOC's
wishes - penetrating different levels of governments and jurisdictions. They are
influential figures, who buy into the city's vision, stand up to it against IOC or public
resistance, and who are so situated as to be able to influence plans and projects over a
long period of time. These guardians can be leading people in a business community
(e.g., CEO's of airports) and public figures who remain prestigious over time (e.g.,
mayors or former mayors, people holding positions in the chamber of commerce, or
people who are executive directors in public transport).
Besides this major task, these guardians should secure buy-in from political
parties during the bidding stage. Contracts have to be negotiated with government
officials and signed on the basis that if temporary measures prove successful during the
mega event, politicians will support their continuation thereafter. Setting aside a budget
for these or any additional transport modifications necessary for future maintenance of
infrastructure, and for the permanent execution of operational tasks is an essential feature
in designing these contracts for the long term.
The best way for these guardians to interact is the establishment of an official
coordination agency prior to the bid that is solely responsible for planning and securing
positive Olympic legacies. This agency should continue to operate after the Games to
supervise the implementation of the sustainable legacy.
For transportation, in particular, this coordination element is vital. Crucial for
Games operations are centralized planning, communication, and coordination
empowering one authority to act across jurisdictions (ministries, departments, planning
councils, etc.). In order for transport to function like clockwork, such a coordinating
entity is fundamental and should be sustained after the mega event. For example, ORTA
could have taken over public transport coordination in Sydney, or ATHOC's transport
190
--i-'~'--L-LW---"-~-"-~i~;iiLi--l-ii7?;i
division could have functioned as a link between OASA and the private transport
providers in Athens. Yet, given the reduced scope of the transport task, the size of the
agency would have to be adjusted to the post-Games operations. All cities had the vision
to switch commuters to public transit through the Games. The high public transport usage
rates resulted from increased resources and enforcement, but most importantly from the
mindset of the riders. People in any society are willing to change their behavior and
accept new rules if they see the greater good resulting from their action. To sustain
continued high transit ridership, this Olympic vision has to be transferred into a
sustainable vision for the city.
Comprehensive planning and the long-term planning horizon
A key problem pointed out several times in this study is the short planning
horizon for transport: the widespread opinion among Olympic planners is that three years
of transport planning is sufficient. To stage the event, this might well be the case, but to
ensure sustainable and more comprehensive planning (such as using the momentum of
the Games to inaugurate an integrated ticketing system), more time is needed. Therefore,
holistic, integrated, and comprehensive planning for sustainability has to start before the
bid files are submitted to the International Olympic Committee and has to be geared
towards after-event usage.
A further reason for early transport planning is the possibility of testing several
alternatives and having great flexibility in decisions. Once the bid files are turned in and
the city is awarded the Games, the host city contract prohibits quick and easy changes to
the plans.
In the run-up to the Olympics, the rule holds: the closer the Olympic Opening
Ceremony, the greater the pressure to meet Olympic demands. With such tremendous
pressure on planning, creative alternatives guided by a vision are hard to implement.
Economic incentives, prohibitive regulations, and informative actions
Mega events should be viewed as watershed moments for implementing
operational transport measures combined with economic incentives, prohibitive
regulations, and informative actions. The incentives the Games bring regarding the
management of transit and traffic operations, as well as transport demands, are plentiful,
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and the key is to implement new transport measures at Games time with a long-term
perspective for the city's future mobility needs. The key question each Olympic transport
agency should consider is, which transport operations necessary for the Olympics can
improve metropolitan mobility permanently?
Former host cities provide varied examples. With regard to the management of
transit operations, there were High Occupancy Vehicle lanes in Atlanta, express buses in
Athens, and interregional bus lines in Sydney. Concerning management of traffic
operations, state-of-the-art traffic management centers, upgrades in incident management
systems, and citywide information and communication systems are a few examples. For
the management of transport demand, flexible working hours and fixed freight delivery
times exemplify measures that could potentially ease downtown traffic.
Summary
A successful outcome of mega events depends on good strategic planning that
minimizes the additional efforts necessary to stage a mega event. Hence, planning should
aim for the alignment of the mega event requirements with the strategic plans for city
development. The key is to identify win-win elements creatively by testing Olympic
scenarios against existing metropolitan plans. It is essential to defend and hold aloft the
identified synergies and to use the Games as catalysts for desirable change.
Future research directions and outlook
At the time of writing (2009), the world is in recession and the logical question to
think about is whether mega events will ever be the same afterwards. I believe that mega
events will continue to take place, as the benefits stemming from them - so countries and
cities still believe - are tremendous. As long as cities strive for global status, mega events
will continue to be a tool to achieve it - at least for a few weeks in the spotlight.
What is likely to change, however, is the former somewhat easy availability of
private and public funds for mega events. For example, ordinary sporting events like
baseball games have lost advertisers since the recession started. Advertising, especially
during the Olympics, contributes significantly to alleviate the costs; international
broadcasters pay for the right to broadcast the Games. On the public side, cities have
192
been burned - especially Montreal - through a sudden devaluation of money, or - like
London, scheduled to stage the Games in 2012 - through a tripling of anticipated costs
(from 2005 to 2008). In the case of a continuing world recession, cities would be likely to
be more cautious in promising public funds and private advertisers might be more
reluctant to spend large amounts of money for advertising during the Olympics. This
scenario, I argue, would make my findings even more relevant, because the
recommendations I have been presenting are aimed not only at maximizing public
benefits, but also at minimizing unnecessary costs.
Another possible scenario for how mega events could change anticipates a move
from broadcasting the Olympics on television to individual access to single sporting
competitions via the Internet. In either case, the funds raised through advertising will go
to purchasing the rights to broadcast. I do not see how this scenario would change the
way in which stadiums are built, or people travel. Nor do I believe that the change in
broadcasting significantly alters the composition of visitors attending the Games. Overall,
any change in broadcasting methods should not significantly affect cities, because only a
small portion of this money goes directly to cities.
To stimulate economic recovery, investment in public works is a frequently used
strategy. Investments related to mega events thus could be used in bad economic times as
strong and motivating catalysts to revitalize cities and their economies.
My findings on Olympic host cities are to a certain extent transferable to other
cities hosting other mega events. The impacts of the World Cup or a world exhibition
might be smaller in scale, but I believe they will show the same pattern of urban change,
because they require similar transport preparations for the peak passenger demands,
including officials, athletes, or attendees.
In this study, I focused exclusively on aligning the Olympic transport
requirements with the metropolitan transport and urban development strategy of the
individual cities. Further work is necessary that captures the true intention of my work
and my concept of "alignment". Beneficial regional development, new employment
centers, and environmental protection are likely desirable goals for future hosts.
Researchers have to understand and extract Olympic opportunities that can be leveraged
in order to realize the broader metropolitan strategy and vision.
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Using the mega event as a tool for discontinuous change requires significant
public investment. The more fundamental the change being sought, the more money will
be necessary. The benefit of using the mega event as a tool is the fixed deadline of the
Opening Ceremony, when all projects have to be completed. To ensure the Olympic
vision with a great post-Games legacy becomes reality, planning has to carefully
acknowledge the potential the Games bring for their city and leverage them to the
greatest extent possible.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Listing of Olympic Games
Year Host City Country Visiors
1896 Athens (1) Greece (1) 700000
1900 Paris (1) France (1) ?
1904 St. Louis (1) United States (1) ?
1906 Athens Greece 300000
1908 London (1) United Kingdom (1) 300000
1912 Stockholm (1) Sweden (1) 327288
1916 Berlin Germany cancelled
1920 Antwerp (1) Belgium (1) 349689
1924 Paris (2) France (2) 612000
1928 Amsterdam (1) Netherlands (1) 665600
1932 Los Angeles (1) United States(2) 2,941,057
1936 Berlin (1) Germany (1) 3769900
1940 Helsinki Finland cancelled
1944 London United Kingdom cancelled
1948 London (2) United Kingdom (2) 1247300
1952 Helsinki (1) Finland (1) 2394099
1956 Melbourne (1) + Stockholm Australia (1) +Sweden 1.341.500+136.236
1960 Rome (1) Italy (1) 1436100
1964 Tokyo (1) Japan (1) 2100000
1968 Mexico City (1) Mexico (1) 3792350
1972 Munich (1) Germany (2) 3307100
1976 Montreal (1) Canada (1) 3187200
1980 Moscow (1) Soviet Union (1) 5268200
1984 Los Angeles (2) United States (3) 5720000
1988 Seoul (1) South Korea (1) 3305950
1992 Barcelona (1) Spain (1) 3033050
1996 Atlanta (1) United States (4) 8384300
2000 Sydney (1) Australia (2) 6700000
2004 Athens (2) Greece (2) 3581000
2008 Beijing (1) China (1)
2012 London (3) United Kingdom (3)
Source:(Olympic Museum 2008a).
Appendix 2: Barcelona Olympic venues and travel routes
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Appendix 3: Atlanta Olympic venues and travel routes
Source: (AGOG 1994, p. 44)
Source: (ACOG 1994, p. 44)
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Appendix 4: Sydney Olympic venues and travel routes
Figure 1: Primary bus routes; Source: ORTA 2001, p. 28-29
Figure 2: Spectator bus routes; Source: (ORTA 1999a, p. 27)
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Appendix 5: Athens Olympic venues and travel routes
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Appendix 6: Open-ended interview questions
* interviewees not willing to be cited in this study are disclosed
* Please state your role and involvement in the transport planning for the Olympic
Games
* Was there a sustainable vision for transport? If so, what was it?
o Was that vision achieved? Why? Why not?
* What type of operational transport measures were applied during the OG?
o Which one was the most successful?
o Were any of those sustained after the Games?
* Going back, would you have done anything different? Missed opportunities?
* OCA 1997 asked the questions: "How can we make the most of the opportunities
the Games present in relation to transport" - how was that followed through?
* Do you think you moved towards transport sustainability through the Games?
o Define sustainability
o What are the sustainable transport legacies?
o Why was not integrated ticketing introduced by the time of the OG as was
originally planned?
* What role did the IOC play in the transportation planning process? Did it
influence the process?
* How was the Olympic transport strategy integrated into Sydney's transport
metropolitan strategy? Was the city plan integrated into the Olympic plans and
how did you think about legacy when you were planning for the Games?
* How did the Olympics change the transport system of your city in the long-term?
Appendix 7: Interview Sources
* interviewees not willing to be cited in this study are disclosed
* Allachin, Craig; Urban Designer and Architect working for Six Degrees PtyLtd.;
interviewed on February 2 2nd, 2008 in Sydney
* Babis, Charilos; former Head of Traffic Management, ATHOC.; interviewed on
August 31st, 2007 in Athens
* Black, John, Foundation Professor of Transport Engineering at the University of
New South Wales; interviewed on February 14th, 2008 in Sydney
* Bovy, Philippe; Transport Consultant for the International Olympic Committee
and Honorary Professor of Transport and Mobility, Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology at Lausanne; interviewed on May 2 2 nd and May 29th, 2006 in
Lausanne, Switzerland
* Brockhoff, John; Policy Manager, Metropolitan Strategy, Department of
Planning, NSW; interviewed on February 2 1st, 2008 in Sydney
* Brunet, Feran; Professor of Economics at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona;
interviewed on June 12th, 2007 in Barcelona, Spain
* Currie, Graham; Professor of Transportation Planning at Monash University;
interviewed on February 2 2nd, 2008 in Melbourne
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* Daniels, Rhonda; Manager Metropolitan Planning, Department of Planning,
NSW; interviewed on February 21st, 2008 in Sydney
* Deloukas, Konstantin; Head of Transport, Attiko Metro S.A.; interviewed on
September 3rd, 2007 in Athens
* Dobinson, Ken; Transport Planner and Advisor, SOCOG, interviewed on
February 15h, 2008 in Sydney
* Dunn, Susie; External relations, transportation planning division of ARC,
interviewed on February 17t , 2009 in Atlanta
* Frantzeskakis, loannies; Transport Planner and Advisor ATHOC.; interviewed on
August 30h, 2007 in Athens
* Grant, Juliet; Manager Transport Planning for the Department of Transportation,
NSW; interviewed on February 27 t , 2008 in Sydney
* Halkias, Managing Director Athiki Odos; Attikes Diadromes S.A.; interviewed on
August 31st, 2007 in Athens
* Hindson, Lisa, Transport and Operations Consultant for the International Olympic
Committee; interviewed on June 2 2 nd , 2006 in Lausanne, Switzerland
* Kalapoutis, Anna; Transport Manager, OASA; interviewed on September 3 rd
2007 in Athens
* Matalas, Konstantin, Chief Executive Officer of Athens publit transport authority
(OASA) ; interviewed on September 5h, 2007 in Athens
* McIntyre, Stephen; Director of Housing and Community Development,
Department of Housing NSW, interviewed on February 29t, 2008 in Sydney
* Millet I Serra, Lluis; MBAassociates and leading architect/advisor for BOCOG;
interviewed on September 14t , 2007 in Barcelona, Spain
* Pamies, Oriol, Communications officer for Transports Metropolitan de Barcelona;
interviewed on September 13h, 2007 in Barcelona, Spain
* Patrikalakis, Dr, Head of public transportation, OASA, former ATHOC member;
interviewed on September 3 rd, 2007 in Athens
* Protopsaltis, Panos, Planning S.A., Former Head of Transport Division, ATHOC;
interviewed on September 4 , 2007 in Athens
* Sala-Schnorkowski, Merce; President of the Economic and Social Council of
Catalunya former president of TMB; interviewed on September 12 , 2007 in
Barcelona, Spain
* Searle, Glen; Professor of Urban Planning at the University of Technolgy Sydney,
interviewed on February 13' h, 2008 in Sydney
* Sermpis, Dimitris V.; Traffic manager working at TMC; interviewed on August
31st, 2007 in Athens
* Stathopoulos, Professor at National Technical University of Athens; interviewed
on September 4 th, 2007 in Athens
* Villalante i Llaurad6, Manuel; Director General de Transport Terrestre.
Generalitat de Catalunya; interviewed on September 13h, 2007 in Barcelona,
Spain
* Waters, Marion; State Traffic Engineer Georgia, interviewed on February 17th
2009 in Atlanta
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